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Abstract 
 
It is widely held that the documentary mode of filmmaking is a subjective endeavor. Bill Nichols 
identifies an unspoken contract between the viewer and the filmmaker, that what is seen is to be 
believed. Often, when it comes to documentary films, viewers neglect to acknowledge how the 
filmmaker goes about in selectively interpreting “reality” for an audience. Bertolt Brecht 
believed that it is the encoder‟s responsibility to make the viewer aware of construction 
processes in a given representation. In this way a critical involvement with the material is ignited 
and consequently the viewer distances herself emotionally from the representation. Self-reflexive 
modes of filmmaking foreground the subjective nature of film by highlighting the process of 
construction. The viewer is thus prevented from suspending her disbelief, and prompted to 
decode the material actively.  These signifiers of reflexivity can be indicated by the overt 
involvement of the filmmaker and the inclusion of filmic equipment. The presence of the camera 
is often obvious in reflexive representations, and the viewer becomes acutely aware of how it 
might influence authentic behavior of the subject filmed. The viewer is therefore not always able 
to see how a subject might react in her natural environment. The camera essentially represents 
the presence of an observing other.  
The documentaries to be discussed in this thesis all investigate subjects against a backdrop of 
social and interactive media. On these online platforms individuals are faced with the presence of 
gazing others who might interact or just voyeuristically observe. Here the subject internalizes the 
gaze and acts according to how she imagines the desire of the gazing other. The various social 
networking platforms documented in these films provide the individual with an environment in 
which she can construct and re-construct an image of self until she attains what she imagines is 
considered as ideal. A flexible form of narration is thus born due to the technical features 
characteristic of such online environments. The self might always go back and adapt and further 
manage/manipulate her image of self as she feels persistently surveyed by a community of 
gazing equals. Here there exists no gazing hierarchy: everyone is visible to everyone all the time, 
making selective self-fashioning and subsequent self-documentation challenging. The film and 
computer screens in which the self sees a reflection of her constructed self becomes something of 
a mirror: when the self witnesses her own reflection in this screen/mirror, she is faced with 
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psychological processes of self-contextualizing. She must attempt to live up to that which she 
believes is desired by her societal Other. The self, forever aware of the ubiquitous gazing others 
in these environments, is always adjusting her concept of self accordingly. Her constant re-
adjustment of her mediated self in such environments serves as a form of self-documentation 
also orientated towards the imagined perception of an other. My thesis surveys the 
representational politics of the process of producing a filmic documentation of these processes of 
online self-documentation.  
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Opsomming 
 
Die dokumentêre film medium word dikwels aanskou as ŉ subjektiewe genre. Bill Nichols glo 
dat daar ŉ spesiale verhouding tussen die skepper van ŉ film en die kyker bestaan: die kyker 
aanvaar dikwels bloot die inhoud wat vir haar voorgestel en namens haar geïnterpreteer word 
sonder om die skeppingsproses daaragter te bevraagteken.Volgens Bertolt Brecht is dit die 
skepper se verantwoordelikheid om ŉ kritiese betrokkenheid by die gehoor te ontlont en 
emosionele verbintenis met die materiaal te verbreek. Die self-refleksiewe voorstellingsmodus 
maak die kyker bewus van die subjektiwe aard van film deur dat dit konstruksie prosesse 
blootstel wat op sy beurt die kyker aanmoedig om die materiaal intellektueel te aanskou. Sulke 
refleksiewe elemente kan aangedui word deur die blatante gebruik van die teenwoordige 
filmmaker en filmiese toerusting. Die soms duidelike teenwoordigheid van die kamera in self-
refleksiewe dokumentêre voorstellings skep ŉ bewussein onder die kyker dat die subjek se 
optrede voor die kamera dikwels minder outentiek is as wat dit sou wees in die subjek se 
natuurlike omgewing. Basies, dui die kamera daarop dat ŉ kykende ander bestaan.  
Die dokumentêre wat ek gaan bespreek in hierdie tesis speel almal af teen ŉ milieu van sosiale 
interaktiewe media. In sulke virtuele omgewings word die individu gekonfronteer met ander 
teenwoordige interaktiewe lidmate of selfs voyeuristiese toeskouers. Die subjek kan beïnvloed 
word in sulke omgewings deur die teenwwordigheid van ŉ ander. Sy internaliseer die blik van ŉ 
kykende ander en tree op volgens hoe sy haar voorstel die ander begeer. Die verskeie sosiale 
netwerk platvorms wat ondersoek word inhierdie dokumentêre skep ŉ omgewing vir die individu 
waar sy ŉ idee van die self kan vorm en weer hervorm. Hierdie proses kan voortgesit word totdat 
sy die beeld bereik van wat sy haar verbeel ideaal is. Die tegniese implementeeie aan sulke 
virtuele omgewings skep die potensiaal vir buigsame narratiewe prosesse. Die self is daartoe 
instaat om keer op keer haar eie geskepte beeld van die self te manipuleer en aan te pas soos wat 
sy konstant dopgehou word in ŉ omgewing waar gemeenskaplikke waarneming die norm is. In 
dié omgewing bestaan daar nie ŉ hiërargie onder die verskeie kykers nie: almal is daartoe instaat 
om na almal te kyk.Dit kompliseer selektiewe self-skepping en gevolglike self-dokumentasie 
aangesien die self voel sy word konstant dopgehou. Die rekenaar/filmiese skerm waarin die self 
haar eie refleksie gewaar dien as ŉ tipe spieël:wanneer die self haar eie refleksie gewaar in 
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hierdie skerm/spieël, word sy gekonfronteer met psigologiese prosesse van self-
konteksualisering. Die self, alewig bewus van die alomteenwoordige kykende ander in hierdie 
omgewings, moet probeer om te voldoen aan wat sy haar verbeel ideaal is volgens ŉ ander.Die 
individu se konstante aanpassing van haar virtuele self in sulke omgewings dien as self-
dokumentasie wat gerig is op die voorgestelde persepsie van ŉ ander. My tesis aanskou die 
filmiese voorstelling van verskeie dokumentêre wat handel oor aanlyn self-dokumentasie. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores the self-reflexive methods of documenting the self as represented by the 
various documentary films, Four Eyed Monsters (2005), We Live in Public (2009) and Catfish 
(2010). I specifically investigate how the self
1
 as authoring agent of her own mediated image 
employs methods which contribute to the construction of self-representations. These films 
represent their subjects against a backdrop of social and interactive online environments. It is in 
this light that I explore how the self perceives of herself in relation to the (sometimes virtual) 
Other
2
 and manages her mediated impression accordingly. Documenting on subjects who attempt 
to document the self online these filmmakers borrow from various documentary methods often 
resulting in hybrid forms of representation. While self-reflexive representational methods are 
dominant there is often an overlap between different modes: elements reminiscent of 
observational and participatory
3
 modes of representation are evident. I look at how the chosen 
modes of documentary representations often mirror the process of subjects‟ self-documentation 
online as seen in the content of the films.By investigating the formal elements of the films in 
                                                          
1
The concept of ‘the self’ is used throughout this thesis as it underlines the construction processes that enable the 
individual to create her imagined and desired idea of herself into being. I often also refer to the “online self” or the 
“mediated self” – this refers to how the individual constructs and represents the impression of herself on any 
mediated platform. 
2
“Other” is used throughout this thesis in different ways. In chapter one I explain Jaques Lacan’s theories on the 
mirror gazing self in which this term is further explored. In this thesis “the other “or “an other” (with a lowercase-
o) refers to the opposite of the self. I use the term to refer to the public: an individual’s online performance, for 
example, is directed at an other (the public who perceives the performance). I also refer to the self as “other” – 
when the self recognizes her image in the mirror she sees herself as a separate other. Other with a capital-O refers 
to Lacan’s “Big Other”. The Big Other speaks to the individual’s imaginary ideas of an anonymous authoritative 
power. It is through the imagined eyes of this Other that the individual often conducts a performance of the self in 
accordance with how she imagines the Other might desire to perceive her.   
 
3
 Bill Nichols refers to the observational and participatory modes of representation in order to clarify the classic 
documentary film movements, cinema vérité and direct cinema – two similar film methods which both champion 
realism (Nichols 2001:109-124). These movements are often confused with one another due to their stylistic 
similarity that maintain long takes and hand-held camera footage which ensure an “authentic” look. Direct cinema 
(which Nichols refers to as the observational mode) evolved in America during the 1960’s and dictated that the 
story unfolds organically as the camera rolled. The documentarian was an objective and passive observer as 
opposed to a director who would participate - a significant aspect that sets the genre apart from the European 
cinema vérité movement (participatory mode) (Nichols 1991:165-167). Cinema vérité, which developed during the 
same era, required natural dialogue and authenticity of action. But unlike the direct cinema, this technique 
required that the filmmaker actively participates in the film as a subjective observer, combining observational and 
participatory filming. Basically, there is an awareness of the present filmmaker and her camera. 
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question, I examine the relationship between documentary film conventions and the conventions 
of online self-documentation.  
Throughout cinematic history filmmakers like Michael Powell (Peeping Tom 1960) and 
Michelangelo Antonioni (Blow-Up 1966) enjoyed making use of such metaphors which criticize 
the constructed nature of cinema both in its content and in its form – making a film about 
someone who is making a film is rather obviously a critique on the cinema as a construct. Also 
many self-reflexive documentary films such as, The Thin Blue Line (1988), The Act of Killing 
(2012) and The Man with a Movie Camera (1929) have followed suit, allowing for film-making 
processes to be illuminated in an attempt to acknowledge the filmmaker‟s subjectivity and allow 
the viewer a position of active and critical decoding. In approaching a discussion on the 
documentation of the self on various internet platforms, as represented by an often self-reflexive 
documentary mode, it is important to acknowledge the subjective influence the filmmaker has in 
such a scenario. 
Typical representational conventions characteristic to mainstream modes of filmmaking intend to 
allow the viewer to suspend her disbelief, which automatically leads to a less active assessment 
and critical engagement of the material seen, according to Liani Maasdorp (2011:208). This in 
turn can lead to the basic assumption that “what they see is „true‟”, according to Bill Nichols 
(2001:125). A self-reflexive process of documentation employs an opposite philosophy. This 
leads to what Paul Ward refers to as the central debate concerned with the relationship between 
“reality and artifice” (2012:6). The self-reflexive filmmaker actively seeks to explicate the 
editing and filming processes for the viewer. This can be done through the filmmaker‟s 
acknowledgement of her presence through text, through visibility and through editing (Maasdorp 
2012:33). These self-reflexive practices are reminiscent of Brechtian defamiliarization 
techniques, which allow the audience a distanced position of critical observation.  
Many theorists believe that objectivity is an idealistic trait to strive for when attempting to 
represent a narrative by use of the documentary format (Katz & Katz 1988; Maasdorp 2011; 
Nichols 1991 & 2001; Ruby 1988). Katz and Katz assert: “the camera, not the viewer, 
determines what we see” and the filmmaker is the one who is responsible as they “determine not 
only what we will focus upon, but the angle, depth, and sharpness of focus, camera movement, 
and/or zooms” (1988:199). Perhaps the most fitting definition of the documentary mode would 
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be John Grierson‟s seminal statement that ultimately the documentary is “a creative treatment of 
actuality” (1966:6-8). The word “treatment” is often interchanged with “dramatization”, which 
mirrors the documentarian‟s “desire and willingness to use actuality material to create a dramatic 
narrative”, argues Winston (2008:107). Through this statement we see the filmmaker positioned 
as the one who attempts to represent actuality through means of subjective expression. Maasdorp 
agrees that subjectivity is absolutely inherent to the film-making process (2011:208). While self-
reflexive methods acknowledge the filmmaker as authoring agent, these strategies also draw 
attention to the often complex relationship between the filmmaker and her subject.  
In the three films under discussion the subject documented becomes involved (to varying 
degrees) in the filmmaking process, thus exercising agency in how she is to be documented and 
represented. In Four Eyed Monsters (2005), filmmakers Arin Crumley and Susan Buice embark 
on a self-reflexive journey by re-telling the personal tale of their courtship through the filmic 
mode of documentation. Crumley and Buice, play “themselves” in this self-reflexive auto-
documentary. Ondi Timoner, director of the documentary film We Live in Public (2009), chooses 
a “straightforward” or “un-obtrusive” mode of representation with subtle hints of self-reflexivity 
in her documentation of the social experiments of Internet pioneer, Josh Harris. Harris is 
documented as he produces a personal webcam surveillance experiment. His intention with this 
experiment is to document and archive the self via socially interactive online media. Catfish 
(2010), which documents the virtual relationship between two Facebook acquaintances, has its 
subject, Yaniv Schulman, self-reflexively becoming part of the construction of the documentary 
as he eventually steps into the role of investigative documentarian.  
The producers of these films are not simply “filmmakers” or “documentarians”. Instead, the 
compound noun “subject-filmmaker” more accurately reflects their position, since, to varying 
degrees, they occupy both roles in the production processes of the films under discussion. In 
assessing the dynamic of such a relationship in the construction process of a documentary film, 
certain questions come to mind as to the “authenticity” of the representation. Essentially the 
subject, who is also the producer, selects how the self will be represented and therefore placing 
the question of authenticity and subjectivity as central to this discussion.  
It is important to understand that the online social networking platforms (SNSs) in which these 
subjects manage an impression of the self can serve as a mirror through which the individual can 
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recognize a constructed image of the ideal self. The act of looking at the self in a mirror is one-
directional: the self reflexively gazes towards a reflection of herself that stares back at the 
material body situated in front of this mirror. Staring at my SNS profile picture or profile page
4
 
framed by the computer screen, I find a likeness to that of the mirror-gazing self. Sherry Turkle 
was the first to recognize the similarity between the socially networked self as framed by the 
computer screen and the mirror-gazing self, calling it the “mirror of the screen” (1999:643). The 
notion of the mirror raises a further point: platforms that enable the individual to gaze at the self 
in a self-reflexive manner provide the individual with an opportunity to embark on psychological 
processes of “selfing” or self-narration. In other words, these platforms facilitate the act of 
constructing a self and construing meaning through the re-cognition of the reflection of the self 
in the mirror or screen (Ochs & Capps 1996; Robertson 2007; Roberts 2011).  
With the advent of social media and significant technical features, these “looking individuals” 
are provided with the opportunity to be actively involved in the representation of their image, 
representing and re-presenting the image of self as often and as excessively as they desire with 
the use of editing devices. When preparing a certain desired identity in front of the mirror, the 
individual might rely on make-up and styling choices for a particular effect. Online, this type of 
identity construction is sustained by manipulating image and text. In this thesis I also explore 
how in an online social milieu the self is no longer the sole observer faced with her own image. 
Rather, a participatory society is born where observers are multiple and gazing is mutual: all 
participating individuals simultaneously produce and consume content produced by the self and 
others that resultantly have an effect on how the self performs her online identity. 
For me, it is exciting to note that the notion of the subject-filmmaker and the mirror-gazing self 
has relevance in terms of an arising global culture of individuals who have agency in how the 
image of the self is represented to the world. Social online theorist, Clay Shirky, insists that there 
currently exists a global culture that no longer purely consumes online material (2010:11). 
Rather, individuals are acting as “prosumers” of their own material, according to Nathan 
Jurgenson (2010:377). This term implies that the self acts as both producer and consumer of her 
                                                          
4
Opening an account on a majority of SNSs requires that the user create a visible profile in which basic (true) 
information about the user is stated: name, gender, date of birth, country, home town, email address, job 
description, religious views, personal interests and of course a profile picture (boyd &Hargittai 2010). 
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own content (and naturally of content shared by others online).Since its inception in 2004 the 
SNS, Facebook, has grown exponentially, inspiring an eruption within the virtual realm of social 
interaction. Resultantly, an array of social networking platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, 
Snap-Chat, You-Tube and Pinterst expanded swiftly. These networking platforms all seem to 
serve the self‟s seemingly insatiable desire to share and gaze at their constructed, ideal image of 
the self, and to be gazed at by a collective audience. Facebook is said to be the most popular SNS 
worldwide, boasting with over 1,440,000,000active monthly users, 968 million of which go 
online every single day. In a South African context alone, Facebook counts more than 11.8-
millionactive users. We are surrounded by mirrors in the form of screens: Ipads, cellphone 
screens, computer screens – all of which provide us with immediate access to social media. We 
are constantly forced through social media to gaze at the mediated self in the mirror of the 
screen. Amid this eruption of social interactive media that advocates complex surveillance 
mechanics, filmmakers such as Susan Buice and Arin Crumley, Ondi Timoner and finally Henry 
Joost and Yaniv and Ariel Schulman, are able to recognize this strange participatory community 
and comment on it in their own self-reflexive ways, continuing the debate on mirror gazing 
selves. The films I selected occupy different positions on the documentary spectrum and they 
therefore constitute a good selection from which to draw conclusions about self-representation in 
documentary films. 
Chapter one in this thesis focuses on a theoretical framework whereby to elucidate complex 
notions of gazing-hierarchies, self-narration and subsequent self-documentation via social 
mediation online as documented by (sometimes) subject-filmmakers with the use of various 
documentary modes of representation. Drawing on Bill Nichols‟s theory on documentary modes, 
I specifically investigate self-reflexivity as a filmic mode of representation that foregrounds 
subjective construction processes. I then focus on Jacques Lacan‟s concept of the mirror-gazing 
self and the Big Other as these theories provide me with a framework to better understand 
participative gazing societies within social media platforms where selves are made visible to 
look at while looking (at the visible image of the self and at images made visible of others by 
others). Considering then that these mutual gazing societies are often at the centre of the self-
reflexive (sometimes) auto-documentaries I will discuss, another layer is added: subject-
filmmakers now not only participate in complex gazing societies online, but they are faced with 
portraying the double role of both producer and consumer of their own constructed filmic image 
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of self. Finally, I examine gazing hierarchies as framed by panoptic and omnioptic (mutual) 
surveillance models in order to gain a better understanding of how the visibility of the self 
functions in social online environments where the omnipresent other is always watching. Here, I 
investigate panoptic surveillance structures and consider how these models have evolved into 
mutual surveillance escapades online, which force the online user to construct and manage a 
desired impression of the self in collaboration with imagined others. 
Chapter two considers the hybrid auto-documentary Four Eyed Monsters (2005) in which 
subject-filmmakers, Arin Crumley (a videographer) and Susan Buice (an art school graduate) 
employ a mixture of re-enactments, real footage and animation in order to re-tell a personal 
history. The couple meet on an online dating site, engage in a tumultuous relationship and decide 
to make a film about their experience. Calling upon memory, the couple utilizes various modes 
of representation that blend together autobiographical documentary, actual footage and re-staged 
drama in order to produce a hybrid genre of filmmaking that re-tells their story. There does not 
seem to be a consensus on how to classify this film on movie sites such as IMDB, 
Rottentomatoes and Metacritic. It is variously called Comedy/Drama/Fantasy, Drama/Art-house 
and Fantasy/Comedy/Romance. The nature of the film is rather experimental and therefore the 
classifying process is complex: elements of all the above mentioned genres are certainly 
recognizable in the film but no one movie site seems to acknowledge the fact that the filmmakers 
clearly address to the viewer their intention of re-telling a personal narrative through audio-
visual documentation. Not to mention the obviously back-stage footage incorporated in the film 
which signify a type of vérité filmmaking. True to the vérité form, the filmmakers self-
reflexively acknowledge their own presence as authoring agents while emulating the aesthetic 
style of this 1960‟s representational methods, complete with grainy, spontaneously captured 
footage. On the other hand, the blatantly re-staged scenes evoke a dramatic element which means 
that the film might be better suited to the drama category. I would like to acknowledge this 
blatant element of documentation involved as part of the film‟s representation as well as 
acknowledge its dramatic effects. From here on I will refer to this hybrid genre as a re-enacted 
autobiographical docu-drama. As the couple‟s romance evolves it becomes clear that they both 
yearn to be creatively expressive. They therefore decide to approach the relationship as if it were 
an art project. Avoiding verbal communication, they interact via written text, emails and silent 
video footage that they take of each other. When the they are not in each other‟s physical 
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presence, they will often communicate via video-diary in which they are able to express 
themselves verbally. As soon as they are in each other‟s immediate environments, all talking 
ceases and interaction is limited to filming each other or communicating via written text. In other 
words, their personal interaction is always mediated. To re-emphasize: calling this film a 
documentary brings about interesting questions as to what exactly is constituted as a 
documentary film, seeing as these filmmakers explore various forms of representation which 
oscillate between modes of fiction and non-fiction. While Crumley and Buice attempt to 
represent a personal historical tale, the viewer is constantly reminded of their re-interpretation of 
their own story via creative re-enactments and self-reflexive methods. 
In chapter three I will discuss the 2009 documentary We Live in Public by Ondi Timoner, which 
records the life of Josh Harris, internet pioneer of the 1990‟s. He conceives of two controversial 
social experiments, which he films and often streams live over the internet with the opportunity 
for interactive commentary from viewers. The experiments investigate what happens to human 
behaviour and identity as tested under extreme circumstances in which surveillance media and 
technology serve as a dominant and omnipresent force, influencing the regular activities of the 
human being as she is always feeling watched. The first experiment called, “Quiet: We Live in 
Public”, is Harris‟ attempt at creating a physical representation of what he imagines the internet 
will look like in a few years. Note that this experiment took place in 1999. In this experiment a 
group of people go to live in an underground “bunker” for 30 days which comes to resemble a 
human terrarium. The bunker consists of tiny capsule hotels or “pod” hotels, resembling 
concentration camps with bunk beds stacked on each other. Each “pod” is equipped with live 
video cameras and television screens which allow occupants to monitor every other pod. At any 
given time, they are able to change the “channel” to observe the real-time action taking place in 
any pod of their choice. They can even tune in on the channel of themselves and observe how 
they are seen by others through the eyes of the camera. When they are not in a pod being 
captured by a webcam, they are being followed around by camera operators. The footage taken 
by these cameras is also available for viewing on the television sets in the pods. Note that 
although Harris himself was documenting all the various actions of the citizens of “Quiet: We 
Live in Public”, the filmmaker Ondi Timoner was also present, capturing footage for the 
documentary on Harris now known as We Live in Public (2009). For the second social 
experiment, Harris decides to step in front of the camera and initiates an experiment where he is 
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both pseudo-documentarian and the subject of the surveillance experiment. The name of the 
second experiment, “We Live in Public”, not to be confused with Timoner‟s documentary of the 
same name, comes to represent two people who do as the title suggests: they live in public. 
Harris and his girlfriend, Tanya Corrin, place several webcams and microphones all over their 
loft apartment in an attempt to film their everyday mundane activities and stream it live over the 
internet with the opportunity for viewers to interact via text. As viewers follow the couple in this 
Big Brother-like
5
 endeavour it becomes apparent that the roles of the interactive members on the 
site, along with the many electronic eyes of the various cameras that follow the couple around, 
represent a collective audience. These ever present eyes have a crucial influence on the couple‟s 
supposedly authentic performance of their “selves”.  
Formally, Timoner engages the viewer on a self-reflexive level: she often signals her position as 
authoring agent which thematically demonstrates how Harris himself comes to portray the role of 
pseudo-documentarian in his self-reflexive representation of his (mediated) self. Harris‟ grainy 
surveillance footage incorporated throughout the film stylistically straddles the divide between 
fly-on-the-wall documentary and constructed performance. It is in this grain that Timoner 
mirrors the feel of the surveillance footage with grainy, observational images. Stylistically there 
is a constant oscillation between these observational images and expository modes of 
representation. As this thesis is concerned with the documentary film representation of various 
forms of self-documentation online, I will mainly be focussing on the second experiment, “We 
Live in Public”, as it is concerned with online activity. However, I will be referring to “Quiet: 
We Live in Public” (from now on referred to as “Quiet”), throughout as it informs and inspires 
the actions of the second experiment, “We Live in Public”. In this chapter I explain that virtual 
others can serve as an audience to an individual‟s constructed self-presentation online and 
influence the authenticity of an individual‟s behaviour, as she constantly feels observed. Harris 
                                                          
5
Big Brother is a reality television game show popularised in the 1990’s and loosely based on George Orwell’s 1984 
(Couldry 2002:283-284) where the leader, Big Brother, rules a society by keeping them under severe surveillance. 
The game show functions on the basis that the contestants, usually referred to as “housemates”, live together in a 
large house rigged with ubiquitous cameras. During the period they spend in the house they are completely cut off 
from the outside world, only monitored by surveillance cameras. In order to win the final cash prize, the 
contestants must survive weekly evictions until only one houseguest is left. 
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and his girlfriend literally inhabit a constructed borderland
6
 in which the online and offline are 
fused together, and private and public boundaries are crossed. In this chapter I will also be 
focussing on gazing hierarchies as theorised by Foucault‟s panopticon and Jurgenson‟s 
omniopticon, analysing how Harris‟ seemingly liberating act of visibility, which defies 
conventional laws of privacy, does not necessarily place him in a democratic gazing scenario. On 
the contrary, using Lacan‟s concept of the Big Other, I argue that Harris consciously encages 
himself within a virtual box, where he is forever dependent on the gaze of the Big Other in order 
to survive. 
In chapter four I discuss the 2010 documentary film, Catfish. This film documents the online 
relationship between subject, Yaniv Schulman
7
  and his online romantic interest, Megan Faccio. 
Throughout their virtual relationship, Yaniv Schulman, a New York photographer, increasingly 
befriends members of Faccio‟s family via the SNS, Facebook, including her very attractive 
mother, Angela Wesselman-Pierce. Not to mention an extensive connection of acquaintances 
that he meets via his online friendships with what he calls the “Facebook Family”. As the virtual 
relationship between the online couple evolves, filmmakers, Ariel Schulman and Henry Joost 
continue to document their blossoming courtship. Over the course of eight months the couple 
share intimate correspondence via Facebook in the form of photographs and messages. The 
beautiful Faccio leaves a remarkable impression on Yaniv Schulman, even recording and mailing 
                                                          
6
Jenny Sundén introduces the term “borderland” – a concept that highlights the tension between the material and 
the virtual (2003:3-4). Kelly Ladd, who uses Sundén’s term to demonstrate how SNSs function as borderlands, 
explains that the idea of a border implies the presence of a physical barrier: the line that separates two spaces. To 
distinguish between what is material and what is virtual, is to create an imaginary map, for example, which helps 
us differentiate between online behaviour as opposed to more “real”, offline behaviour (Ladd 2009:11). A 
borderland exists between online and offline. Many scholars have attempted to define this territory, recognizing 
that there is a “land” where the material and the virtual meet, influencing online life. Beth Coleman refers to “X-
Reality” – the reality that exists in between the material and the virtual (2011:8-11). Zhao et al. refer to a 
“nonymous space”, implying the opposite of “anonymous” (2008:1818). Nonymous social networking spaces 
provide the opportunity for virtual online interaction between users who are already connected offline. Because of 
the offline-based online relation between users the assumption exists that in a nonymous space the individual will 
not be able to make exaggerated identity claims due to the offline familiarity between users (Zhao et 
al.2008:1818). For Anders Albrechtslund (2008: sp) the term “mixed world” suffices to underscore the relation 
between online and offline (2008:sp). Similarly, Hille Koskela, who investigates personal online webcam 
surveillance, asserts that the mediated online self exists in a space “suspended between the real and the virtual” 
(2004:200).  
7
Throughout this thesis I refer to theorists, filmmakers and their subjects by their surname. Subject of the film 
Catfish (2005), Yaniv Schulman, is related to the filmmaker of the same film, Ariel Schulman. To avoid confusion 
throughout this discussion I will be referring to the filmmaker by his surname, Schulman, and to the subject by his 
full name, Yaniv Schulman. 
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him songs at request which she claims to be singing herself. Yaniv Schulman soon discovers that 
this is all pretence as he clearly recognises the songs are covers. This discovery ignites suspicion 
in Yaniv Schulman and the filmmakers initiate an investigative journey into the many mediated 
claims from Wesselman-Pierce and Faccio. The film crew finally pay the Facebook Family a 
visit in their home town, Ishpeming, Michigan. Soon it is revealed that the entire eight month 
virtual correspondence was a hoax: an elaborate fantasy performed by the mother, Wesselman-
Pierce, who appears to be the exact opposite of what she had claimed to be on her Facebook 
profile page
8
. While Wesselman-Pierce‟s Facebook profile page brags with an image of a 
strikingly attractive woman, the filmmakers now discover an unremarkable looking 40 year old 
housewife who is fully responsible for the care of her husband‟s two cognitively impaired sons 
from a previous marriage. What is more, it is discovered that Wesselman-Pierce pretended to be 
the various members of the online “Facebook Family”, having created profile pages for each of 
them separately. Yaniv Schulman‟s romantic involvement with “Megan Faccio” was maintained 
online by the Wesselman-Pierce, who looks nothing like the girl from the pictures on “Faccio‟s”9 
alleged Facebook Profile page. The film has a striking opening scene in which the filmmakers 
place the mode of self-reflexivity as central to the representation of the film. Shots are often 
grainy and have a unsteady quality to it and the presence of the filmmakers is quite pertinent, 
resulting in a style reminiscent of the participatory or vérité mode of filmmaking. Throughout the 
film Schulman and Joost thematically mirror the notion of constructing a mediated representation 
of the self by paying close attention to Yaniv Schulman‟s personal self-reflexive online 
impression management. They do this by constantly signalling to the viewer their own presence 
as authoring agents. While the film often makes use of straightforward montage sequences, the 
visual quality of the film becomes increasingly “hand-held”, especially in the final act of the film 
when Yaniv Schulman becomes a fellow filmmaker. The filmmakers perhaps make this stylistic 
choice in order to signal an urgency with which they want to recover the truth, emphasizing the 
                                                          
8
Opening an account on a majority of SNSs requires that the user create a visible profile in which basic (true) 
information about the user is stated: name, gender, date of birth, country, home town, email address, job 
description, religious views, personal interests and of course a profile picture (boyd &Hargittai 2010). 
 
9
The architecture of the social networking environment in which most of Wesselman-Pierce and Yaniv Schulman’s 
correspondence takes place allows its users to perform multiple virtual roles at once while constructing an online 
narrative of the (perhaps desired) self. While Yaniv Schulman thought he was talking to Megan Faccio, he was in 
fact talking to Wesselman-Pierce. From here on I will therefore be referring to “Faccio” with inverted commas to 
indicate that she was not real in the sense Yaniv Schulman imagined her to be. 
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investigative quality the film often tends to produce.  Although Yaniv Schulman and “Faccio‟s” 
communication extended beyond the bounds of Facebook and included text messages, phone 
calls, emails and even at one point a postcard, I will be focussing on the couple‟s virtual 
correspondence via Facebook as this thesis is concerned with the mediated narration and 
documentation of the self on social networking platforms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical foil for the self-reflexive processes of documenting the 
self through various mediated forms visible in the films Four Eyed Monsters (2005), We Live in 
Public (2009) and Catfish (2010). I investigate self-reflexive documentary methods and look at 
how these methods aid the filmmakers in commenting on the self-reflexive construction of the 
online self. I also explore Jaques Lacan‟s theories on the mirror-gazing self and the Big Other, in 
an attempt to demonstrate how the subjects in the films rarely self-document in isolation but 
rather always in accordance with what they imagine their public desires. Finally I examine 
various gazing hierarchies significant to online spaces as theorized by Hille Koskela and Nathan 
Jurgenson. This helps me to ask whether the subject-filmmaker who bears the ultimate gaze is 
able to document material authentically and without bias.  
 
1.1: SELF-REFLEXIVITY 
 
The self-reflexive mode of representation, characteristic of some documentary formats, is a 
filmmaking strategy chosen by filmmakers to foreground the very presence of the filmmaker, 
and the process behind the making of the film. The self-reflexive mode emphasises the film's 
subjective influence, thus challenging the viewer to actively participate in a critical decoding of 
the content documented. Maasdorp asserts that mainstream modes of filmmaking conventionally 
and purposefully employ continuity editing in such a way as to render it “invisible” to the 
viewer, and therefore resulting in a less active critical decoding of the text (2011:208-209). Film 
academic, Bill Nichols, proclaims in his book Introduction to Documentary, that self-reflexive 
documentaries, on the other hand, might be seen as something rather Brechtian
10
, in that it can 
                                                          
10
BertoltBrecht, a theatre practitioner and scholar, articulated that a theatre event could be structured in such a way 
to create an awareness of its construction processes for the audience, rather than to allow for an “uncritical 
emotional engagement” and “identification” with the content (Maasdorp 2011:209). Some film scholars believe that 
this notion of alienation or Verfremdung could effectively be applied to self-reflexive documentary modes of 
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alienate its viewers from the content and remind us of the format used to present the content 
(2001:128). Typically, a mainstream documentary can give the impression that it is showing 
reality when actually the filmmakers are constructing the way in which this apparent reality is 
being shown to its viewer (Nichols125-128). Mainstream documentarians often opt for 
continuity editing in order to make editing invisible and “facilitate unimpeded transfer of story 
and emotion from the text to the audience” (Maasdorp 2011:217). Nichols argues that, by 
contrast, self-reflexive documentaries “ask us to see documentary for what it is: a construct or 
representation” (2001:125). Referring to a theatre context, Brecht‟s “elements of unnaturalness” 
is a strategy employed whereby to signal to the viewer the formal elements involved in the 
creation of a product (Maasdorp 2011:217). Applying Brecht‟s principle to a filmic context, 
“conspicuous” editing methods, for example, might create an awareness of the construction of 
the film, argues Maasdorp (2011:217). An “unobtrusive” or “observational” mode of 
representation, mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, that “shows what happens in front of 
the cameras without overt intervention” could result in the viewer being vulnerable to the “bias” 
of the filmmaker (Nichols 2001:109). A self-reflexive film, in turn, will typically employ 
noticeable devices to remind the viewers that they are watching a film, a representation and 
construction of the filmmaker‟s subjective take on the specific content. The self-reflexive 
filmmaker therefore does not merely “show” the chosen events filmed but reveals how it is 
filmed through text, dialogue, editing and visibility, thus encouraging intellectual engagement 
with the film form.  
 
Jay Ruby, following Johannes Fabian, argues that self-reflexive documentaries expose to the 
viewer the process of producing a product: in a reflexive non-fiction film we recognize the 
involvement of the producer and elements are utilized which draw the viewer‟s attention to the 
construction process (1988:35). Of course, the viewer also enjoys the final product. Typically, 
other documentary modes will exclude self-reflexive signals, only leaving the viewer with the 
product (Ruby 1988:35). Often such a film will seamlessly combine visuals and sound in a 
flowing and unobtrusive way. This type of continuity editing aspires to suspend disbelief and has 
the ability to engage an audience on an emotional level (Maasdorp 2011:208). Nichols maintains 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
filmmaking as it encourages the viewer to engage intellectually with the material and subsequently maintain a 
critical distance (Austin & Jong 2008:163; Maasdorp 2011:208-209). 
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that commonly the documentary relies on the viewer's “neglect of his or her actual situation [...] 
interpreting a film, in favour of imaginary access to the events shown [...] as if it is only these 
events that require interpretation, not the film” (2001:125). Nichols concludes that often we 
assume that what is shown to us is the truth and forget that what we see has selectively been 
chosen for us to see (2001:125).  
Self-reflexive methods can be signalled firstly, through text: the filmmaker can acknowledge her 
presence by often addressing the film‟s own creative conception. In chapter four I discuss the 
film, Catfish (2010). This film opens with a scene in which the subject of the documentary and 
the filmmaker engage in a conversation on film ethics, clearly foregrounding the filmmaking 
process. In this way the filmmaker verbally draws the viewer‟s attention towards formal 
elements of the film. Secondly, visibility aims at allowing the viewer to see “behind the scenes”, 
allowing her to witness technical processes and devices present in the documentation of 
something. Here the director will often be seen in front of the camera, sometimes talking to the 
subjects (although this is not an absolute requirement), perhaps addressing the viewers. 
Occasionally camera operators are seen or even filmed filming their subjects. Perhaps the earliest 
example of this kind of self-reflexivity is Dziga Vertov‟s seminal The Man with a Movie Camera 
(1929) in which the cameraman is seen filming his subjects, as the obvious self-reflexivity of the 
title predicts (Nichols 2001:126). Paul Rotha, a British documentary filmmaker who partook in 
the construction process of the film, amusingly remembers this process as “one camera 
photographing another camera photographing another camera” (Winston 2008:168). Such 
reflexivity is also apparent in We Live in Public (2009), a documentary I will be discussing in 
chapter three. In this film, the documentarian documents her subject as he in turn documents 
himself via the use of various media. Thirdly, by drawing attention to editing practises, 
filmmakers can prompt the viewer to critically assess the representation with which they are 
presented. For example, by juxtaposing two scenes, Vertov demonstrates what a specific scene 
(containing a camera operator who is filming his subjects) looks like in the editing room, where 
the same scene is shown being assembled from strips of film (Nichols 2001:126-127). The 
subject-filmmakers of Four Eyed Monsters (2005) regularly employ similar editing strategies, 
drawing the viewer's focus to the formal elements used to construct the film. Here we already 
start seeing the filmmaker‟s creative and subjective impact: the filmmaker chooses how to 
assemble material for “meaningful impact” (Nichols 2001:127). According to Nichols, such self-
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reflexive methods deconstruct the “impression of unimpeded access to reality” and place the 
viewer in a position where she can “reflect on the process by which this impression is itself 
constructed through editing” (2001:127).  
 
The filmmakers all incorporate (to varying degrees) self-reflexive methods which lay bare this 
construction process. Their often blatant involvement not only as authoring agents but as subjects 
of the representation places the notion of subjectivity as key to understanding the subject-
filmmaker relationship in the films under discussion. If a filmmaker is to engage in the filmic 
documentation of a personal narrative, then it is difficult to divide the subject from her own 
subjectivity in the construction process of the given representation. But, Jay Ruby warns that one 
must be careful of confusing various terms often associated with reflexivity formats, such as 
“autobiography”, “self-reference” or “self-consciousness” (1988:35). As I demonstrate 
throughout, these elements often do appear in a self-reflexive work. However, a film that is 
autobiographical, self-referential or self-conscious is not necessarily self-reflexive: to comment 
on film as construct, the filmmaker must consciously do so. One of the main focuses of this 
discussion is the fact that in all three films, the subject at some stage and in some or other form 
becomes the filmmaker of her own narrative. One may therefore find these features functioning 
in various ways, and a self-reflexive narrative does not have to have these elements as part of its 
construction.  
An autobiographical film is typically defined by its subject matter, which is usually focussed on 
the filmmaker‟s life, according to Carolyn Anderson (Anderson 2006:67-68). The 1986 film, 
Portrait Werner Herzog, directed by Werner Herzog himself, is an example of an auto-
documentary. In this film, Herzog is the director as well as the subject who, among other things, 
investigates the processes of making films in an utterly obvious, self-reflexive way, often 
proclaiming via dialogue the hardships of producing a film. Jay Ruby stresses that in an 
autobiographical work, even though the producer is “at the centre of the work” she is not 
necessarily automatically reflexive (1988:35). Naturally, in an autobiographical work, the 
producer, who is the self, is “self aware” but as Ruby proclaims, in order to be reflexive, one has 
to be “sufficiently self-aware” (1988:35-36). The filmmaker must know precisely which “aspects 
of self are necessary to reveal” so that the audience might comprehend not only the “process 
employed” but also the “resultant product” (Ruby 1988:35). The viewer must know that these 
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processes employed are “purposeful, intentional, and not merely narcissistic or accidentally 
revealing” (Ruby 1988:35-36).   
Self-reference, on the other hand, is not autobiographical or reflexive. It is rather “the allegorical 
or metaphorical use of self” (Ruby 1988:35-36). In a self-referential representation aspects of the 
self are used symbolically. In a way, it can be argued that all filmmakers are self-referential, 
drawing on personal experiences to create their products (Ruby 1988:36-38). Four Eyed 
Monsters (2005), which I will discuss in chapter two, makes use of self-referential techniques. 
However, although the filmmakers extract from their own personal narrative in order to tell their 
story, the film is not only purely referential and should not be confused with self-reflexivity 
either. Rather, this film employs both methods in various forms to re-present the narrative. Being 
“self-conscious in terms of being reflective” is not necessarily being self-reflexive either – only 
if the producer were to intentionally make her own “self-consciousness popular to the audience” 
could the film be considered self-reflexive, according to Ruby (1988:35-37). To re-emphasize: a 
work has to adequately indicate that the producer‟s intention is for his film to be regarded as 
reflexive, otherwise “the audience will be uncertain as to whether they are reading into the 
product more or other than what was meant” (Ruby 1988:35-37).  
 
1.2: NARRATION OF THE SELF 
 
Psychoanalyst Jaques Lacan introduced the concept of the “Mirror Phase”, to describe the 
process by which an infant recognizes herself as separate from her reflection in the mirror – that 
is, to understand her reflection as a separate other. At this moment, the individual enters into 
what Lacan refers to as the “Symbolic Order” (Dashtipour 2009:322; Fink 2004:117). It is within 
the Symbolic Order that we make use of social tools such as language, learned symbols, codes 
and cues which assist us in the narration process of “who we are”, to create, define and express 
our identities or imagined ideal selves (Lacan 1977; Miller 1988). Considering the content of the 
films I am currently discussing, as well as the form through which they are represented to the 
viewer, the idea of narration serves as a forum where these symbolic tools like discursive and 
visual text can be used in a coherent manner to communicate the story of the self. Elinor Ochs 
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and Lisa Capps believe that we are always in the process of narrating ourselves: we tell stories 
about ourselves to ourselves and others, in an attempt to make sense of past and present events 
and to plan future ones, to situate ourselves within specific contexts and to make sense of 
ourselves as situated within those contexts (1996:20-23).  And we do this through the use of 
tools that belong to what Lacan dubs the Symbolic (Lacan 1977; Miller 1988). But it must be 
remembered that symbols are constructed, mediated ways of getting a “certain idea about an 
event or self” across, and therefore the narration is itself a construct and often selective 
(Dashtipour 2009:323).  
The concept of narration is also more than just the process of utilizing the tools of the Symbolic 
Order in order to express and “define” ourselves. For Ochs and Capps, narration gives the self 
the opportunity to “create continuity between past, present and imagined worlds” and this can be 
done through the use of various techniques or modes of representation (1996:19). Consequently, 
there is a sense that the process of narration is a necessary component that individuals depend 
upon in order to produce not only the meaning and definition of self, but also to essentially 
produce proof of the existence of that self. Textual or visual narration in the form of 
photographs, home videos, diaries, letters or memoirs are all methods employed by the 
individual through which she can contextualise her experiences and gain perspective on how 
those experiences have shaped her into a specific identity (Ochs & Capps 1996:19-21). 
Essentially, narration serves as a means whereby we can say: “I was here”. Personal narratives 
are thus naturally subjective, as they are “embodiments of one or more points of view”, instead 
of “objective, omniscient accounts” (Ochs & Capps 1996:19-21). It is in this light that I approach 
the subject-filmmaker binary. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter a filmmaker who is 
involved in the documentation process of the self has difficulty separating  herself from her own 
subjectivity in the construction process of the film.  
The subjective nature of narratives of self raises another important issue, namely the question of 
memory and selective construction. Ochs and Capps refer to the “fragility of memory and the 
relativity of point of view” in order to illustrate this point (1996:21). In the film, Four Eyed 
Monsters (2005), for example, we witness the very subjective re-invention and re-telling of a 
personal narrative told through methods of re-enactment and the utilization of recording devices. 
Ochs and Capps state that memory can never capture an “authentic experience” but rather a 
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present moment is “immediately transform[ed] [...] into its abstraction” (1996:21). Thus the very 
act of telling a story already presupposes its constructed and mediated nature. In Four Eyed 
Monsters (2005) the filmmakers do not only attempt to re-remember an event, but they obviously 
re-invent it through creative endeavours employed through means of editing, animation and 
compositions that emphasize self-reflexivity. This re-emphasizes the notion that subjectivity is 
intrinsic to self-documentation processes.  
Throughout this thesis I often shift my attention to how the subjects construct the online self and 
perform that self through making use of the process of narration. Note that an SNS serves as a 
platform where individuals can present and document their desired selves. Fortunately an SNS 
provides a platform where individuals can also create and re-create re-edit and re-shape the 
desired identity of the self who stares back at them from within the computer screen.  
In the films I discuss, several components determine how the self is narrated. First, the space 
within which the self chooses to narrate about herself will influence the narration process, as 
various habitats have various “rules” and landscapes with their own set of tools, social 
constraints and features. An SNS for example, is a virtual habitat in which the individual is 
reliant on the technical features the site provides, which will assist a user in the construction of 
her narrative about herself. Second, it is important to remember that the mode within which these 
stories are told is used in order to highlight the construction processes present when attempting 
to document the self through mediated forms. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I am 
interested in how an other might influence the process of online self-documentation and 
subsequent impression management and how that is represented to me through means of the 
filmic non-fiction genre. In the following section, I theorise this question by exploring Jaques 
Lacan‟s ideas on the relationship between the self and the Big Other and how the two 
collaboratively construct visual concepts of selves via imaginary processes. The audience 
becomes the Big Other and influences the way in which the self will narrate herself “into being”.  
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1.3: THE MIRROR-GAZING SELF 
 
In evoking a psychoanalytical discourse through the use of Jaques Lacan‟s theories on the Mirror 
Stage and the Big Other, I would like to demonstrate how an online identity is self-reflexively 
constructed and managed with the assistance of the one(s) to whom the identity is being 
presented. This analysis, however, is not restricted to online platforms where self-documentation 
is a ubiquitous practise, since I also explore self-reflexive ways of documenting the self via 
filmic modes of representation. For me there is a strong correlation between the construction and 
subsequent conduct of the self as shaped through the eyes of the observer. Shortly, I will 
demonstrate how the role of the one who gazes is multifaceted and highly influential for the 
individual being observed. The individuals who observe the self on whichever chosen platform – 
SNSs or self-reflexive filmic modes of representation – come to constitute an audience. This 
audience is made up of two components: the traditional, (sometimes anonymous) viewer who 
either passively observes or interacts, and the original self who creates and conducts the 
performance of that self through whichever form of mediation. The logic here is simple: if the 
self embarks on a process of self-documentation within a public platform, then that same self 
comes to be an observer of her own constructed image while being observed by others. Lacan‟s 
“Mirror Stage” is concerned with the psychological implications of the infant‟s first encounter 
with the reflected image. Recognizing the self in the mirror, the infant identifies her body as a 
unified self. Lacan explains this as experiencing the image of the body in the “form of its 
totality” (1977:2-4). Through this process of recognition an identity is subsequently produced 
through imaginary and symbolic processes. 
Significant to this thesis is the fact that Lacanian identity processes are always viewed in 
“relation to someone else” (Dashtipour 2009:322). In the films the documentarians comment on 
this notion by demonstrating how this relational process becomes obvious in an interactive social 
networking sphere, where it can be argued that identity is often comparatively formed through 
the eyes of others. On an SNS there is a sense of democratic collaboration when considering the 
processes of self-documentation. Clay Shirky‟s hypothesis – referred to in the introduction to this 
thesis - concludes that online forms of social mediation provide individuals with the opportunity 
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to actively participate in the creation of the product of self instead of passively consuming it 
(2010:8). Nathan Jurgenson again refers to this process as “prosumption” – producing and 
consuming a product simultaneously (2010:377). Practises of self-documentation dictate that the 
product is the self. And within online platforms, the self is placed in a shaky position: she is 
often reliant on the presence of another virtual entity consuming her online existence as product.  
Lacan‟s theories are well known for the three orders of subjectivity (or inter-subjectivity) that he 
defines: the imaginary, the symbolic and the Real. The imaginary is focused on the process of 
(mis)recognition of self. Through the imaginary, an ego is substantiated (Dashtipour 2009:323). 
From this point forward, the individual will mainly use language as part of what Lacan refers to 
as the symbolic order to form identity. Certainly, the symbolic is concerned with the processes of 
discourse, language and socially-codified laws and traditions which further assist in defining “the 
self” (Dashtipour 2009:323). In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the image which is “sustained by the 
symbolic” is the foundation of identity (Miller 1988:37; Dashtipour 2009:323). The Real is 
defined as the “extra-discursive realm which includes those intense libidinal affects that escape 
the domestication of language” (Dashtipour 2009:323-324). 
To make clear: the infant, during the “Mirror Stage”, simultaneously has a self recognition as 
well as mis-recognition of the self. The infant will see the image of the self in the mirror and 
recognize herself as “I”. This, however, is mis-recognition because the infant cannot see its 
whole self but simply a reflection of herself. Therefore recognizing its own reflection as “I” is 
similar to recognizing itself as other. Suddenly the child is forced into the imaginary. The self 
sees the reflection of itself as “I” and she is connected to the material (her corporeal body) but 
also connected to what she thinks she sees (her imaginary). The body she sees is not her body – it 
is simply a reflection of her body. What Lacan refers to as the “ideal” is the reflected version of 
self in the mirror that the ego is trying to imitate (Dashtipour 2009:323; Miller 1988; Žižek 
2002).  
It is important to understand that in Lacanian theory the self can never view herself fully. She 
becomes visible only as constituted through the imagined and desired gaze of an other. This 
point is crucial to my argument: social media and SNSs provide individuals with a platform to 
create an online self for gazing others. They may then look at what they have created, as one 
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might look into a mirror and see not only the reflection of the physical self but also external 
facets which belong to the symbolic mode of defining the self. This dynamic process of 
constituting the (idea of) self through the perceived gaze of the Other will be examined in more 
detail in the following sections.  
A construction of self online can be said to be for an other. But who is this other? Is it the public 
that represent our interactive audience on an SNS? Lacan‟s Big Other represents societal ideals 
and constraints which the self attempts to live up to. For me, the other is also the reflection of the 
self. The “I” in front of the mirror can recognize herself as other – but it is also that other that the 
“I” will attempt to reconstruct through imaginary and symbolic methods in order to achieve what 
might constitute the “Ideal-I”. 
If, as Lacan argues, identity processes are always viewed in relation to someone else –
identification with others or an ideal image (Dashtipour 2009; Žižek 2002) – then the “I” is 
always created purposefully for an other. The image is fundamental to how we view, explain and 
define ourselves and in Lacan‟s theorization of subjectivity, the self takes on an external image: 
either the “reflected image of their own body” or “images/gestalts of like others”, imagining the 
ideal self (Dashtipour 2009:323). Lacan dictates that the ideal image can be of “role models, 
loved ones or icons” (Lacan 1977:2) – indeed, any other who serves as a “mirror” to the self 
(Lacan 1986; Dashtipour 2009). Perhaps here it would be fruitful to refer to Cooley‟s “looking-
glass-self”, as a means to better demonstrate notions of “collaborative” and “imagined” identity 
construction and management. The “looking-glass-self” implies a dynamic process of self-
construction where the “I” creates the “me” through the imagined eyes of the Big Other (Cooley 
1902:17; Robinson 2007:95). There is a similarity in this dynamic to that of the “Mirror Phase” 
in which the self is kept “in check” by the imagined judgement of an other (Lacan 1977:4). In 
my investigation, identity development and imaginary self-fashioning is always discussed in 
relation to how the individual imagines the desire of the Big Other. The self imagines how an 
other might scrutinize her and therefore maintains and manages her mediated online self 
according to imagined constraints.  
The concept of Lacan‟s Big Other might be applied to a modern-day SNS where “social 
structures and societal values” are automatically embedded within these social environments. 
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The social nature of these sites requires the necessary presence of an other and the individual 
user therefore feels persistently observed and acts accordingly. The Big Other can consequently 
be viewed as the “Other of language, of certain ideals, norms and ideology of a particular 
society” (Dashtipour 2009:323-324). Thus, it is this Other “which constrains the option of 
images available in the process of re-evaluation of social categories” (Dashtipour 2009:323). It is 
important to note that the self cannot select just any set of “attributes” or “images” in order to 
complete an ideal image of the self: it is as if the Big Other places limits on who we can be by 
judging the social identity with which we choose to represent ourselves (Dashtipour 2009:324). 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the imagined ideal image of self (ego-ideal) is what is required in 
order to be accepted by the Big Other (or by the Big Other‟s imagined desired gaze) – the subject 
“judges” themselves and their image (ideal ego) according to how they imagine the Big Other 
desires to perceive them (Dashtipour 2009:324-325). In my examples, subjects are often looking 
at themselves in simulated mirrors-screens. The ideally constructed self staring back at the 
original creator from inside the “mirror” also becomes an other. In this way, the original self 
becomes an onlooker of her own constructed image, judging her image as she imagines the Big 
Other might.  
The other in Lacanian terms can also be the one who looks back at the “me” in the reflection of 
the mirror. Online environments offer multiple incarnations of the other: the other as reflection 
of the “I”, the other as the audience to whom I present my own imagined other, as well as the Big 
Other, representing the societal ideals according to which I construct my imagined self. The 
original I, who looks at her reflected other, is always aware that there is a (second) Big Other, 
also looking into the mirror (due to the public nature of modern SNSs).  
Lacan‟s Mirror Phase can illuminate the process and action of self-reflexively constructing and 
subsequently documenting the mediated self - which is often superbly mirrored within the 
chosen forms of representation of these documentaries. Hence, what interests me is how the 
influence of the Big Other functions in how subjects choose to represent themselves. 
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1.4: SELF-SURVEILLANCE 
 
The presence of an (imagined) Other, always “looking”, seems to be most prevalent in an online 
environment where selves are made visible to be looked at. The sociality of SNSs might create 
an acute awareness of these “watching eyes” (even if imagined) and subsequently dictate the 
presentation of the online self. Through Lacan‟s formations on the idea of the “Mirror Stage” we 
learn that one often looks at oneself through the eyes of an imagined Other, as constructed in the 
imaginary. The somewhat heightened awareness of other(s) watching in online spaces, such as 
SNSs, automatically influences the way in which the individual presents herself. I argue that 
there is a strong correlation between the action of looking and being looked at in an online 
sphere, and the concept of surveillance. Traditionally the idea of surveillance in critical theory is 
often based on a conception of a hierarchical society, which involves the practise of someone 
who watches and someone who is being watched – often an exercise initiated for disciplinary 
purposes. This dynamic of watching over a subject through surveillance is often referred to as the 
panoptic gaze. The Panopticon, which was initially used as an architectural design for a prison 
conceptualized by philosopher Jeremy Bentham, was further explored by Michel Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish (1975), in which he uses the Panopticon as a metaphor for modern 
disciplinary practises that can involve scrupulous surveillance and observation. Foucault 
explored the psychological implications of human behaviour in light of the extent to which 
surveillance is incorporated into everyday life in an attempt to “keep in check” a society that 
consequently internalizes control due to feeling constantly watched. Foucault‟s Panopticon is 
now a popular theory often used by contemporary social critics as a means to discuss notions of 
visibility through the use of surveillance practices.  
The basic principle of Bentham‟s Panopticon was that prisoners could be observed any time, 
night or day, without them necessarily knowing whether or not they were indeed being observed 
(Lyon 2007). The architectural structure of the Panopticon consisted of circular rows of prison 
cells. In the middle of the circular structure was an observation tower, which was tall enough for 
the observer in the tower to be able to see the interior of each cell. The windows of the tower 
were masked so that it was not possible for prisoners to know whether or not someone was 
actually in the tower (Lyon 2007). Therefore the psychological effect of the Panopticon was that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 24 
the prisoners would never be certain whether or not they were being observed but would always 
feel as if they were. Consequently prisoners would have to assume a compliant position and 
internalize the gaze with which the disciplinary authority would watch, a process that made it 
easier to control the prisoners. I find the similarity between the psychology of feeling watched 
due to a surveillance institution and feeling observed by the Big Other as imagined by the self in 
front of the mirror of the screen, appropriate for this discussion on self-reflexive auto-
documentation through various forms of mediation. It is important to note, however, that the 
surveillance gaze as framed by the theoretical conception of the Panopticon must in no way be 
equated with the Lacanian gaze, although there are distant similarities between Foucault‟s idea of 
the panoptic gaze and the Lacanian gaze. For Anders Albrechtslund online social networking is 
indeed anchored in surveillance practices and he insists that taking on this approach might 
present us with the opportunity to challenge conventional understandings of surveillance 
(2008:sp). 
Internalizing of both the Panoptic gaze and the Lacanian gaze (through the eyes of the Big Other 
as constituted by the imaginary) impacts the way in which the individual conducts herself and 
manages the constructed impression of self that she presents to the world. This sense of always 
being watched, and the extent to which this shapes the representation of self, is central to this 
study, particularly in my discussion on Ondi Timoner‟s film We Live in Public (2009). Subject, 
Josh Harris, raises key questions about the structure of power relations in online forums due to 
his interesting surveillance documentations. Surveillance theorist Hille Koskela argues that when 
surveillance practises cease to conform to the traditional construct of a hierarchical system where 
the observer watches over the observed, and instead the one who is usually observed now also 
becomes the observer to her own and other‟s visibility, the individual feels empowered (2004 & 
2006). But in chapter three, I suggest that this empowerment might be premature for the subjects 
of the documentary, We Live in Public. It must be made clear that the specific kinds of 
surveillance that will be discussed within the various chapters differ slightly: the case studies 
discussed represent various online networking forums, some dated, some modern and some even 
fictional, which in turn influence the visibility and management of the image of the self slightly 
differently with each film. The concept of the panoptic gaze as it relates to the Lacanian gaze is 
helpful for each film as they are all concerned with practises that include various degrees of 
visibility and gazing online.  
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1.4.1: PERSONAL WEBCAM SURVEILLANCE 
 
Applying concepts of surveillance theory to personal visibility practises through the use of the 
webcam is challenging. Hille Koskela insists that, “webcams challenge the very basics of 
surveillance theory” (2006:175). Using Foucault‟s panopticon as a springboard to understand 
normative conceptions of “up-down-monitoring” (the watcher watches over the watched) 
Koskela is adamant that although the implementation of personal webcam surveillance relates to 
surveillance studies, it goes “beyond the panopticon” (2006:175). By examining the four modes 
of thinking that Koskela identifies as essential to the Panoptic model, it becomes apparent that 
the changing conditions from traditional Panoptic surveillance to self imposed webcam 
surveillance (and other interactive social media visibility practices) has evolved into an exercise 
that challenges the traditional understandings of the panoptic surveillance model (2006:176).  
First, she states that webcams challenge the panoptic dynamic of “visibility and power”: a 
panoptic gaze traditionally situates the one who is looking as more in control/powerful than the 
one being looked at, who is not able to look back (2006:175). By willingly making the self 
visible through means of webcam surveillance, an individual might challenge conventional 
power structures as understood by traditional surveillance theory. I, however, will soon 
demonstrate how a platform is then re-created which makes the visible subject newly submissive. 
I argue that this new submissiveness is due to a reliance on the gaze of the audience. Second, 
according to Koskela, the “webcam phenomenon” excludes the internalization of control: 
individuals who choose to make their private lives visible online “refuse to internalize the rules 
of hiding and concealing [...] these rules conventionally relate to the private realm and by doing 
so, ensure submissiveness”. By revealing the private online, the self might feel empowered in 
that she challenges conventional constrictions of “up-down-monitoring” which controls the 
extent to which she makes the personal visible (Koskela 2004 & 2006). Although I agree with 
Koskela, I would further like to explore this aspect. Online visibility or even online 
“exhibitionism”, as Koskela refers to it, might empower the individual in that she feels (or 
performs the feeling of) “no shame” in her revealing of the personal (2004:206-207). But at the 
same time, she again experiences a reliance on the viewer to whom she exposes what is 
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seemingly “private”. This apparently “empowering” act of extreme visibility initiates a new form 
of submissiveness: reliance on the audience. Third, Koskela states that webcams are not devices 
that inherently aim to normalize or “cure” through disciplinary psychologies. Indeed, the 
utilization of surveillance is normally connected with other disciplinary establishments such as 
police or security. Even the original concept of the Panopticon was for the sake of disciplining 
prisoners. This is not the case with the personal webcam surveillance. Rather, personal webcam 
exploits serve in assisting the subject with the documentation of her personal and „real‟ online 
self. Finally, Koskela recognizes that the practices of personal webcam surveillance indicate that 
power and control should not be seen as equal (2006:175). By “empowering” the self through 
taking control over the extent to which what content is made visible and how, the self does not 
necessarily have control over how her visible self will be received and how her performance of 
self will be interpreted on the other end. As previously established, with personal webcam 
surveillance the subjects remain reliant on the very existence of their viewers; otherwise there 
would be no point to making the self so intimately and publicly visible.  
 
1.4.2: PARTICIPATORY SURVEILLANCE 
 
Theories on surveillance studies with specific reference to the panopticon serve to assist in better 
understanding relationships between looking and being looked at online, while bearing in mind 
the ever-present Lacanian Big Other, who lives mainly as constituted by the imagination of the 
self conducting her own performance of the self. On most SNSs, however, the practice of feeling 
watched and therefore acting accordingly becomes complex in terms of the mutual visibility 
exercises involved. Online, the “I” is able to watch, and is probably being watched at the same 
time, and is aware of possibly being watched. Note, though, that there does not necessarily have 
to be someone present, watching, in order for the “I” to imagine someone is watching. According 
to the Lacanian conception of the Big Other previously discussed, the presence of an other as 
constituted through imagination is often very influential and can dictate how the “I” will present 
and conduct herself. Whether there is an actual interactive other present or whether the “I” is 
acting according to and for the imagined presence of the Big Other, the psychology of feeling 
under surveillance and acting as if being observed still applies.  
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But what happens when the surveillance gaze as we traditionally understand it evolves into a 
mutual practise within the online forum? Here, Albrechtslund introduces a term called 
“participatory surveillance”, which suggests the mutual involvement of watching and being 
watched (2008:sp). Like Koskela, he also introduces the idea that through surveillance practises 
online there is a power shift: individuals watching and individuals being watched, reach apparent 
equilibrium as they both take on the same position and are both equally involved in the practise 
of observing and being observed. Thus, there is an aspect of mutuality in terms of a collection of 
people who watch and who are being watched, often doing both at the same time and often 
viewing not only others but also internalising the gaze, viewing themselves as others.  
In an SNSs environment the typical “up-down-monitoring” ceases to exist and instead 
monitoring and surveillance becomes a mutual practise of reciprocated and simultaneous 
surveillance where both observer and observed partake in the endeavours of looking and being 
looked at. We now move away from the traditional hierarchical surveillance model, associated 
with unequal power systems of gazing and towards a network of observers. Although it might 
seem as if the self is symbolically released from the prison of the hierarchical gaze, I would 
argue that, ironically, the “I” might still be metaphorically ensnared by the network of her 
imagined Other always present, always observing and always an entity to whom the imagined 
desired image of the self must be presented. In participatory surveillance the “I” makes herself 
visible and is therefore able to survey another while being observed herself. It can be argued that 
the “I” is aware of this and therefore the content of the self made visible can be done so 
selectively. But now the question becomes: what exactly does the “I” make visible and how? 
And how does this further the process of moving away from traditional conceptions of a 
hierarchical surveillance system?  
Considering the enormous influence of the observing Big Other, it is useful to mention the 
concept of the synopticon and the omniopticon. The idea of the synopticon, originally introduced 
by Thomas Mathiesen, evolved out of Foucauldian panopticon as surveillance was becoming 
increasingly available to the everyman and individuals started “taking control into their own 
hands” through the use of personal webcam surveillance (1997:215-234). The Internet and social 
media do provide a “channel of extensive surveillance and control of the individuals and moves 
„surveillance integration‟ to a new level”, according to Lyon (2007:8). The synopticon typically 
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refers to the idea that mass media has enabled an environment where “the many see the few”, 
instead of the “few seeing the many” (Mitrou et al. 2013). But, elaborating on the synoptic, it is 
Jurgenson‟s concept of the omnioptic gaze that is of particular use for the films to be discussed 
within this thesis. The omniopticon typically refers to a “democratization of the gaze” where “the 
many see the many” – essentially, the idea of participatory surveillance mentioned earlier. This 
kind of mutual gazing has become the standard custom with the ever-increasing popularity of 
interactive social media sites (Jurgenson 2010:377) 
Let‟s consider the “democratization of the gaze” once more. For me, this notion implies two 
separate strands of thought: first, the concept indicates a participatory society that engages in the 
social practises of mutual gazing, usually as made possible by social networking sites, and 
thereby challenging traditional conceptions of hierarchical surveillance models. Second, these 
traditional structures of looking are challenged when considering that the individual, who looks 
and is being looked at, is also in control of her own visibility. It is the latter notion that poses a 
problem, if we are to dub these omnioptic processes of looking as democratic: to be in control of 
one‟s own visibility, is to have the opportunity to be selective about what is made visible and 
what not.  
Koskela states that we increasingly “seek to play an active role in the production of images [...] 
reclaiming the copyright of our lives” (2006:199). Individuals are indeed increasingly involved 
in the construction process and impression management of the self online. Clay Shirky asserts 
that we are no longer pure consumers (2010:6-8). Instead, we have become the producers of our 
own content, what Jurgenson would refer to as a “prosumer” – someone who is both a consumer 
and producer of a product (2010:377). It is imperative to understand, though, that online the self 
who produces and consumes simultaneously, is often also the very product produced and 
consumed by self and others. To be able to control my own visibility is also to “constantly 
participate in my own surveillance” (Jurgenson 2010:377). If we are to say that “I am the 
producer of my own visible content”, then our attention is simultaneously drawn to the selective 
production processes. Koskela states that “there is some voyeuristic fascination in looking but 
reciprocally some exhibitionistic fascination in being seen” (2006:199). This idea will be 
explored in more detail in chapter three, when I discuss self-surveillance by means of online 
media. But by implying that the one who makes herself visible is exhibitionistic, is to state that 
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there is an acute awareness of an other watching (even if imaginary). Koskela states that, 
“surveillance is a chance to display oneself under the gaze of the camera” (2006:204). Omnioptic 
forms of gazing provide the subject with a democratic practise of mutual gazing while giving her 
the platform to have active agency in how the self is presented. 
This thesis essentially aims to investigate documentary representations of online self-
documentation. The various ways, in which subjects are able to contribute to the filmic 
representations of their “selves”, makes for a fascinating look into the subject-filmmaker 
relationship. This dynamic of both producing content and being content produced is a practise 
that is characteristic of modern social networking platforms, in which gazing is mutual and the 
fashioning of an ideal self a collaborative process. The intention to construct a narrative of the 
self via mediated means is severely influenced by the imagined presence of a gazing, scrutinizing 
other. Consequently the self performs her mediated self according to how she imagines the Big 
Other desires to see her. The self-reflexive strategies with which filmmakers attempt to 
document these various forms of self-documentation are often mirrored in the construction 
processes of online identity building. While the films are predominantly self-reflexive, 
filmmakers subtly play around with various representational strategies that serve to highlight the 
complicated negotiation between selves and gazing others. Chapter two considers the subject-
filmmaker relationship amid an auto-documentation of subjects who communicate only via 
mediated means. Chapter three investigates the strange borderspace a subject inhabits, living 
suspended between the “real” and the “virtual”, while under severe self-surveillance. Finally, 
chapter four inspects how the influence of the Big Other can lead to intense self-construction and 
collaborative fantasy building. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HYBRID FORMS OF SELF-REFLEXIVE AUTO-
DOCUMENTATION IN FICTIONAL MEDIATED WORLDS 
 
Four Eyed Monsters (2005), presents itself within the form of a hybrid mode of documentary: in 
a semi re-enacted autobiographical manner the filmmakers, who are both subjects of the film as 
well as its producers, attempt to selectively and creatively represent a personal narrative. In the 
introduction to this thesis I have reviewed how the mixing of different representational strategies, 
both significant to the documentary and the non-fiction realm, result in what I refer to as a re-
enacted autobiographical docu-drama. 
The subject-filmmakers of the film initially present themselves to each other through an online 
dating site (which is fictional in the film but represents the standard form of a modern online 
social dating site). They then move from the virtual arena to meeting face to face in an offline 
space while still making use of conventional forms of textual communication by corresponding 
via written word or through filming each other. Finally the filmmakers, Arin Crumley and Susan 
Buice decide to make a documentary about their experience. Selected scenarios are re-enacted, 
filmed and edited – often splicing in „real‟ footage with re-enacted ones. Through adding blatant 
self-reflexive devices the subject-filmmakers highlight the representational nature of a film, 
fictional or documentary, in order to comment on the problematic of the form itself and how we 
interpret it. Re-enactment is often employed in the film where the subjects perform the role of 
both filmmaker and subject. Certainly, the self-reflexive methods and re-enacted modes of 
representation allow the viewer to be aware of processes of construction and performance. This 
representational form is mirrored in the content of the film, where subjects self-reflexively 
construct online selves. A narrative which might have discursively been acted out on an SNS is 
now re-enacted and mediated through a camera lens.  
By looking at the unconcealed presence of the filmmakers in the film, dialogue and editing 
devices employed, I note how the couple cleverly comment on their complicated role as 
subjective subject-filmmakers who in an autobiographical manner attempt to self-document, 
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inevitably becoming performers who represent an idealized version of the self (Ochs and Capps 
1996). I also explore how the self-reflexive form of the film is reflected in the content, as 
Crumley and Buice demonstrate themes of impression management via online social means, 
video-diary and even surveillance-based experiments. I also glance at elements from various 
documentary subgenres visible in the film and examine how they contribute to this hybrid genre 
of filmmaking. 
In the film the subjects do communicate via various textually mediated forms such as instant 
messaging, email or hand written text. But I will be focussing on the visual forms of 
communication. Photographs and video footage are forms of self-presentation with which the 
film is preoccupied at both the level of content and the level of form. It is in this light that I also 
investigate the complex dynamics of the gaze that arise in a film where subjects who view each 
other as subjects are also filmmakers – bearers of the ultimate gaze.  
 
2.1: RE-ENACTED AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL DOCU-DRAMA 
 
Four Eyed Monsters (2005) is represented within a format of something which certainly seems 
self-reflexive, and also particularly subjective in that it conveys strong elements of 
autobiography – often represented through means of highly performative re-enactments and 
poetic as well as inventive montage editing and even video-diary. What makes for an even more 
thought provoking dynamic between what Jay Ruby refers to as the “filmmaker‟s position”, the 
“process” of constructing the film and the “final product”, is the fact that, similar to both Catfish 
(2010) and, to some extent, We Live in Public (2009), the filmmakers become their own subjects 
(1988:35). I must stress the significance of this dualistic relationship where subject and 
filmmaker are one and the same. The knowledge of such a relationship immediately flings the 
viewer into a position of critical examination and decoding as she is acutely aware of the 
subjectivity involved in the construction of the representation (Maasdorp 2011:208). The self-
reflexive quality of this film evokes fascinating questions about its hybrid form of representation, 
and its strong autobiographical influence invites critical assessment of the processes of self-
documentation. In addition to introducing a myriad of self-reflexive methods, the subject-
filmmakers predominantly make use of re-enactment to convey their subjective personal 
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experience. Joseph Jon Lanthier (2011:sp) reminds us that while documentaries are essentially 
“creative treatments of actuality”, as Grierson claims, the filmmaker is also faced with the 
challenge and responsibility of facing an audience that will “assume authenticity, unless told 
otherwise” (2011:sp; 1966:15). I have already established that representing actuality via filmic 
means is to employ a selective process of interpreting for the audience the „reality‟ captured. 
Naturally, the latter part of Lanthier‟s statement refers to the choice a filmmaker faces when 
deciding how to represent her subjective interpretation of the subject matter. The employment of 
self-reflexive methods typically has the ability to jolt the otherwise „gullible‟ audience into a 
position of critical examination and produce an intellectual distance from the subjective 
representation. This question on subjectivity places the convention of re-enactments in non-
fiction film in an extraordinary position. For Lanthier the notion of re-enactments “subtly patrol 
the [...] border between documentary and fiction-film” (2011:sp). 
These subject-filmmakers employ varied self-reflexive methods emphasizing their subjective 
experiences while simultaneously co-opting the elements of the “poetic mode” of representation 
in order to demonstrate the “artistic” reinterpretation of past events (Nichols 2001:102-104).The 
poetic filmmaker is usually more concerned with representing “a world of the artists imagining” 
rather than representing “the historical world”, often making use of “abstract patterns of form or 
colour or animated figures”, re-emphasizing the subject or filmmaker‟s subjective experience 
innovatively (Nichols 2001:103). Crumley and Buice re-imagine a certain historical reality and 
creatively reinterpret it for the viewer and for themselves as viewers of their own constructed 
content (Ochs & Capps 1996:20; Nichols 2001:103). It is in this light that the dilemma of 
authentic autobiography is fore grounded. Firstly the couple attempt to re-present history. But 
they do it creatively, employing innovative methods reminiscent of poetic modes of 
representation. These creative choices along with re-enactments result in a near non-fiction 
rather than accurate documentation. The self-reflexive methods on the other hand serve in 
creating awareness. Naturally, the camera does indeed record “selectively”, as Katz and Katz 
insist, and logically, the camera is an inanimate object with the ability to only record what its 
physical and technical limitations will allow it to see (1988:119). Therefore it is rather the 
filmmaker behind the camera who chooses where to point the camera and how to represent a 
story – often her own story as is the case of Four Eyed Monsters (2005). 
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The presence of subjectivity in this documentary is prevalent. By looking at the inclusion of 
filmmakers, dialogue and editing devices employed in the film, I note how these producers 
cleverly comment on their own complicated role as subjective subject-filmmakers. I then discuss 
the film‟s autobiographical quality which illuminates the notion of subjectivity present in the 
representation. 
In chapter one I addressed processes of self-narration and focussed on the notion that a re-telling 
is subjective as it is based on memory, resulting in what one could call selective re-inventions of 
a specific (personal) history. What Ochs and Capps refer to as “the fragility of memory” and the 
“relativity of point of view” stresses the notion that memory can never fully capture “authentic 
experiences” but rather, an event is immediately rendered into its “abstraction” (1996:21). When 
embarking on a process of self-narration, the subject attempts to contextualise the self, making 
sense of the world that surrounds her (Ochs & Capps 1996:19). But narration is ultimately a very 
subjective account of “one or more points of view” rather than “objective omniscient accounts” 
(Ochs & Capps 1996:21). Although this film has an autobiographical quality to it sustained by 
the many re-enacted scenes spliced together with what appears to be spontaneously captured 
behind-the-scenes footage, one cannot help but to question the level of authenticity in the filmic 
re-telling of their story. I have already pointed out that the concept of re-enactment in a 
documentary film becomes somewhat superfluous – on the one hand a documentarian is 
challenged to represent actuality responsibly and on the other a documentary can be considered 
to be a filmmaker‟s innovative perception of reality (Winston 2008:15). I have also contested 
that any attempt at narration through documentation can only ever be subjective (Nichols 2001; 
Katz & Katz 1988, Ruby 1988; Maasdorp 2011). In addition, if a narrative is told with the aid of 
self-reflexive methods, then the impact of subjectivity in the re-telling is acknowledged. The 
very statement that documentary is a “creative treatment of actuality”, is implicitly 
acknowledged through the filmmakers‟ intentional presence and their creative methods of 
narration (Grierson1966:13). They use re-enactments in this film for various reasons and the 
performative quality of the re-enactments blurs “boundaries between fiction and non-fiction”, 
according to Anderson (2006:68). Non-realist techniques such as animation, stylized 
performance and theatrical set design, which are often found in self-referential auto-
documentaries, all feature in this film as a way of sketching the internal lives of the subjects 
(Anderson 2006:68). Thus the performative nature of the re-enactment is employed. Bear in 
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mind that through the self-reflexive quality of the film, the autobiographical nature of this 
documentary allows the filmmakers to introduce highly dramatized moments as a means to 
highlight subjectivity.  
In an autobiographical documentary or an “auto-documentary”, as Anderson refers to it, the 
subject of the film is the filmmaker, her life central to the unfolding of the narrative (2006:68-
70). She states that typically the auto-documentary combines “observational footage with 
interviews [and] archival materials to create life stories situated historically [...] usually with a 
voice-over narration by the filmmaker” (Anderson 2006:69). Four Eyed Monsters (2005) starts 
out as self-reflexive (that is, aware of its own construction processes) and soon becomes 
reflective (self-conscious) in the way in which it incorporates various autobiographical elements 
(Ruby 1988:36; Anderson 2006:67-69). In this film the viewer is “brought into the world of the 
storyteller”, as Patricia Aufderheide puts it, through video confessionals, first-person narration 
and what seems to be archival material (2007:sp). But the acute awareness of the re-enactment 
aspect of the film leads to more contrived modes of representation. It is also autobiographical in 
that the filmmakers tell us it is. In the introduction to the film Crumley and Buice address the 
viewers, stating that they are the producers of what the audience is about to see. Soon the viewer 
comes face to face with their personal tale: it is important to understand that here the camera 
doesn‟t capture „real‟ events in an observational style - historical events are rather re-enacted for 
the camera. Even though I previously demonstrated the purposefully self-reflexive methods 
present in this film, it is important to note that just because an autobiographical documentary is 
reflective it does not necessarily have to be focussed on its own construction process.  
 
2.1.1: SELF-REFLEXIVE METHODS: 
VISIBILITY, DIALOGUE and EDITING 
 
An assumption exists that the documentary filmmaker is faced with an ethical responsibility to 
represent reality authentically, (Maasdorp 2011:208-210). But the awareness of this 
responsibility and the challenge of objectivity within such a representation lead to the 
development of reflexive modes of representation, which triggers an awareness of film as 
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subjective construct for the viewer (Maasdorp 2011:208). Typically self-reflexive methods are 
established in a non-fiction film in order to make evident the methods of construction of the film. 
While all documentaries are subjective to some extent, in Four Eyed Monsters (2005) the self-
reflexive style serves as a means to support an exceptionally subjective account of the subjects, 
who are also the filmmakers. This notion seems even more multifaceted when it becomes clear 
that the subjects (who are obviously portraying “themselves”) are documented, documenting 
themselves and each other. Subjects are often seen holding up video recorders filming each other 
and themselves, making filmic vignettes within the film. In the following section I look at how 
reflexive elements are present through visibility, through dialogue and with the employment of 
editing devices in the film. 
 
The most common form of self-reflexivity in non-fiction films, as previously mentioned, is to 
show the filmmaker (director or camera operator ) and the filming equipment (Nichols 2001:125; 
Maasdorp 2011:209). In Four Eyed Monsters (2005) the filmmakers appear on screen 
consistently, as subjects initially and then finally as filmmakers who address the fact that they 
have been playing the “roles” of the subjects in this personal autobiographical narrative. Self-
reflexivity appears briefly but blatantly as the film begins in the form of an introduction 
addressed to the audience by the filmmakers themselves, stating that they hope the viewers will 
enjoy the product. Cameras, filming equipment and editing rooms are visible throughout the 
film. However, to be purposefully self-reflexive is not the same as witnessing the subject of a 
non-fiction film, who is documented as being a videographer; hold up a camera to film 
something (Ruby 1988:35). For example, the inclusion of filmic equipment in a shot would seem 
to be inevitable during a documentary like No Subtitles Necessary (2008), a film which 
investigates the relationship between two Hungarian cinematographers Lazlo Kovacs and Vilmos 
Zsigmond. Another example would be the behind-the-scenes documentary Hearts of Darkness: 
A Filmmaker‟s Apocalypse (1991) which chronicles the filmmaking process of Francis Ford 
Coppola‟s Apocalypse Now (1979). The visibility of filmic equipment and filmic jargon seems to 
be inevitably included in these projects seeing as the filmmaking process is at the centre or at 
least a main theme in these non-fiction films. Naturally the inclusion of these signifiers 
automatically does comment on the filmic process, whether intended or not. But, to be 
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purposefully reflexive, as Jay Ruby (1988:35) states, is to employ methods which clearly tell the 
viewer that this representation is a subjective endeavour and that the filmmaker employs self-
reflexive methods in order to encourage intellectual engagement with the material. In Four Eyed 
Monsters (2005) the filmmakers do not hide the fact that they have reconstructed their tale within 
a reflexive mode of representation, as we see through the introduction: here, the filmmakers 
address the audience, asking them to enjoy the film. And sure enough, any questions or 
confusion about motives behind this specific reflexive mode of representation, seem to be 
resolved in the final act of the film: the viewer finally realises just how reflexive this endeavour 
really was as the couple overtly and creatively confess to the viewer that the entire re-enacted 
non-fiction was an indulgent and almost therapeutic means whereby to explore the tendencies of 
their tumultuous relationship. A multitude of self-reflexive methods are used here in order to 
emphasize the couple‟s preoccupation and method with (re)telling „their story‟: where previously 
we saw Crumley and Buice filming each other as subjects, a venture which formed part of the 
narrative, we now see shots of them (which seems to be „behind the scenes‟ footage) showing 
how they have been filming each other as filmmakers, not subjects. 
There is also a formal shift in this scene. Suddenly, what seems to be “real” footage is intercut 
with re-enacted scenes. Crumley and Buice clearly kept the cameras rolling throughout the 
process, capturing back-stage drama in guerrilla-like
11
 style. But the mixture of behind the 
scenes footage intercut with re-enacted scenes, places the viewer in a particularly remarkable 
position of critical examination. The viewer cannot know for certain what to interpret as “real” 
footage and is therefore rather critical of the authenticity of all footage seen. However, the 
uncertainty introduced through this technique of intercutting re-enactments with live footage 
further emphasises the constructed nature of film. In this way, the filmmakers succeed in 
commenting on the frivolity of the often popular assumption that a documentary necessarily tells 
the truth (Lanthier 2011: sp, Maasdorp 2011:208-209, Nichols 2001:125). 
The filmmakers shift from working behind the camera to in front of it, as both subjects and 
filmmakers, and the visibility of camera equipment and filmmaking processes develops the 
                                                          
11
With the advent of digital cameras, guerrilla filmmaking became an accessible means of independent filmmaking 
often characterised by low budgets and small crews and resulting in a ‘handheld quality’ and often grainy 
aesthetic. 
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notion of film as construct for the viewer allowing her an intellectual distance of critical 
interpretation (Maasdorp 2011:209-211). As previously mentioned the work is autobiographical 
and so if Crumley is a filmmaker/videographer in „real life‟, he is shown as such in the film. 
Often seen with a camera or in his editing room, Crumley as filmmaker and writer of his own 
story implicitly acknowledges the fact that he is the creator of this re-enacted non-fiction by 
showing himself as incessantly filming. Crumley goes a step further and not only makes himself 
visible but shows the audience how he has made himself visible by implicitly referring to 
filmmaking devices and processes of filming: he films himself filming himself, Crumley as 
subject describes an editing program at one point, and he even plays around with adjusting 
settings in order to acknowledge his own involvement in the construction process of the 
representation seen. In one scene, Crumley makes a video-diary in which he explains to Susan 
(and to his audience) how a film editing program works – here he is out of focus at first but soon 
adjusts the settings making the viewer aware of his position as technician/filmmaker. Liani 
Maasdorp (2011:218) often refers to “conspicuous” devices or strategies employed which signify 
the filmmaker‟s overt involvement within the technical representation of the film. In a blatantly 
obvious reflexive moment, Crumley explains to Buice via a video-message how a certain editing 
program functions with helpful notes that he has jotted down onto a piece of legal paper. He 
encourages her to pursue her interest in filming as he believes it will help her in expressing 
herself creatively. Crumley is speaking directly into the camera as if through it with (an 
imagined) Susan. The setting that surrounds him, reminds the viewer of the technologies 
involved in the filmmaking process, as we see wires, screen, mikes and earphones – all visual 
indicators that signifies an editor‟s space. On the legal pad we see directions of how to run a film 
editing program. By foregrounding these methods by which a film is produced the filmmakers 
remind the audience of the process involved in the construction of the representation thus 
triggering a critical engagement with the material. I find this scene slightly „tongue in the cheek‟. 
It has already been established that Crumley is the filmmaker who documents himself 
documenting himself – by overtly speaking towards the camera, speaking with (the imagined) 
Susan, it is also as if he is looking at his audience, implicitly explaining to them the process he 
himself employed in order to produce what we now see. Also in this scene, Crumley blatantly 
adjusts the focus at one point. According to Maasdorp, technical adjustments are “aesthetically 
unpleasing changes to focus, exposure and composition” which are usually made by the camera 
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operator as a means to “improve the overall quality of the [...] shot [or to] compensate for 
changes in lighting and subject position that have occurred while filming” (2011:218). 
Conventionally, these kinds of adjustments will not be included in films that make use of 
continuity editing, as they overtly remind the viewer of the filmmaking process involved in the 
representation of what is seen. But Buice does this in order to acknowledge his own presence as 
filmmaker and then addresses it via dialogue. Although I mention self-reflexivity as an intrinsic 
part of this representation, these self-reflexive methods not only comment on the film‟s own 
format, but also assist in the development of narrative and subjects.  
In the final act of the film, the subjects address the constructed nature of the process of 
filmmaking: voiceovers address the dilemma of making such an autobiographical filmic 
representation, while we see moving images of the couple building sets, working in an editing 
room and constructing a narrative in front of a storyboard. We hear Crumley stating: “We‟ve got 
all the writings and the drawings and the video [...] to make this into something” and “I am not 
interested in arriving anywhere [...] I am interested in the process”. By overtly drawing the 
viewers‟ attention to the creative process the viewer is faced with the filmmakers‟ blatant 
acknowledgement of film as construct. These verbal statements refer to the material and footage 
which the filmmakers already own which they will come to incorporate into the film by either re-
staging or re-appropriating it. While simultaneously addressing the filmmaking process we hear 
them arguing, and phrases like, “the difficulty of executing this project”, are emphasized, again 
drawing the viewers‟ attention to the filmmaking process as opposed to seamless, flowing 
narratives which allow viewers to suspend their disbelief instead of getting critically involved 
with the material. 
While the viewer is bombarded with the verbal references to filmmaking processes she witnesses 
a constructed composition which again draws her attention toward the self-reflexive structure of 
the film. Crumley and Buice are seen in the editing room and in front of the story board. In the 
editing room we see Buice‟s face in the monitor. Initially, we see a close-up of the face. Then the 
camera starts zooming out, to reveal her face framed by a computer screen, then we see Buice 
and Crumley working in the editing studio, and finally we witness a camera operator, filming 
this composition. The shot of the computer screen is reminiscent of Lacan‟s mirror: Buice is 
showing us how she is selectively constructing a narrative of the self (see figures 1, 2 and 3). 
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Figures 1, 2 and 3 
Buice‟s face in close-up, her face framed by the screen, the couple in the editing studio engaged in the 
filmmaking process of editing. 
 
At the end of this sequence, the viewer is finally left at the beginning. The couple are seen in the 
same studio where the introduction of the film took place in which they charmingly tell their 
viewers to enjoy the film. We witness Arin directing Susan, telling her to “be natural, be present” 
and to “lean in”. Susan‟s defiance in this scene annoys Arin and the viewer senses a tension here 
- but at this point the viewer has also been exposed to enough self-reflexive and re-enacted 
elements to know that this tension might simply be dramatised in order to demonstrate the 
difficulty these subjects seemed to encounter in creating the film. Through the use of dramatic 
music and voiceovers overlapping in frenzy, it becomes clear that the filmmakers‟ intention here 
was to create drama and illuminate the strenuous process of having constructed the re-telling of 
the subjects‟ personal narrative.  
The filmmakers also draw our attention to the constructed nature of the narrative by using what 
Maasdorp calls “conspicuous editing” (2011:217-221). This refers to the self-reflexive use of 
editing devices in order to comment on the film as construction. In a rather “poetic” scene Susan 
initially shows us how she can create intimate moments via the camera – we view parts of her 
body, an eye, an ear and her mouth, in close-up, each shot intercut with a shot of her filming 
these different parts of her body herself. The soundtrack adds a romantic tone to what we are 
seeing. Through this scene we are being made used to the convention of experiencing intimate, 
poetic compositions in a tender tone, while consistently being reminded through the visibility of 
the camera, the running time in the corner of the screen and the shots of Susan filming herself, 
that what we see is a construction. In the next scene, a sex scene, we are again reminded of the 
construction of the filmic process through montage editing. Dynamic shots of fingers tracing 
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across bare skin in close-up are intercut with shots of doves lifting off and a sunrise through the 
clouds, perhaps implying a sexual awakening of sorts. Montage is a film editing technique 
involving the juxtaposition of images within a film to create symbolic meaning (Eisenstein 
1999:21-22). Here, its serves in creating new meaning by drawing comparison or parallels 
between two contradictory or disassociated images (Eisenstein 1999:21-22). While the viewer is 
swept up in the romantic compositions accompanied by a dreamy soundtrack, every time we see 
the fingers tracing across the skin, we also see the running time in the corner of the screen and 
we are reminded of the previous scene in which Buice showed us how she came to construct 
intimate close-ups of herself.   
The presence of the camera here, demonstrates to the viewer the intrinsic role it plays in self-
reflexive construction processes and it simultaneously makes the viewer ask what the position of 
the camera is within such an intimate scene between subjects. Would the conventional 
documentarian who is observing and not intimately involved with the subjects being filmed, be 
able to enter into such a private space with her recording devices? Susan sends a text message 
via her phone to Arin the following day. The message states: “it was fun not talking to you” re-
emphasizing the notion that an intimate moment was experienced through means of mediation. 
Crumley and Buice persistently and self-reflexively re-enact scenarios which situate them within 
a narrative that strongly relies on the presence of these recording devices and thematically we are 
reminded that the presence of the camera plays an intrinsic role not only in the relationship but 
its visibility also serves as a self-reflexive signal to the audience. It is a means through which the 
couple narrate, communicate and record their connection. It becomes evident in the final act of 
the film that both Crumley and Buice not only embarked on this filmic process with the intention 
to re-tell “their story” but also in order to archive it. They also make clear in their introduction to 
the film that the viewer is welcome to visit their website, foureyedmonsters.com. This site not 
only further promotes the film but features a thirteen part web series in which the couple 
continue to document the construction process of the film. The episodes favour guerrilla style 
„behind-the-scenes‟ footage (not featured in the film) which covers the trials and tribulations of 
the couple‟s relationship during the production process. In this way the couple uses a mediated 
platform in order to preserve their experience - albeit publicly.  For Brian Roberts the camera as 
recording device can serve as a means of “delaying or eradicating mortality as well as keeping a 
memory alive” (2011:sp). What documentary cannot do however, even though the perception 
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might exist that this is the documentary‟s purpose, is to “provide an unbiased objective account 
of the truth”. This is the case of Four Eyed Monsters (2005). A personal tale is subjectively 
retold via creative strategies that not only comment on film as construct but also simultaneously 
reconstructs a personal history to whichever extent the authors‟ desire. Therefore the traditional 
assumption that a documentary is an authentic representation of reality is once again challenged 
here. 
 
2.2: PRODUCING THE VISUAL SELF INTO BEING 
 
The subject-filmmaker dynamic inherent to the film Four Eyed Monsters (2005) places 
filmmakers, Crumely and Buice in a peculiar position: the couple are able to simultaneously look 
at the content they have constructed while being looked at by viewers of the film as well as by 
themselves as filmmakers. By referring to three scenarios in the film, Arin filming himself in 
front of the mirror, Susan filming herself and Arin filming Susan, I would like to unpack the idea 
of the self as both subject and creator of the documented narrative which is Four Eyed Monsters 
(2005) and in so doing develop the theory, by referring to Lacan‟s Mirror Phase, that the self 
collaboratively constructs and performs the self with and for her audience. The variously 
mediated gazes that we perceive in the film serve to demonstrate the complexity of looking and 
being looked at by the Big Other, the self, as well as the self as other. This process produces a 
self-reflexive filmic genre that is both re-enacted documentary, fictional narrative and fantasized 
“art” work. It is necessary to note throughout that the filmmakers are actively involved in how 
they are (re)presented as subjects through the mediated lens; formally they are consistently 
demonstrating how they have come to re-construct a personal narrative through self-reflexive 
methods, as discussed in the previous subsection of this chapter.  
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2.2.1: CRUMLEY FILMS CRUMLEY (FILMS CRUMLEY) 
 
Below, we see the process of Crumley constructing the image that will represent his online self. 
This process becomes reminiscent of the self-reflexive methods employed by Crumley and Buice 
in the scenarios discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4, 5 and 6 
Crumley prepares for his virtual date. 
 
In the images above (figures 4, 5 and 6) we find a brilliant example of how Crumley performs 
the double role of both filmmaker and subject. In this scene (which will henceforth be referred to 
as Crumley‟s “mirror scene”) the subject is simultaneously filming and being filmed while 
preparing for a virtual date. The subject-filmmaker is seen standing in front of a mirror, filming 
himself. He looks at himself (as other) not only as framed by the mirror, but he also composes an 
image of himself as seen through the lens of the camera he is holding up to the mirror. Crumley 
“sees” the self three times: as filmmaker who composes the image for the viewer of the film; as 
subject looking at the self in the mirror; and finally as self seen through the eyes of the camera 
lens in the mirror. Note also that Crumley is preparing for a virtual date with a, currently 
anonymous, virtual other, so by extension, he is also seeing himself as he imagines the Big Other 
will see him. The many layers and mediated ways of looking finally result in Crumley capturing 
the image of self in a black and white snapshot which will become the profile picture (see figure 
7 below) of his online dating profile, an image which can be argued was produced through 
Crumley‟s imagination to translate a certain desired identity to his public. We soon realize that 
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the “mirror scene‟‟ is Crumley‟s preparation for something. Crumley shows the viewer a ritual: 
he dresses attractively, cuts his hair, strikes a pose and finally takes a picture of himself. Once he 
uploads the picture onto a dating site in the following scene and constructs new descriptors of 
himself that accompany the image, after which he messages random anonymous women, the 
viewer realizes he was getting ready for a potential (virtual) date. It can be argued that Crumley 
thus composes an image which will allow him to see himself the way he hopes others (potential 
dates) will see him and constructs his online visual identity accordingly. Media theorist, Andra 
Siibak, is of the opinion that online profile pictures serve as important symbol for the subject: 
they are the “first impression” of the subject, giving an “overview of a person‟s self-concept and 
physical characteristics”, although these photos are often “staged performances” and therefore 
the mediated self becomes less authentic (2009:sp). 
 
Figure 7 
Arin‟s profile picture implicitly portrays him as artistic photographer, while simultaneously commenting 
on his own self-reflexivity due to the visibility of the camera. 
 
From a Lacanian perspective this is a way of “producing” the online image of the self as an ideal, 
desired self to be looked at: the manufactured photograph of the self becomes a means of ideal 
self-presentation.The profile picture characteristic of modern SNSs is an example of the process 
by which the self creates her own desired image of self, according to how she imagines the Big 
Other is perceiving her. Brian Roberts believes that virtual self-portraiture is being created 
constantly by individuals to visually communicate certain constructed narratives about the self 
(2011:sp). I argue that, the profile picture is a modern-day refashioning of a mirror, into which 
the individual might look, seeing her constructed version of her own fantasized “ideal-I”. 
Roberts, who also draws a through line between re-cognizing the self-image and the process of 
re-cognizing the reflection of the self in the mirror (within whichever form, photograph or film 
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screen), states that the experience of catching our reflection in “any medium which can produce 
an image of the self”, results in “existential thought processes” asking, “who is that?” (2011:sp). 
This is essentially significant of Lacan‟s Mirror Phase in which an identity (or concept of self) is 
formed through the imaginary processes when recognizing (re-cognizing) the reflection of the 
self in the mirror (1977:4).  
This moment of composing an image in the film serves in illuminating the notion that not only 
filmic representations can be methods for construction, but so can photographic processes. 
Roberts acknowledges that there is a common assumption that the photographic record is an 
image which “mirrors reality” and that it is a “faithful” record (2011:sp). Although Roberts 
implies that the photographic image might in some instances reflect the image of the self in the 
way a mirror might, as the photograph does “take a moment from reality and reproduces it as a 
recognizable image” he also affirms that “we tend to forget how the camera sees what it sees” 
and the various technical devices and choices concerning composition and lighting that are often 
involved in the producing of a self-portrait to the likes of Crumley‟s mirror-picture (2011:sp). 
Chalfen states that to “fully appreciate the potential power of photographs to act as a form of 
self-presentation; we must remember […] such images remain but one rendition of reality” 
(2002:142-143). 
In 2004 MySpace appropriately popularized what was then called “the mirror pic” (a picture 
taken of oneself in the mirror, requiring the camera to be captured in the mirror). Naturally, when 
the “mirror-pic” originated, camera phones were not yet the custom. The result was that big, 
almost invasive, cameras were visible in these pictures. Crumley‟s picture is clearly taken in the 
mirror as the camera reveals, as was the tendency of the time, which adds an utterly self-
reflexive element to the composition. Again, Crumley is indicating to his viewer that even 
online, he is commenting on himself as filmmaker and photographer. The overt visibility of the 
camera draws attention back to the important role that the camera plays in Buice and Crumley‟s 
relationship. In the context of the film, the mirror picture not only gives insight into Crumley as 
subject but serves as a self-reflexive moment. This mirror image draws a thematic link to self-
reflexive modes inherent to the film – Crumley the filmmaker is often documented as filming 
himself as subject. With the mirror portrait Crumley as subject photographs himself and 
purposefully selects the resultant constructed image in order to present an imagined (ideal) image 
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of his online self. On Crumley‟s webpage, which advertises him as videographer, he is also 
defined by his camera which is present in the photograph. It seems that the camera or the 
photograph or any kind of lens through which the mediated image of Crumley comes to be 
presented accompanies him whenever the viewer sees him, and becomes not only a prop with 
which to comment on self-reflexive methods of representation but also an extension of Crumley 
as subject, defining him as creator of mediated images. 
Crumley‟s mirror-picture is a kind of modern day self-portraiture providing the individual with 
the opportunity to look back at the constructed self, and applaud that creation. The need to 
present and document the self in a mediated and constructed manner is not an utterly new 
concept. People have been documenting ideal versions of themselves throughout the ages – both 
Lacan and Goffman quite clearly profess the need of the self to consistently construct and 
perform the self with the other in mind (1986 & 1959). Chalfen and Strano, insist that often we 
assume a photograph is a real record; a form of visual documentation which captures and 
preserves history but we forget the shooting and editing practices involved which shapes the 
photograph into an ideal image (2002:141-149, 2001:sp). The photo Crumley does take of 
himself by himself does connote a certain poetic or even artistic image and indicates the need to 
be summarized by the visual indicators in the photo. He is seen with his camera in one hand, 
which self-reflexively informs the onlooker that the camera plays a significant role in Crumley‟s 
demeanour, and by extension presents his virtual desired self that wishes to be seen as “creative” 
and “artistic”. He looks away from the lens (which he is clearly holding), adding a layer of 
“mystique” to the image: perhaps Crumley wants to imply that he is “deep” or “mysterious”, a 
popular tendency in profile pictures, according to Zhao et al. (2008:1825). And to add a final 
layer, he chooses to present the photo in black and white, creating a slight feeling of nostalgia 
and again signifying his “alternative” or “artistic” and “deep” desired characteristics. All these 
elements contribute to the very obvious idealized version of the self that Crumley constructs: he 
wants to be perceived as creative, artistic, poetic or even mysterious. This self-reflexive process 
of creating, narrating and performing the self by the self by means of photography, assist 
Crumley and Buice in creating a hybrid genre of storytelling which in turn support them in the 
contrivance and portrayal of certain ideal selves. In figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 at the beginning of this 
subsection, we see the process of Crumley constructing the image that will represent his online 
self. This process becomes reminiscent of the self-reflexive methods employed by Crumley and 
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Buice when they persistently comment on their presence in the construction of their auto-
documentary. Ultimately, this entire scene is a double commentary on the reflexivity and 
subjectivity with which Crumley and Buice chose to represent their images of self, as well as 
their personal narratives. 
 
2.2.2: BUICE FILMS BUICE (FILMS BUICE) 
 
In committing to communicating only through creative means of expression, both Buice and 
Crumley invest in an inventive process of narrating about the self to each other through the use 
of various forms of media. At a stage, Buice is documented as going on an art retreat and 
Crumley suggests communicating via video-diary for the duration of her stay. Here, Buice the 
filmmaker performs the role of subject as filmmaker, capturing the self in a specifically 
fantasized and constructed way. Her videos, the contents of which are addressed to Crumley, 
seem to portray her as artistic. It might be argued that she performs the role of someone who is 
artistic, often talking about her art, citing poems, and finding quirky ways of portraying 
messages by including mixed media drawings with montage-like editing in her messages. 
Buice‟s intent is to send these messages to Crumley, as the subject engaging in the filming of 
herself. She also engages in a self-reflexive performance of a desired identity. Essentially, Buice 
becomes an audience member to her own, sometimes rather existential, digital performance: her 
virtually mediated body becomes the vehicle through which she constructs a desired idea of the 
self. Here, Crumley is constituted as an other – her lover to whom she performs and expresses a 
certain desired identity. She also reflects on existential subject matter in the video messages and 
ponders whether or not she can live up to how Crumley as other conceives of a good artist, all 
the while expressing her need to be seen as an artist (her desired identity). While she is filming 
she also becomes her an other looking back at her creation of the self. Buice is seen holding the 
camera up to her face, the numbers in the corner of the screen reminding the viewer that we are 
watching a constructed scene by not only the subject but also by Buice the filmmaker who is 
ultimately in control of the composition of how she as subject within her personal re-constructed 
story is portrayed. For Buice this soon seems to become a therapeutic session in which she 
performs the tortured artist not able to “express from her core” as she herself states, resulting in 
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expressive ways of communicating, as she uses her body to illuminate a narrative. This recording 
of the self while expressing the need to be creative, could at times seem indulgent to the viewer: 
Buice‟s desired self clearly attempts to portray herself as artist and in the figures below (figures 
8, 9 and 10), Buice is uses an image of her body as a canvas to re-create a personal narrative in 
an inventive way while simultaneously producing a certain desired perspective of the self. Buice 
is seen as double filmmaker. She is ultimately documenting the self and by extension a narrative 
of the self that has come before – an artistic re-invention of her personal history. 
 
 
Figures 8, 9 and 10 
Buice uses her body as canvas to construct and perform a mediated narrative of the self. 
 
2.2.3: CRUMLEY FILMS BUICE or “STALKING SUSAN” 
 
In this self-reflexive autobiographical docu-drama the couple meet online and Buice suggests 
they meet up – she invites Crumley to visit her at work where she is a waitress. Although 
Crumley eventually musters up the courage to go, he does not make his presence known once he 
is there. Rather, he waits until Buice‟s shift finishes and starts following her, without her 
knowing, recording footage of her with his video camera recorder. He finally follows her all the 
way home, Buice still unaware. Crumley decides to send an email to Buice, and attaches photo 
stills from the footage he took of her, making it evident that he had been following her around 
unobtrusively. The email is fittingly titled, “Stalking Susan”. Buice responds to the photos 
stating that it had “excited” her to know that at “anytime, anywhere”, someone could be 
watching her. Crumley‟s fascination with filming Buice (without her initial consent) makes for 
an entertaining and suspenseful scene, but Crumley‟s motivation behind doing so dominantly 
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serves in highlighting elements of self-reflexive filmmaking for the viewer. Rather, what makes 
for complex power dynamics of gazing in this scene is Buice‟s response to the scenario that 
implies a compliance with the situation. Approaching this scene from a surveillance perspective, 
an interesting dynamic evolves which, although reminiscent of both panoptic as well as 
omnioptic gazing practises, isn‟t really one or the other. While panoptic looking entails the 
observer in a position of power (the observed not in control of her own visibility), ominioptic 
gazing provides the observed with the platform to choose when and how she will be made 
visible. Omnioptic forms of gazing entail a democratic element as explained chapter one - 
instead of feeling shame at her own visibility over which she has no control, the observed is 
liberated by willingly and purposefully making the self visible. In this scene, Crumley bears the 
gaze and selects how he will show her the way she is seen through his camera lens which 
represents an other. Buice in turn has no control over how her mediated self will come to look 
and look back at her from within the mirror of the screen. And yet, through her response, Buice 
indicates that she is thrilled by the situation. There seems to be a desire here to be looked at – to 
be produced through the gaze of another in the Lacanian sense of the word. In chapter three, I 
briefly refer to Žižek who, also within the Lacanian framework, explores personal surveillance 
websites that for him serve as the perfectly created platform in which the self demonstrates her 
reliance on the gaze from an other (2002:225). Žižek also notes in this instance a kind of reversal 
of the traditional panoptic surveillance model in which the subject is forever observed and has 
“no place to hide from the omnipresent gaze of the Power” (2002:225). With these surveillance 
websites, however, Žižek recognizes the development of a kind of “anxiety” from what he calls 
the “prospect of not being exposed to the Other‟s gaze all the time” (2002:224). I believe that 
concept applies here. I have investigated the role the camera plays in the relationship between 
Crumley and Buice, both as prop through which to communicate and tool with which to 
document their story. There is clearly reliance to communicate through the camera with each 
other rather than talking face to face. For Žižek the gaze of the camera (and by default what it 
represents, namely, the Big Other) serves as an “ontological guarantee of his/her being” 
(2002:225). The couple portray various positions of power in this scene: fundamentally one 
looks and one is being looked at. But it is not plainly hierarchical and subservient: while 
Crumley is the dominant observer, Buice‟s simultaneous compliance and self-confessed 
“excitement” establishes an almost erotic tone in this scene – she wants to be looked at. Perhaps 
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Crumley‟s gaze serves also as the “ontological guarantee” of Buice‟s being. Žižek contests that 
the self exists in that she imagines she is perceived through the gaze of an Other (2005:225).It 
will be useful to unpack the different gazes in this scenario – where they come from and who 
they are directed at has a powerful impact on psychological processes of self-imagining.  I would 
first like to look at Crumley‟s role as observer and then at Buice‟s role as the observed.  
Crumley‟s stalking act has a voyeuristic quality to it. Simply put voyeurism is the “act of 
viewing the activities of other people unbeknown to them” (Hayward 2001:446). Often the term 
has “illicit connotations” as voyeurism also points towards the act of deriving pleasure from this 
anonymous viewing, often referred to as scopophilia. Crumley and his camera adopt the role of 
voyeur, and due to Buice‟s obliviousness to their presence he adopts a position of power and 
hierarchical control over Buice‟s visibility (at least for the moment). According to Hayward 
voyeurism might be a strategy adopted by the male to “counter his fear of sexual difference” 
(2001:447-448). In acting as voyeur he “fixes the woman with his gaze, voyeuristically 
investigat[ing] her body, and therefore sexuality – she is the object of his investigation and in 
that way he safely contains her” (2001:447-448). The fact that Buice cannot return the gaze in 
this instance reiterates that he is in a position of power – he is the one who has agency over her 
visibility and subsequently over her. Crumley‟s camera becomes like a forbidden window, with 
Crumley as Peeping Tom, voyeuristically lurking outside of it and gazing through it, unbeknown 
to the object of the gaze. Buice‟s statement, however, suggests that she opens the blinds for her 
voyeur, who at this stage is anonymous, inviting his gaze into her home. Through her statement, 
Susan essentially performs the role of the female who is subservient, not able to look back, fixing 
herself as object of his gaze and subsequently he remains in a position of power. Even if she 
liberates herself by inviting the gaze back in, she still cannot look back. But does she want to 
look? The basis of Lacan‟s argument on the Big Other is that this other is fundamentally 
constituted through the imagination. It is through the imagined gaze of the Other that the self 
conducts and constrains the idea of her “self” according to an imagined judgement. Contrary to a 
typical voyeuristic scenario, with its definite hierarchical power structures in which the subject is 
not in control of her own visibility, something nearly liberating and even slightly omnioptic 
happens here: Buice welcomes the gaze. She wants to be looked at and it is clear that she does 
not feel the need to look back. What is significant about this situation is that Crumley doesn‟t 
remain anonymous: he brags about his position as voyeur by proving to her via email that he had 
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watched her. Perhaps Buice welcomes it in the hope to receive more images of herself. Two 
things become clear here: Buices‟s desire to be perceived through the gaze of the Other is 
evident, and secondly, it seems like she wants to be in a position to gaze at the image of herself.  
When discussing Buice‟s role in this scenario it is important to understand that her gaze 
oscillates between her gaze as subject and her gaze as filmmaker. By signaling to her stalker that 
she enjoyed being watched, she invites him to do so again, fixing herself as the object of his 
gaze. Traditional surveillance conditions are challenged in that she willingly invites the gaze in, 
but at this point she cannot look back. Although this scene might seem as if it fails in terms of 
hierarchical surveillance models, I do not think this was the intent – as online social media is at 
the foreground of this film, I believe rather that it attempts to demonstrate the complex looking 
dynamics involved in a space (online) where the image of the self is consistently scrutinized by 
the self as other as well as by the self‟s imagined Big Other, reliant on their judgement. In 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, the imagined ideal image of self (ego-ideal) is what is required in order 
to be accepted by the Other‟s imagined desired gaze – the subject “judges” herself and her image 
(ideal ego) according to how she imagines the Other desires to perceive her (Dashtipour 
2009:323-324). But, what weighs stronger for me here is Buice‟s interest in looking at herself 
through the footage Arin sends her of herself. Although it must be noted that in turn, and within 
the content of the film, Buice is not able to choose which parts of herself will be shown to her, 
this scenario illuminates the Lacanian idea of the desire of the self to be given life through means 
of another‟s (an other‟s) gaze. Through her statement, Buice not only fixes herself as the object 
of Crumley‟s gaze but his need to show her the way she is seen through his eyes obviously 
speaks to Buice‟s narcissistic desires to see herself through Crumley‟s (imagined) eyes. It is 
important to note the necessary presence of Crumley as facilitator to Buice‟s imagined self: the 
actual footage Crumley is taking of her shows her the way she is seen by him as he looks at her 
through his camera and how she is possibly perceived by others around her. At this stage, and for 
the sake of the narrative, Crumley‟s identity is of little importance – he is an anonymous other 
who serves her narcissistic desires of seeing herself the way she imagines others see her and in 
this way she becomes a second audience member of her own documented self. Crumley almost 
becomes an object, fulfilling Buice‟s desire to look at herself in the way that others look at her. 
This scenario might serve as an affirmation for Buice that an other is looking. The proof of 
Crumley‟s gaze via email is perhaps flattering to Buice: her image served back at her is an 
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affirmation that someone desires to “look”. While the content of this film might document ways 
of self-fashioning on SNSs, the filmic representation follows reflexive methods which allow the 
viewer to understand that the filmic mode of representation might just be another platform or 
means of mediation through which these subject-filmmakers are able to re-present the image and 
narrative of their (possibly ideal and imagined) selves. 
It is vital to remember, however, that ultimately Buice is portraying two roles: that of subject and 
that of filmmaker. If I am to consider this scenario from a self-reflexive point of view, it must be 
remembered that Buice is also a filmmaker, who essentially chooses how she will be seen, and is 
able to “look” at how she is seen, not only by Crumley within the content of the film but also as 
filmmaker who bears the ultimate gaze. This means that she is ultimately greatly involved in the 
construction of her mediated image and very much in control of the way in which she will be 
seen by her audience even if she performs the role of subject complying with a hierarchical gaze 
towards her. The couple reaches a democratic equilibrium of gazing at themselves: they are both 
the ultimate observers and selectors of their own mediated images. 
 
2.3: CONCLUSION 
 
Four Eyed Monsters (2005) presents its viewer with various complicated questions which serve 
to highlight the dualistic role of the subject-filmmaker. As prosumers of their own content 
Crumley and Buice succeed in telling a story via a hybrid mode of filmmaking which manages to 
comment on film as construct and reveal the issues around the treatment of actuality. This idea 
simultaneously sheds light on the complexities of subjectivity within the documentary filmic 
genre, while exploring the concept of the self produced through various forms of social media.  
By adding obvious self-reflexive devices, the subject-filmmakers highlight the representational 
manner of making and presenting a film – fictional or documentary – in order to comment on the 
problematic of the form itself and how the viewer interprets it. As subjects and as filmmakers, 
Crumley and Buice act as voyeurs of each others‟ visually mediated selves. Set against the 
background of a fictional online dating site, the filmmakers comment on their position as victim 
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of the imagined judgement of others and demonstrate how they manage their online impressions 
accordingly. Crumley and Buice both become each others‟ Big Other, maintaining a relationship 
where interaction is always mediated and therefore also constructed. Often the camera becomes 
the mediator through which this couple communicates. However, the camera is also a prop with 
which they capture, present and define their visual identities. It is as if the video camera becomes 
a third member of Arin and Susan‟s relationship, signifying their role as filmmakers that bear the 
ultimate gaze, deciding how to present what and representing the imagined eye of the Big Other. 
By including self-reflexive representational strategies, the filmmakers comment on the very 
complex role of the subjective subject-filmmaker and in turn illuminate the autobiographical 
dynamic which allows them to further emphasize subjective self-documentation. By creating 
interesting scenes that document how subjects manage their mediated image of self with 
collaborative assistance from (imagined) others, the filmmakers demonstrate mirror-gazing 
processes. While constantly reminding his viewers of his self-reflexive role as filmmaker, 
Crumley, as subject, gazes through many lenses, attempting to either extract from it some sort of 
coherent narrative about his desired self or undertaking to fulfil the symbolic role of Other who 
gazes at his fellow subject. His fellow subject, Buice, is however also his fellow filmmaker and 
while the documented gazing practises between the two subjects aim at highlighting certain 
power dynamics in looking, the filmmakers cleverly remind the viewer that as filmmaker, Buice 
bears the ultimate (hierarchical) gaze: forcing the viewer to see what she wants them to see. 
In the following chapters, I will explore this dualistic relationship of the subject-filmmaker 
further and demonstrate how the self never performs her desired idea of self in isolation, but 
always in collaboration with the imagined Other. Chapter three investigates the notion of 
personal webcam surveillance online. I explore how the subject of We Live in Public (2009) 
becomes a pseudo-documentarian of his own mediated image: claiming control over the 
distribution of his mediated image, while maintaining a subservient position of observed, rather 
than observer of his own image. While I explore the subjects‟ personal identity construction 
practices online, I systematically look at how filmmaker, Ondi Timoner, mirror these notions in 
her representational methods which, although at times seems straightforward have strong self-
reflexive tendencies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SELF-REFLEXIVE SURVEILLANCE AND DOCUMENTATION 
IN PAN/OMNI-OPTIC BORDERLANDS 
 
Ondi Timoner employs various elements from different representational modes to present the 
content of this film. Editing is predominantly seamless and the mode of representation fairly 
conventional: she uses methods reminiscent of observational and expository representational 
strategies, including a mixture of interviews with chyrons
12
, observational footage, photographs, 
voice-overs and text. She however dominantly employs self-reflexive methods of composition 
and juxtaposition, inviting the viewer to partake in a critical decoding of the content while 
simultaneously stressing Josh Harris‟ own self-reflexive involvement in the production of his 
mediated and subsequently documented self.  
The voice-over narration traditionally found in expository documentaries
13
 is used in this film in 
order to contextualize the narrative (Nichols 2001:105). Timoner often makes use of this 
convention in order to create context for the viewer and provide the viewer with personal 
opinions. However, she soon confesses via voice-over her role as documentarian and observer of 
Harris‟ activities, a claim to authorship which clearly adds a self-reflexive element to the film. 
The knowledge that her presence as filmmaker is pertinent in Harris‟ experiments also raises 
questions about the authenticity of his behaviour in front of her cameras. In order to demonstrate 
this point Timoner employs not only a mixing of self-reflexive and expository modes but the 
documentary but sometimes relies on observational methods which, although seemingly 
unobtrusive, can have the potential to influence subjects filmed. The methods Timoner employs 
                                                          
12
A chyron is the text which is typically superimposed over shots of interviewees in the lower third of the screen, 
stating the interviewee’s name and field of expertise (Maasdorp 2011:223). 
 
13
Voice-over commentary, significant to expository modes of representation, where the “speaker is heard but 
never seen”, addresses the viewer “directly” with “titles or voices that propose a perspective, advance an 
argument, or recount history” (Nichols 2001:105). Timoner not only makes use of this representational method in 
order to propose a certain perspective but through it she also introduces her own self-reflexive position as 
subjective filmmaker. 
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in order to introduce Harris within the first few minutes of the film, set up a convention for the 
viewer which allows her to understand the complicated dynamics of who the authoring agent is 
in the telling of this story: the viewer is faced head on with the puzzling relationship we come to 
face in We Live in Public (2009) between the two very present documentarians. 
As We Live in Public (2009) begins the viewer hears a voice, which she will later come to 
recognize as belonging to Josh Harris. In this voice-over he states: “I‟m about to be eaten”. Such 
a statement conjures up images of human prey or even cannibalism, and soon enough the viewer 
will come to understand the often animalistic tendencies of the self when captured under the gaze 
of severe surveillance in Harris‟ experiments. This statement is then immediately followed by the 
first visual image of Harris as he is making a personal video recording in which he addresses his 
dying mother, saying goodbye to her. The viewer sees the running time in the corners of the 
screen, characteristic of any conventional home recording device, indicating that Harris is 
filming himself. By opening the film with this remarkably powerful scene, Timoner 
demonstrates two vital themes of the film: first Harris as creator and documentarian of his own 
mediated image, and second Harris‟ reliance on technical media when expressing emotion. 
Harris‟ message to his mother comes across as rather cold. But if his statement alone does not 
provide the viewer with enough proof of his detachment towards this touching subject of his 
dying mother, Timoner strategically inserts a quick comment from his brother, stating: “It was 
hard...just getting a message from him...a cold message”. The oscillation between Harris‟ 
seemingly “cold” message and his brother‟s affirmation that it was indeed a “cold” message is an 
editing strategy employed by Timoner in order to emphasize this point. The editing produces a 
flowing nature of the argument but before the viewer can completely suspend her disbelief, 
Timoner very clearly draws the viewer‟s attention back to the technicalities involved in the 
construction processes of the video message by emphasizing Harris‟ own involvement with how 
he is presenting his mediated message. These self-reflexive methods encourage intellectual 
engagement with the content viewed. Timoner continually plays around with these various 
methods of representation– expository and (later in the film) observational while simultaneously 
making use of self-reflexive strategies – in order to demonstrate the delicateness of film as 
subjective construction. Both Maasdorp and Nichols state that most self-reflexive films do not 
adhere to the “rules” of only one particular type of subgenre (2011:217 & 2001:100). As the film 
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continues, this becomes a theme as we see Harris struggling with how he attempts to present and 
subsequently document himself.  
Unlike Susan Buice and Arin Crumely who self-reflexively perform the roles of filmmaker-
subject in Four Eyed Monsters (2005), and distinct from Nev who becomes the facilitator of his 
own narrative towards the final act of Catfish (2010), Harris‟ participation in the construction of 
how he is portrayed lies within his projects. Instead of the story of the filmmaker and the story of 
the subject colliding as with the other films, we find here two-part documentation: first, Ondi 
Timoner‟s documentation of Josh Harris, and second, Josh‟s experiments as documented by 
Harris. Timoner‟s formal techniques, although they might often seem “straightforward”, re-
iterate the self-reflexivity with which Harris attempts to document his story. 
In the previous chapter I have highlighted the ways in which a mediated self can come to gaze at 
herself within the mirror of the screen as other. When this self portrays the role of subject-
filmmaker or “prosumer”, she is able to re-construct the idea of the self via editing methods, 
according to how she imagines the Big Other perceives of her. In order to understand the way in 
which visibility and the psychology behind being seen function in the “We Live in Public” 
terrain that Harris and his girlfriend, Tanya, constructed, I must first highlight some vital factors 
which I believe influenced the couple‟s behaviour, and the way in which they documented 
themselves. The visibility and demeanour of their supposedly authentic selves online is reliant on 
the environment in which they choose to “live in public”. A mediated territory manifests and the 
couple is represented as simultaneously “real” and “virtual” – never really being one or the other. 
“Real” footage is captured of them, but immediately their bodies are turned into mediated 
entities to be streamed live over the internet. Despite the utilization of the technical features and 
devices (social media and webcams) which assist in the construction of their online presence and 
which provide them with the platform to present themselves within this specifically mediated 
(though apparently “authentic”) manner, the space that this couple inhabits that allows them to 
move seamlessly between the real (albeit constructed) and the virtual come to function as a 
borderland. This borderland in turn comes to embody a space where “rules” are challenged and 
normative understandings of private vs. public, and power vs. control, as well as power vs. 
submissiveness (in terms of surveillance theory) are re-defined. 
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Another vital factor to take into consideration in this scenario is the role of the Big Other. 
Timoner herself never bothers with exclusively highlighting the couples‟ motivations behind the 
implementation of such an experiment and so rather than asking why the couple made themselves 
visible in such a way, I would like to ask for whom do they do this? I have addressed the theory 
behind Lacan‟s Big Other and must refer to Žižek, who emphasises that an anxiety has arisen in 
modern socially mediated cultures out of the idea of “not being seen” (2002:225). The argument 
here is that only in so far as the self is looked at can she feel validated. Harris himself continually 
states during interviews that being seen on television and other media gave purpose to his 
existence.  
Harris uses surveillance as a means to perform the role of pseudo-documentarian in order to 
construct and subsequently document his own narrative. He uses what might seem like a “fly-on-
the-wall”14 approach through intrusive personal webcam surveillance which consequently 
documents him and his girlfriend in the most mundane as well as explicit ways. The space in 
which he chooses to carry out this happening
15
 has a severe effect on the relationship between 
the couple and their viewers, who, it can be argued, assist them in the construction of their daily 
“authentic” routines. The couple come to inhabit what might seem like a border-space, living in-
between the „real‟ and the virtual, never purely being in one space at one time but always having 
one foot in each world. This brings about a myriad of complexities which underline their 
intimate relationships with their viewers. I use the word intimate here as it indicates the strange 
                                                          
14
Fly-on-the-wall filmmaking is a strategy employed by filmmakers in an attempt to “simply capture” footage as it 
plays out in front of the camera without overt intervention or direction, seeing events as a fly on the wall might 
(Winston 2008:210). This term is often synonymous with direct cinema or what Nichols refers to as the 
observational mode of representation referred to in the introduction to the thesis (Nichols 2001:109). 
 
15
A “Happening” has been considered to be a type of performance art or (often spontaneous) theatrical event 
originally inspired by artists such as Allan Kaprow, Jim Dine, Claes Oldenburg and the Dadaist movement. The 
event is usually multi-disciplinary and favours a nonlinear-narrative. Peter Brook addresses the notion of a 
“happening” in his book, The Empty Space (1968:155), stating that it can take place “anywhere, any time, of any 
duration: nothing is required, nothing is taboo… *a happening+ may be spontaneous, it may be formal, it may be 
anarchistic…” Josh’s documentary endeavour which is part surveillance experiment, part performance art, evokes 
a type of “happening”: a spontaneous event where anything goes. Participants are both performers and audience 
members partaking in an improvised documented art-event.  
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explicitness with which this couple share their most private activities online, challenging the very 
conventions of what is constituted as private and/or public.  
The collaborative impact that the viewers have on Harris and Corrin‟s everyday actions, 
emphasizes the vital role that the audience – who function as the Lacanian Big Other – plays in 
the demeanour of the mediated self. A collective audience is invited to look in, with their 
subjects unable to reciprocate the gaze, therefore leaving Josh and Tanya in a submissive role 
reliant on the presence of others watching in order to validate the existence of their mediated 
narrative.  
We Live in Public (2009) offers a powerful example of how traditional power systems associated 
with surveillance theory come to be challenged through the implementation of personal webcam 
surveillance. I also explore the vital role that space plays in this self-documented endeavour, 
demonstrating how the perfect arena is created for challenging normative understandings of the 
private/public binary. The omnipresent onlooker/audience member(s), and the presence of the 
Big Other, have a significant influence on the demeanour of the subject who perceives herself as 
under surveillance. I therefore draw on the concepts of the Lacanian Ideal-I and Big Other in 
order to understand this personal surveillance webcam documentary that both subject and 
documentarian attempt to represent.  
 
3.1: PERSONAL WEBCAM SURVEILLANCE: BEYOND THE 
PANOPTICON 
 
“In „Quiet‟ I was in control of the rats in my laboratory and in „We Live in Public‟, I was the 
rat.” 
Josh Harris (We Live in Public 2009). 
 
Harris‟s statement serves to highlight the various power struggles associated with different forms 
of gazing established in the personal surveillance experiments, “Quiet” and “We Live in Public”. 
In this statement, Josh believes that he was “in control” – implying he was in a power position 
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(of looking) during the surveillance experiment, “Quiet”. This experiment, which employed 
omnioptic ways of surveying, provided individuals with a platform for democratic gazing. I have 
mentioned Jurgenson‟s concept of the omniopticon which designates participatory surveillance 
practises associated with modern SNSs, where individuals who gaze are simultaneously gazed at 
by virtual others, therefore making this specific gazing endeavour “democratic” as opposed to 
hierarchical gazing characteristic of panoptic surveillance models (2010:378). Democratic gazing 
is, however, a problematic surveillance structure. Individuals are liberated by modern day SNSs 
where a participatory virtual society exists and mutual gazing is the norm. But, as previously 
emphasized, to be in control of one‟s own visibility is to be in control of how one is perceived 
through that which is made visible and that which is not. Modern SNSs that encourage social 
surveillance provide individuals with the optimal platform for selective (re)presentations of the 
self, and necessitate active impression management in order to maintain that idea of self (boyd 
2007; Goffman 1959). However, I would like to call up the image of Big Brother – a term which 
commonly connotes the image of an omnipresent eye, always watching – to argue that social 
surveillance between peers within a participatory surveillance society is fundamentally structured 
in a way similar to what Harris anticipated with his capsule hotel of the “Quiet” habitat (Žižek 
2002:225). In this subsection I take a look at Harris as pseudo-documentarian while referring to 
Timoner as authoring agent of the representation of Harris. 
The inhabitants of the “Quiet” experiment partake in mutual gazing within a state of utter 
exposedness, while Harris (Big Brother), who initiated the event, is always present, always 
watching but not always visible. His dominant transparency is juxtaposed by Timoner‟s 
presence. Her voice-overs continually remind the viewer that she is present, observing with her 
camera. Harris bears the ultimate gaze in the experiment which cannot be reciprocated, even if 
his subjects are able to gaze at each other. Harris sets the optimal stage for the practise of mutual 
gazing, and yet he, and by extension his multitude cameras, still exemplify the Panoptic tradition 
so completely. Traditionally Jeremy Bentham‟s panoptic surveillance model dictates that there is 
an individual in control of the “look” towards another, while the individual who looks is herself 
never visible. With “Quiet” the image of Bentham‟s panoptic prison structure, described in 
chapter on, evolves: suddenly the walls of the various cells arranged in a circular row, are made 
out of glass, enabling the inhabitants to see each other. But the ultimate “eye in the sky” still 
remains invisible. Inhabitants of such an environment might briefly forget about Big Brother, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 59 
being occupied with the mutual gazing between each other. Nevertheless, the presence of the one 
who is observing but who cannot be observed prevails. An inhabitant of “Quiet” states in an 
interview that the ultimate question to ask within such a state of severe surveillance is: “Who is 
behind all of this?” Fittingly she calls Harris, Mr. Oz, referring to L. Frank Baum‟s “The 
Wonderful Wizard of Oz” (1900). Here, a fairy tale enigma is brought back to life, painting 
Harris as the ultimate puppet master, a wizard who uses magic and props in order to sustain a 
myth that he is great and powerful. In the fairy tale it is finally discovered that the wizard is but a 
mere human being, manipulating his people. An interesting image to call to mind: while Harris 
performs the role of invisible observer in the tower, it is only partially so. Alluding to the fact 
that he is a puppet master or a wizard is to assume that he is actively participating in this 
surveillance endeavour, using “tricks” to manipulate the inhabitants of “Quiet” into thinking that 
he is “in control”, as he himself declares in his statement at the beginning of this subsection. 
Calling him “Oz”, fundamentally suggests that this interviewee is aware of his ultimate 
powerlessness. It is vital to note that this comment is made by the interviewee many years after 
the actual experiment. The viewer never actually hears the inhabitants of “Quiet” referring to 
him as “Oz” during the part of the documentary that follows that specific experiment. This 
interviewee might in fact in retrospect have noticed that Harris was fundamentally powerless and 
was therefore able to make the metaphorical connection. In the film, Harris is “in control” in so 
far as he sets the stage, points the cameras and calls “action!” After that he is seen as 
unobtrusively observing.  
Although Harris adopts the role of observer, it is not to say that he does not have an effect on 
what is happening in front of the cameras. As Bill Nichols argues, the observational mode of 
documentation implies that the filmmaker apparently unobtrusively points the camera and 
observes the “real action” playing out in front of it, but the mere presence of the camera 
influences the authenticity of the documented individual‟s demeanour (2001:109-111). Nichols 
raises the question: “Do people conduct themselves in ways that will colour our perception of 
them [...] to satisfy a filmmaker who does not say what he wants?” (2001:111). Harris appears to 
take on the role of a pseudo observational documentarian. But ironically his apparent non-
intrusiveness makes itself known within the form of the omnipresent camera lens which 
inevitably influences the authenticity of his subjects‟ demeanour. Timoner briefly shows Harris 
as being overtly present during this experiment only twice. In the first example, Harris physically 
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enters the experiment and he observes, along with numerous inhabitants, a near-savage moment 
in the glass shower. The shower, shaped in the form of a fat cylinder and standing in the centre 
of a room, serves as a playground which soon turns into a battlefield for two inhabitants of 
“Quiet”, a male and a female, who engage in a playful chase sequence. The female dangles from 
a pole right outside the shower, tempting a naked male who stands in the shower. Here, Harris is 
seen giving direction for the first time. He simply looks toward the male, and states, “Go for it.” 
The scene between the couple develops into an almost savage ritual: the inhabitants and camera 
operators gather round chanting and encouraging the male to perform his strength while chasing 
the skinny female who tries to get away but keeps slipping on the wet floor. Harris looks at the 
nearest camera and states: “I‟m sitting here...looking at two people, basically naked...with thirty 
people watching, and it‟s like, yeah, okay, that‟s the future”. I find this statement striking. The 
first part of the statement implies Harris‟ apparent lack of concern, which although seemingly 
apathetic, must not be falsely understood as “non-intrusion” (Nichols 2001:111). His very 
presence and the presence of the cameras, the omnipresent eye(s) watching, facilitate the 
spectacle of this scene. The latter part of Harris‟ statement, “that‟s the future”, refers to the idea 
of a space that welcomes mutual gazing, where normative understandings of what is constituted 
as private or public are challenged. 
A second instance, in which Timoner shows Harris in a position of “power”, sees him delivering 
a sermon in the “chapel room”. He states: “We must constantly tell the universe man was here. 
Man was here”. This scene, with its cult-like feel, complete with modern architecture that 
mimics a church, exemplifies Harris‟ intent obsession with documentation as a form of 
archiving. It is important to remember that this footage captured of the inhabitants was intended 
to be stored. These were not meant to be fleeting images that disappear the moment they are 
seen. Harris refers to the “Quiet” experiment, stating: “Everything is free, except the video we 
capture of you...that we own.” Harris created a habitat which would provide individuals with the 
opportunity to be utterly visible in their most private and everyday habits while partaking in the 
practise of gazing while being gazed at by “real” as well as electronic eyes that have the ability 
to archive the material it records.  
I would like to return to the idea of Harris as “unobtrusive observer”. It is interesting that 
Timoner‟s representation of Harris plays with notions of surveyor, who has no apparent 
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influence on the action taking place in front of him but whose prominent presence in the minds 
of the subjects filmed, seem to be prevalent. While Timoner paints Harris in such a light one 
must perhaps wonder about Timoner‟s own position as observer of Harris‟ enterprises. Although 
Timoner is present during Harris‟ escapades, filming them, her own presence as documentarian 
seems to be forgotten by the viewer. Subtly, she will from time to time pull our attention back to 
her, the filmmaker, through her own visibility or first person voice-over narration. But instead of 
a mysterious “knowing” voice, however, Timoner defies the conventional formula of expository 
voice-over narration, by allowing the viewer to be aware that she, as filmmaker is the one 
narrating and constructing the way in which Harris is presented to us. In the very beginning of 
the film she briefly, through voice-over narration, tells the story of how she and Harris met, 
which led to him inviting her to become a rather present filmmaker in and of his life. By using 
expository methods Timoner both provides context and proposes a specific perspective. Timoner 
uses the voice-over tradition and thus she implicitly introduces herself to the audience resulting 
in a self-reflexive gesture that makes the viewer aware of the fact that she is the one in control of 
Harris‟s visibility. Although I find Timoner‟s presence as filmmaker pertinent, she will often 
allow the viewer‟s focus to dwell on Harris as pseudo-documentarian of his mediated self. In 
such instances, Timoner herself becomes un-obtrusive and simply observant. The juxtaposition 
of certain shots and compositions during interviews rather frames Harris as documentarian and 
surveyor of his own endeavours while simultaneously subtly hinting at Timoner‟s self-reflexive 
position as filmmaker. In a sit-down interview with Harris the viewer is made acutely aware of 
contrived representational strategies. Timoner places Harris in a room filled with screens in 
which the recorded footage of the interview she is presently having with him is captured in real-
time. Some of the screens are angled in such a way that it seems as if the talking heads are 
looking right at the corporeal Harris, surveying him. Timoner includes many shots during the 
film in which Harris is staring into the screen of the weliveinpublic.com interface, gazing at his 
mediated self in the same way other anonymous online users might. The blatant use of visible 
technical equipment in the scene again signals to the viewer that Timoner is ultimately in control 
of how Harris is represented to the viewer of the film. Timoner‟s role as documentarian often 
oscillates between observational to expository to self-reflexive allowing her to become like the 
electronic eyes of “Quiet” and “We Live in Public” – somehow always present to “capture” 
Harris.  
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It is the notion of documentation of the self that drives Harris towards his second experiment, 
“We Live in Public”. Here, Harris decides to turn the cameras on himself and, as he notes, where 
he suddenly becomes “the rat”. This statement implies that initially he was in control, but that he 
lost or gave up that control. This suggests two things: first, that this surveillance experiment is 
intricately linked to hierarchical dynamics of looking and being looked at, and second, the 
statement generates the feeling that the experiment might not have gone as planned. That is also 
how Timoner sketches it – she provides the viewer with a bleak look at what happens when the 
self is placed under severe surveillance (Jurgenson 2010:376). Timoner uses titles and voice-over 
narration to pose questions about the dynamics of watching and being watched asking in which 
ways we are “freer or more constrained” (Jurgenson 2010:376). Her perspective supports the 
theme that omnioptic looking poses a problem, for the mutuality of the gaze always makes the 
individual aware that she is watched – even though she is allowed to look back.  
 The concept of personal (webcam) surveillance is challenging in terms of traditional 
understandings of the panoptic surveillance model. Hille Koskela states, although there are far-
reaching similarities between traditional understandings of the panoptic surveillance model and 
personal webcam surveillance, the latter has indeed gone “beyond the panoptic” (2006:175). 
Mathiesen and Jurgenson also demonstrate with concepts such as the synopticon and the 
omniopticon that modern interactive social media conditions allow the subjects who have never 
been in control of their own visibility, to step into various roles where they are able to gaze in, at 
others and at their own idealized construction of their visibility (1997 & 2010). The synopticon 
serves as a direct counterpart to the panopticon and refers to mass media technology which 
enables “the many to see the few” rather than the “few seeing the many” (Mathiesen 1997). The 
omnioptic gaze conversely refers to a “democratization of the gaze” that has become the norm 
with the ever-increasing popularity of interactive social media sites (Jurgenson 2010:377).  
In chapter one I refer to Koskela‟s four modes that relate to the traditional understanding of 
panoptic gazing, and she demonstrates how personal webcam surveillance challenges certain 
elements traditionally associated with this type of gazing (2006:175-204). These elements are: 
the observer as omnipotent, self-imposed visibility as empowering, and power and control as 
functioning on very different levels. A fourth component she refers to is that of surveillance as 
disciplinary tool – this aspect will not be focussed on in this discussion as the personal webcam 
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practise is more concerned with documentation of selves through surveillance practises, rather 
than disciplining the self (2006:175-204). Although I agree with Koskela that personal webcam 
surveillance and documentation do challenge the very basic understandings of the panopticon, I 
also find that often in the case of Harris‟ social surveillance experiments, attempts at challenging 
these surveillance conventions are unsuccessful. This prevalence of conventional surveillance 
dynamics is particularly visible in Harris‟ second surveillance experiment, “We Live in Public”, 
in which he turns the camera on himself and becomes the “rat” in the experiment. I now 
investigate Koskela‟s modes in more detail and look at how they relate to Harris‟ surveillance 
experiments. I simultaneously look at how Timoner emulates this dynamic through her 
documentary representation of Harris. 
 
3.1.1: TOP-DOWN-MONITORING CHALLENGED 
 
In chapter one I discussed how the panoptic surveillance model entails an observer who is in a 
more powerful position than the observed, because she is able to watch over the subject, the 
subject in turn not in control of her own visibility. Koskela insists that personal webcam 
surveillance challenges this traditional hierarchy associated with panoptic surveillance 
(2006:175). I would like to uncover the process that Harris embarks upon when simultaneously 
stepping into both the role of the observer (who is normally in the power position) as well as the 
subject (who is usually submissive and who doesn‟t have control over the extent to which she is 
made visible). Harris willingly makes himself the object of the gaze, thereby re-defining this 
conception of power as framed by traditional surveillance theory. The result as Koskela contends 
is that normative understandings of the hierarchical structure of the panopticon are tested.The 
traditional surveillance model is challenged due to the subject agreeing to be made visible and 
due to the fact that this subject seems to have control over what is made visible and what not.  
Elements of the omniopticon are prevalent when considering mutual visibility and gazing 
practices on SNSs where there is a general involvement in participatory surveillance. On SNSs, 
the practise of watching and being watched becomes part of a joint commitment of participatory 
surveillance and mutual gazing where I share because I know the other will also share. I make 
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myself visible because I am able to be both subject who is looked at and observer who may look 
at what the other shares.   
Harris willingly participates in his own visibility in the most intimate as well as mundane ways, 
which might seem like an empowering and liberating action. However, Koskela argues that just 
because the hierarchical structure is challenged, this does not mean there is no power (2004:206). 
Building on Koskela‟s insight, I would like to posit that even though it might seem as if these 
subjects who partake in the personal webcam surveillance experiment have agency and control 
over their own visibility, there is no mutual gazing involved here. In the “We Live in Public” 
experiment the gaze can be invited in but can never be reciprocated. Harris and his girlfriend, 
Tanya Corrin, place themselves under surveillance, the footage then streamed live on their 
weliveinpublic.com website. Participants on the site are invited to look in but the couple can 
never look out. The only way in which they can communicate is through written text or by 
looking into the nearest camera in an attempt to communicate through it with their viewers, but 
even then they are only met with their own gaze looking back at them through the computer 
screen. 
The surveillance gazing in the “We Live in Public” experiment, present a new (and yet old) 
power structure since the gazing is one-sided. Agreeing to be visible and making the self visible 
could seem like an exercise that challenges the traditional hierarchy associated with “up-down-
monitoring”, and yet a new kind of submissiveness is created where the couple is reliant on their 
viewers watching and on their viewers commenting. Josh and Tanya are completely (and 
willingly) exposed while their viewers make their presence known through discursive text. Also 
note that the viewers do not necessarily have to comment and make their presence known via 
text, they can also simply “look in”, “passively” voyeuristic.  
Clearly, Josh makes it difficult for himself to fully empower and emancipate himself from the 
hierarchical gaze by submitting himself to a state of over-exposure, not really able to escape the 
omnipresent surveillance cameras, which allow observers a position of one-sided gazing. In the 
following sections I will unpack the fact that Harris and Corrin can view themselves more or less 
the same way their viewers can, which introduces a slanted way of gazing within this specific 
surveillance experiment and has severe Lacanian implications for the imaginary of the subjects 
viewed. 
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3.1.2: VISIBILITY AS EMPOWERING: INTERNALIZATION OF THE GAZE 
 
Along with the idea that there has been a power shift in the traditional understandings of 
surveillance when applying the concept to online forums, Albrechtslund also insists that ideas 
concerned with what is normatively constituted as private or public are challenged, as intrusive 
surveillance practises are ever-increasing online (2008:sp). Using Foucault‟s panopticon as a 
springboard to discuss the psychology associated with surveillance online, Albrechtslund further 
claims that often there is a negative association with the idea of surveillance online: words such 
as “snooping, spying and privacy invasion” are prevalent in the associations individuals might 
have with surveillance (2008:sp). At the same time there is something “exhibitionistic” about 
personal webcam surveillance (Koskela 2004:206). Through the popularity of social media, it 
has become a normal exercise to engage in the practise of making the self (idea of the self) 
visible. To what extent the self is made visible and how, might however come to challenge 
normative conceptions of what ought to be shared and made visible and what not. Harris‟s 
second social experiment, “We Live in Public” raises questions about what constitutes the 
private and the public spheres. The couple eagerly expose their intimate lives on camera, 
exposing everything from cooking to urinating, from brushing their teeth to getting dressed and 
from talking on the phone to having intercourse.  
For Koskela there is an empowerment that comes with this kind of exhibitionism. She states that 
by “revealing their private intimate lives individuals refuse to take part in [...] two regimes” 
(2004:208). These are the “regime of order” and the “regime of shame”, both referring to the 
hierarchical and traditional understanding of surveillance where there is an observer in control 
watching over a submissive observed. Through “showing it all” Harris and his girlfriend 
emancipate themselves in the sense that they challenge normative conventions concerning 
privacies. Ironically they make themselves subject to be viewed under the scrutiny their viewers. 
In a Lacanian sense they are performing to an anonymous audience who come to represent the 
Big Other – a faceless collective that stands for normative conventions and societal constraints 
and judgements. By producing a spectacle of the “real” and completely exposed self through 
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webcam surveillance, it is as if the subject performs the role of someone having no shame – 
blurring the lines between public and private. 
 
3.1.3: POWER vs. CONTROL 
 
In challenging these conventions (i.e.: what is constituted as acceptable behaviour in terms of 
how we normatively perceive privacy) Harris steps into a position of “power” where he takes 
over the role of the filmmaker who directs his actors (himself) to bare all. He is now both 
observer and subject (performer). But as Koskela states, power should not necessarily be seen as 
similar to control (2004:209). Even though he is making visible the intimate and the private, 
which seems like an empowering and liberating act, he still does not necessarily have control 
over how the intimately exposed spectacle of himself will be received by the viewer, and is 
therefore, it can be argued, actually forever dependant on an Other watching and judging in order 
for him to validate what he is to someone through his visibility of self. 
In an interview with Timoner, Harris states that the viewers would reprimand him via discursive 
text for not washing his hands after using the bathroom. States Harris: “It is a very definite 
reminder that they are watching you do your most intimate deeds.” But, Harris is the one who 
turned himself into subject for this very purpose: to live publicly under the surveillance of a 
collective Other watching. This apparently brave and controversial way of living is at once 
empowering for the subject and turns the subject into a compliant product, to be viewed under 
the scrutiny of a one-sided gaze. I develop this theory in more detail in the following subsection 
in which I classify the “We Live in Public” terrain as a borderland and look at how the 
conventional private/public binary is challenged. 
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3.2: THE GLASS BEDROOM: A PHYSICAL MANIFESTATION OF A 
BORDERLAND 
 
In Harris‟ “We Live in Public” surveillance based experiment, the glass shower from “Quiet” is 
replaced by what Erika Pearson refers to as a “glass bedroom”. The image of the glass bedroom 
suggests a space conventionally reserved for privacies, with walls which are made out of glass, 
implying that any passerby can look in (Pearson 2009:sp). This visual metaphor has severe 
implications when considering the “We Live in Public” social experiment that fundamentally 
challenges conventionally conceptualized ideas of the public/private binary. Furthermore, if the 
mediated territory that the “We Live in Public” couple inhabit resembles the metaphorical image 
of Pearson‟s glass bedroom, then new questions arise regarding Harris‟s role: he is 
simultaneously the subject locked in the glass bedroom, as well as the documentarian of his own 
visibility, both from within the room, and from outside the walls of the glass bedroom, looking 
in. This visual metaphor highlights the important role the space plays in these specific forms of 
self-reflexive online visibility practises that Harris explores with his social experiment.  
Pearson draws on Erving Goffman (1959:17) who adopts a dramaturgical analogy of everyday 
life to be a theatrical performance, insisting the individual is an actor who gives a social 
performance. Extrapolating from this theatrical model, Pearson uses the Goffmanian conception 
of what he calls the front-stage and back-stage metaphor to reveal how, in online environments, 
private and public lives can often be blurred. The front stage refers to an “observational space”, a 
setting in which “explicit performances are constructed and displayed, where individuals „play 
their parts‟” (Goffman1959:17). Back-stage refers to a more private setting, where “intimacy and 
familiarity see a relaxing of the strictures of performance” (Pearson 2009:sp). Goffman uses this 
concept of a back stage in order to emphasize the difference in our social selves and our private 
selves. For Pearson, online, sociality of the self is often suspended between private and public. 
With “We Live in Public” front and back stage are revealed simultaneously. This social 
experiment is reminiscent of Allan King‟s 1969 A Married Couple in which the director would 
move into a couple‟s home for months filming their every move, like a real-life fly on the wall 
(Winston 2008:157). This method of direct cinema aims to observe the action in front of the 
camera without “overt intervention” (Nichols 2001:109-110). But, as previously established, the 
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spontaneity of the subjects filmed might be sacrificed amid the significant presence of the 
camera (Nichols 2001:110). With “We Live in Public”, the director is replaced by the artificial 
eyes of the rigged cameras all over the loft, and Harris (the producer) decides to step in front of 
these electronic “flies”, placing himself within a position where he must move back and forth 
between producer and (authentic) subject, private and public, control and subversion. But Harris 
created a scenario where there was no back-stage and the “relaxing of strictures” (Pearson 2009: 
sp) could consequently never take place: by declaring a private space public, Harris‟ back-stage 
revolved into yet another front-stage. Timoner mirrors this dilemma Harris faces in her own 
representation of him. While she oscillates between semi-observational and self-reflexive 
documentarian, the viewer is faced with complex questions about the authentic or inauthentic 
behaviour of Harris in front of his self-rigged cameras and we are reminded of the “authoring 
agent” of the representation we see. Timoner makes use of juxtapositions in order to comment on 
the strange environment Harris and Corrin inhabit that merges the front- and back-stage. In one 
instance she directly juxtapositions shots that range from the inside of the fridge, to the cat-box 
and to Josh sitting on the bathroom toilette. Then we see Josh getting dressed, Josh urinating and 
getting into bed. The oscillation between images that range from the explicit and private (back-
stage) such as a naked Josh using the bathroom, to the mundane images (normally reserved for 
the front-stage) such as the shot that shows us the contents of their fridge, emphasize the notion 
that in this space front- and back-stage were one and the same. Maasdorp asserts that the 
utilization of juxtaposition of shots in documentary film can clearly be used as a self-reflexive 
strategy which allows the viewer to “consciously compare” two or more differing shots with 
each other, creating awareness of the representation as construction (2011:219). 
Koskela also explores the front-stage back-stage conundrum when discussing personal online 
webcam surveillance, stating that such an environment isn‟t really private or public but exists in 
a space suspended in between these two extremes (2006:177). The camera placed inside of the 
toilet in “We Live in Public”, is a rather apt example of just how readily available the private and 
most intimate is for the viewing of the public (in public). To demonstrate this Timoner includes a 
shot of Harris who indicates to his viewers the position of the surveillance camera situated inside 
the toilet. He points, quite literally, towards the object (and to us through the screen) which is 
used to invade most intimate acts, inviting our gaze into the toilet bowl.  
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Besides the merging of private and public space this arena also takes on the challenge to connect 
the „real‟ with the virtual. The “We Live in Public” environment is not an entirely public space, 
as the only means to reach in is through mediated text from the viewers or audio-visual real time 
cues from the subjects viewed (see figure 1 and 2). Personal webcam surveillance spaces are also 
very different from purely virtual, as virtual spaces are usually “defined as something beyond 
bodily presence” (Koskela 2006:177-178). Through the use of the camera, bodies that move and 
act in “real time” can be seen as such via the mediated form of live streaming. It is as if the 
viewer is accompanying the couple in the present, even though a physical barrier exists: the 
computer screen which keeps them from being able to touch physically. Therefore a space exists 
that manifests between the material and the virtual, a space reminiscent of Jenny Sundén‟s 
concept of a borderland, discussed in the introduction and chapter one. The implementation of 
webcam surveillance does indeed distort different perceptions of reality (Bernard 2000; Koskela 
2006). The “We Live in Public” experiment brings into being exactly such a territory – a space 
where actions as framed in various mediated forms seem to oscillate between what is considered 
virtual and what is seen as real, never really being either one or the other. 
 
 
Figure 1 and 2 
Josh is seen talking to his viewers by looking into the nearest surveillance camera in a response to a 
comment he had just read on the weliveinpublic.com
16
 page. 
 
To demonstrate the complex “in-betweeness” this space comes to represent, I want to turn my 
attention to the various modes of communication utilized in this physical manifestation of a 
                                                          
16
In the film the web interface that Harris uses for his experiment is registered under weliveinpublic.com, which 
Harris refers to in a voice-over at one point. As soon as Josh finally quit the experiment he also took the site down. 
Because the reason for the site was to display real-time footage of Harris and Corrin it served no purpose anymore 
once they had given up the experiment. 
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borderland. Often, when they are being filmed, Harris and Corrin are seen sitting in front of their 
computers while on the weliveinpublic.com website, interacting and reacting to the commentary 
from anonymous viewers (see figure 1 and 2 above). They are being filmed in real time by the 
surveillance cameras and webcams when doing this and the footage of them is being streamed 
live over the weliveinpublic.com website. In other words, an interactive community of viewers 
will observe the couple, framed by their computer screens and they can then interact via text. 
That text can then be replied to by Harris and Corrin either textually or by looking into the 
nearest camera lens and verbally expressing (though mediated) to the viewer their response. The 
conversation between these “real” (yet mediated) live bodies being streamed over the internet 
and the disembodied anonymous bodies that take on textual form exists through various forms of 
mediation: text, real-time audio-visual streaming surveillance footage or verbal interaction.  
Timoner uses a standard interview set-up when she speaks to an interactive member of the 
weiveinpublic.com website, Deandra, who states: “It‟s not some sort of staged or scripted 
performance...it‟s interactive. We‟re reaching out to them; they‟re reaching out to us.” Note the 
choice of words: the image suggests that the viewer is able to “reach” through a screen and into 
the “private” realms of this couple‟s existence. Yet this is only possible in a virtual and mediated 
manner. The interactive communication that plays a key role in this surveillance experiment also 
highlights the collaborative construction of the virtual “show” the couple is putting up for their 
audience. It certainly has to be argued that the inhabitants of this glass bedroom cannot be 
unaware of the fact that their walls are transparent and therefore a performance certainly needs to 
be extended into the private/back-stage area for it is now plainly visible. In the case of “We Live 
in Public” it is the subjects of the self-documented experiment who construct the glass walls of 
their home with the intention to invite the gaze in. Here, it also becomes vital to understand that 
the one who gazes is an integral part of the experiment. If she did not look in, the glass walls 
would in fact be superfluous. 
Even when the subjects look out by looking into the camera in an attempt to reach their audience 
more personally perhaps, all they are met with is an image of themselves looking back at 
themselves framed by the window on the weliveinpublic.com interface. Referring to online 
social interaction, Pearson argues that in such a situation some “exchanges” between subjects are 
created with an “awareness of the users beyond the glass walls” with the subjects  and playing to 
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this audience, the collective Big Other (2009:sp). Harris and Corrin are certainly not able to look 
out in the same way that their viewers are able to look in. The mediated text which appears via 
the weliveinpublic.com website serves as symbolic proof of their viewers‟ existence, and 
therefore gives purpose to the “We Live in Public” spectacle.  
 
3.3: THE LACANIAN DOCUMENTARIAN: THE POWER OF THE 
ELECTRONIC GAZE 
 
In this subsection, I will highlight Harris‟ intent reliance on the Big Other, as a means to validate 
his own image of the self (2009:323). Harris‟ online surveillance escapades are produced and 
simultaneously constrained by how he imagines the interactive online viewers will perceive him. 
Harris structures the event in such a way that he is able to also view himself (as other) as 
captured by the surveillance cameras. This provides the viewer with complicated subject-
documentarian strategies: Harris is both subject and producer of his own mediated image.  
I have established that Harris becomes something of a pseudo-documentarian of his own 
surveillance experiments, performing the role of both subject and producer who is able to gaze at 
the mediated image of the self while being gazed at by an anonymous collective (the Big Other). 
Harris is not involved in the film in the way Susan Buice and Arin Crumely chose to overtly and 
self-reflexively portray the roles of subject-filmmaker in Four Eyed Monsters (2005). Nor does 
he become a fellow filmmaker and facilitator of his own narrative as Yaniv Schulman does in 
Catfish (2010). Rather, Harris‟ involvement in the construction of how he is portrayed lies within 
his projects – experiments which serve to tell the story of “a moment in time”, captured in Big 
Brother-esquestyle through surveillance processes, and providing Harris with an electronic 
mirror in which he could see himself the way he imagined others to see him. There is a two part 
documentation here: instead of a merging between the narrative of filmmaker and the narrative 
of subject, it is important to remember that with We Live in Public (2009), there is firstly Ondi 
Timoner‟s documentation about Josh Harris, and secondly, Harris‟ experiments as documented 
by Harris. In turn, the footage of Harris captured of his self by himself, is selectively organized, 
juxtaposed and contextualized by Timoner. Harris provides the viewer with fascinating subject-
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documentarian dynamics during his surveillance experiments, while Timoner‟s formal 
techniques often mirror the self-reflexivity with which Harris documents his own story. 
These images were made viewable to the masses, but one must wonder; who were the masses? 
Who was looking? I would like to remind the reader of Žižek‟s conviction, discussed in chapter 
two, that “-cam” websites are born out of an anxiety of not being the subject of someone‟s gaze 
“all the time” (2002:225), in contrast to panoptic surveillance systems that entail the omnipresent 
gaze of power from which the individual has no place to hide. Žižek draws on Lacan in order to 
demonstrate that it is this anxiety that brings forth the implementation of the omnipresent 
electronic gaze situated within the everyday, for it is now the “camera‟s gaze which serves as [...] 
ontological guarantee of his/her being” (2002:225-226). The logic here is: “I exist only in so far I 
am looked at all the time” (ibid). As previously expressed, the utilization of recording devices, 
photographic, filmic and even textual, can assist in the documentation of the self and is created in 
order for the “I” to contextualize herself within the narrative of the “me” (Cooley 1902:17; Ochs 
& Capps 1996:19-21). This statement, however, implies the necessary presence of a third party, 
an other. The “looking-glass-self” metaphor referred to in chapter one highlights the vital role an 
other plays within this scenario. The “looking-glass-self” functions on the basis that the “I” 
conceives of a concept of “self”, usually through social interaction, by how she imagines an 
other to perceive her (Cooley 1902:17; Robinson 2007:95). The emphasis here should be on the 
employment of imagination. Lacan frames this best: we perceive of our selves “from the 
imagined position from which we are being seen” (Fink 2004:117-118). But Lacan‟s Big Other 
places limits on our identity through judging the social identity with which we choose to 
represent ourselves. According to Dashtipour, Lacan‟s concept of the Big Other could be 
interpreted as the “omnipresence of social mediation [...] social structures and societal values 
embedded within social media.”  
In relation to the influential role the Big Other plays, I would like to ask, what happens to the 
relationship between the one who watches and the one who is being watched? Or rather, what 
happens to the relationship between the one filming and the one being filmed? If we are to 
consider the subject-filmmaker binary once more, these questions serve to demonstrate the 
intricate and complicated nature of the process of filming oneself as subject, a process that turns 
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the “I” into an “other”. This is Lacan‟s point, however: the mirror-gazing self, faced with her 
own reflection is met with a gaze from the self as other (Žižek 2002:225-226).  
In the surveillance theory subsection, I have already demonstrated how there is a power struggle 
between the viewer and the subject that is being viewed. Harris is both observer as well as 
subject viewed by other anonymous observers and by Harris himself (as an other) in his 
surveillance experiment, “We Live in Public”. So the question becomes; who is really surveying 
who and what influence does that have on the supposedly authentic, visible self? Traditional 
understandings of surveillance are challenged when the one who is usually being watched, steps 
into the position of observer while at the same time being observed. Although the practise of 
mutual gazing so significant to modern day SNS‟s is not present in the “We Live in Public” 
experiment, there is a democratic element noticeable in the various gazing practises involved.  
I have mentioned how the surveillance model present in the “Quiet” experiment entailed both 
panoptic and omnioptic ways of gazing. The inhabitants were able to gaze mutually at each 
other, while Josh (“Oz”) held the ultimate gaze, seemingly unobtrusively observing, yet his mere 
presence (and by extension the presence of the cameras) proved to be influential for the 
inhabitants, as they were always feeling watched. With “We Live in Public” there is a reverse of 
this. Panoptic gazing is typically referred to as the “few watching the many”, while omnioptic 
gazing is seen as “the many viewing the many” (Jurgenson 2010:377). With Josh‟s “We Live in 
Public” experiment, the couple willingly become the subjects to be viewed by a collective and 
anonymous public, and suddenly “the many” are watching “the few”. This surveillance structure 
is reminiscent of Mathieson‟s (1997) “synopticon”, which evolved out of the Foucauldian 
panopticon and is typically referred to within the social media environment. The concept 
developed as surveillance was becoming increasingly available to the everyman and 
progressively more individuals were taking control into their own hands by means of personal 
webcam surveillance (Mitrou et al. 2013). 
The concept of “others” can also be interpreted as omnipresent voyeurs, constituted by Harris‟ 
imagination. Either way, Harris still has to perform his identity for those who “watch” in an 
attempt to observe what the “Ideal-I” might look like. Lacanian theory dictates that the ego, or 
rather the “ideal ego”, comes to be manifested within the imaginary of the self (Dashtipour 
2009:323-324). It is imperative to note that in Lacanian theory the self can never view herself 
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fully: the (idea of) self becomes visible as constituted by the imagined/desired gaze of an other 
(Žižek 2002:224-225). In this documentary the viewer is confronted with theoretical implications 
of a Lacanian nature which illuminate the complex dynamics of looking and being looked at – a 
process which eventually leads to a mental breakdown of sorts suffered by Josh, as he 
incessantly  keeps “performing” the self for virtual others (who might mainly exist in his 
imagination).  
Harris, in essence, reflexively becomes his own audience member, sitting in front of the mirror 
of the screen only ever able to really look back at himself and see the way he is seen by others 
(figures 3 and 4).      
 
 
Figure 3 and 4 
The weliveinpublic.com interface. Footage recorded by the surveillance cameras is streamed live over the 
internet and viewable to all interactive others on the site. Lacanian theory dictates that the self looks at her 
own reflection (in the mirror of the screen) as other. In the “Mirror Stage” a child discovers the separate 
“I” and other; in other words, the child can finally recognize a sense of separateness between the self and 
other (Žižek 2002:224-227). 
 
In an interview that Timoner conducts with surveillance artist, Leo Fernekes, the notion of the 
power of the “electronic gaze” (Jurgenson 2010:375) is unpacked. Fernekes states that if he were 
to walk up to a person and say “take off your pants”; chances are unlikely that the individual 
would do so. However, if the same question is asked to the same person while holding up a 
camera, the individual would obey because, states Fernekes: “the eyeballs which perceive that 
moment, give it power”. The “eyeballs” he is referring to is of course the camera lens, and by 
extension the other who is looking through the lens towards the subject. This Other is also the 
Other who dictates “certain ideals, norms and ideology” and it is the Other‟s omnipresence that 
is forever prevalent in the mind of the self which makes the self act accordingly (Dashtipour 
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2009:323). Through Timoner‟s documentation of Josh, it seems that his primary motivation in 
initiating the “We Live in Public” experiment was, as the title suggests, to indeed be “living in 
public”. In my opinion, however, it quickly turned into surveillance based exploitation in which 
the subjects started living for the public, in public. The existence of an omnipresent gaze (which 
cannot always be reciprocated) places the visible self in a panoptic situation where the self is 
forever aware of the ubiquitous eyes, the Big Other observing. She is thus always adjusting her 
concept of self accordingly. Timoner emphasizes this point by highlighting the couple‟s acute 
awareness of watching eyes as she allows us to witness a most private argument.  
Something fascinating happens in this scene in terms of reflexivity and the notion of the very 
present Big Other. For the first time Timoner does not cut between frames captured by Harris‟ 
personal surveillance equipment, deciding which images to juxtapose and within which context. 
Rather, Timoner allows a somewhat long argument between the couple to play out in order for 
the viewer to see how interactive members of the weliveinpublic.com site would witness this 
specific occurrence. Early on in the documentary Harris is heard saying that a myriad highly 
sensitive cameras with motion detectors attached were placed all over the loft, making sure that 
the cameras would follow whoever was moving around. As a result, images often jump from 
Harris to Corrin who are arguing to images of an empty home, the cat box or a laundry room, as 
the housecat moves around and is subsequently detected by the cameras. Timoner cleverly lets 
Harris talk about this technical device, an idea which he himself conceived of during the rigging 
of the cameras in the loft, in order to acknowledge Harris‟ personal engagement with how the 
image of him would be captured for his interactive online audience, and to reflexively draw the 
viewers‟ attention to the inclusion of technical devices in the overall representation. We become 
accustomed to the convention of the motion detectors early on, as Timoner includes several 
scenes where Harris and Corrin are playfully attempting to see who can make the most 
movement from within separate rooms in order to get the camera away from each other and 
subsequently get more “screen time”. During the argument scene the images jump as the 
movement of their bodies is detected by the camera. This jumping is signalled by a clicking 
sound as the images move from one frame to the next – a convention the viewer recognizes by 
this time as indicating movement in another room which makes the camera move. This sound, 
along with the obvious and ever-present numbers in the upper left-hand corner of the screen 
(specifying which camera is being used at that moment), triggers awareness for the onlooker of 
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the technical features involved in the presentation of these mediated bodies. In a Brechtian way, 
the sound functions as a call from the camera stating its presence and reminding the onlooker 
that just as we are aware of the technicalities involved in this endeavour, so also the couple is 
aware of not only the cameras but of what they represent, namely, the Other. Here, Timoner 
allows Harris‟ equipment to do the editing for her, emphasizing the fact that Harris himself is an 
active participant in the construction of his surveillance documentation. This unintentional 
jumping between empty spaces and a dramatic scene in the living room creates an accidental 
tension and juxtaposition between images, metaphorically signifying the difficulty of intimacy in 
public. Timoner frames this well in the build-up before the scene: we hear Corrin in voice-over 
as she discusses the irony of living in a space where she felt like she had an incredibly “deep 
connection” with the virtual viewers and yet no connection with Harris. This statement is 
accompanied by images which reiterate the distance between the subjects: Timoner strategically 
fast forwards footage of Harris and Corrin as captured by the surveillance cameras while they 
occupy separate spaces in the house – generating a feeling of distance and alluding to Harris and 
Corrin‟s alienation from each other while creating a sense that time has passed. This kind of 
time-lapse photography – quickening the pace by fast forwarding footage – is a method of 
editing often used in conventional filmmaking in order to indicate that time has passed. Timoner 
does this in order to prepare the viewer for the argument scene: no longer are Harris and Corrin 
giddy and excited about their experiment, playing around with equipment. The (perhaps 
unintentional) self-reflexive elements significant to the “We Live in Public” arena are often 
mirrored within Timoner‟s own representation of Harris, acknowledging formal elements used 
whereby to construct this film. 
When the viewer finally witnesses the rather melodramatic argument between the couple, we 
become sensitive to the severe influence of the couple‟s gazing public. When talking about this 
incident in an interview with Timoner, Harris states that Corrin had insisted he sleep on the 
couch after the disagreement because the “group” (viewers) had “put her up to it”. In other 
words, the focus here is on the influence the collective online other has on Corrin‟s actions, 
manipulating her to act according to how she imagines they might desire to be pleased. Both 
Harris and Corrin state in different interviews that “fighting in public” was about “egos” and 
who was “winning”, demonstrating the performative nature of their intimate conversations. As 
soon as an argument was over, states Harris, the subjects would rush to their computer stations to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 77 
see how the disagreement was perceived by their public – a very definite reminder of how 
powerful the influence of others was in this experiment in how they collaborated in the plot of 
the subjects‟ public show. Timoner cleverly pairs these statements with images of Harris and 
Corrin being apart: a shot of Tanya alone in the bed or doing chores, while we see different shots 
of Harris, each time accompanied by a mirror. The first image is of him in front of an actual 
mirror, standing alone, looking at himself. The second and third is of him, alone, in front of the 
computer screen. By juxtaposing these images Timoner implies that while Corrin recoils from 
interaction with Harris, he searches for interaction with others – looking at his own image as 
other in front of the mirror and in front of the mirror of the screen. Timoner ends off this section 
with an interview from Nacho Platas, who states that Harris had finally crawled into the 
Television set without the control in his hand. The implication of this statement reminds me of 
Harris‟ rat analogy where he himself had claimed that he had lost control of his experiment. In 
fact, in contrast to “Quiet” he now was the experiment. 
The “Quiet” and “We Live in Public” experiments both function on various levels of looking: 
selves are clearly observed by others but are also looked at by the self through the eyes of the 
self as other. To demonstrate this, Timoner adequately juxtaposes several images which serve in 
better understanding the complexities of looking while being filmed in these environments (see 
figures 5, 6 and 7). 
 
 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 
Mutual gazing by self and others in “Quiet”. 
In the illustrations above, an inhabitant of “Quiet” is seen filming himself and we are introduced 
to the various stages of gazing. First we see him as filmed by what I assume is Timoner‟s 
camera, looking at himself in the mirror of the television screen. Next we see how he sees 
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himself framed by the screen. In this image, there is a camera behind the subject, which films 
him seeing himself while he sees himself filmed by others. The last stage involves the point of 
view of the other inhabitants of “Quiet”, who are faced with a selection of channels, each of 
which is dedicated to one person being filmed in real time. As the inhabitant above demonstrates, 
the self mediated ad infinitum, has the opportunity to view himself through the eyes of others as 
well as through the eyes of himself as other. 
In the second experiment, it becomes even more layered: the self cannot reciprocate the gaze in 
the omnioptic way the inhabitants of “Quiet” were able to do. When Harris and Corrin look into 
the camera in an attempt to reach through it and communicate with their audience, they are 
bound by the medium, which limits them from touching physically and from gazing into an 
other‟s private realm. Instead they are met with their own image on the weliveinpublic.com site 
which stares back at them. Note that the footage of the subjects‟ bodies, as recorded by the 
multitude of cameras in the loft, was constantly being streamed live on this website. Viewer 
participation was limited to looking and publicly commenting on what they were seeing. 
However, when occupying the role of viewers, the couple were seeing a reflection of their own 
image as seen through the imagined eyes the Big Other.  
In the beginning of the documentary Harris is heard saying that soon we will come to live in 
“constrained virtual boxes”. I find this wording interesting seeing as it is Harris who will enclose 
himself within a “virtual box”, capturing footage of himself within a screen in self-imposed 
surveillance exercises. It is at this point that Timoner demonstrates Harris‟ belief by making use 
of superimpositions and placing a talking Harris within an animated constrained virtual box. This 
box resembles a modern-day socially interactive networking platform (see figure 8). A 
superimposition is traditionally “the layering of two visual elements over each other” (Maasdorp 
2012:106). Maasdorp argues that superimpositions can be used as self-reflexive devices in non-
fiction films to signal to the viewer the presence of an “authoring agent”, who selectively 
combines two images in order to create “connotative meaning” (2012:106). In this instance, the 
viewer sees a talking head (belonging to Harris) in the midst of an interview – a convention of 
traditional forms of documentary. Timoner decides to make use of a gradual zoom out which 
overlaps with a superimposed, animated frame resembling what is now recognizable as a You-
Tube window. The further she zooms out, the more you-tube windows we see, each containing a 
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talking Harris in the midst of some or other interview. The windows, along with Harris‟ 
statements on the audio, overlap until finally a collection of windows come to resemble a cage of 
sorts (see figure 8).  The self-reflexivity here comes from the obviously fabricated image, 
manipulated with the use of superimposition (Maasdorp 2012:107). Timoner quickly zooms in 
again as we see Harris‟ mouth in close-up, stating that “years ago the lions and tigers were kings 
of the jungle and then they wound up in zoo‟s...I suspect we‟re on the same track”. Timoner uses 
an effect of stripping away in order to focus on what is important: now Harris is the animal 
captured in the (virtual) zoo. 
 
Figure 8 
The superimposed virtual boxes Timoner uses in order to “encage” Harris with his own words.  
 
Timoner selects interesting compositions as a means to highlight the self-reflexive form this film 
often adopts and inspire an intellectual engagement with the content seen. It is a convention of 
contemporary mainstream documentaries to often make use of the “sit-down” interview that is 
usually “carefully composed” and “well lit” (Maasdorp 2011:217). Timoner makes use of this 
convention throughout the film and uses it as an opportunity to comment on the notion of self-
reflexivity. 
 
Figure 9, 10 and 11 
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Harris and Corrin in front of the bathroom mirror and then again framed in the webcam window on the 
weliveinpblic.com interface. Then, Harris alone, facing himself in front of the mirror while 
simultaneously viewed by anonymous audience. 
 
“Capturing” or “documenting” the image of the self made visible for others, is a common 
practise in the surveillance experiments documented in this film. With “We Live in Public” the 
couple is consistently faced with their own image as captured by the surveillance cameras and 
streamed live over the weliveinpubplic.com interface (see figures 9, 10 and 11). In this scenario 
the image of their mediated bodies is made visible for others as well as for themselves as other. I 
must call to mind the contrived interview set-up discussed in subsection three once more. 
Timoner composes an image during the sit-down interview with Harris which reminds the 
viewer of the contrived construction processes often prevalent in self-reflexive documentaries, as 
well as the many mediated gazes with which Harris chose to surround himself with in his 
experiments. Here we are met with a double Harris: the interview set-up comprises of a talking 
Harris with a screen behind him, capturing the footage of the interview in real time. Timoner not 
only comments on her own presence as filmmaker but draws a thematic link to Harris, himself a 
creator of personal reflexive and mediated experiments. Just as the composition produces a 
double Harris, so also the viewer comes to see two versions of him throughout the film. On the 
one hand Harris is subject of Timoner‟s documentary as well as his own surveillance 
experiments. On the other hand, he also plays the role of documentarian and surveillance artist, 
creating and then capturing an image of self in public. In this set-up, one Harris looks at the other 
Harris, as if recognizing the reflection of himself as other in front of the mirror. This is in fact the 
case with the second experiment: Harris is faced with his own captured image, staring at his 
mediated self as framed by the mirror of the screen and left to imagine how the Big Other 
interprets this image of him. I recall an image at the beginning of the film where Harris is framed 
by the many superimposed boxes that resemble virtual windows. Timoner clearly reiterates that 
visual image here; metaphorically reminding the viewer that although Harris liberates himself 
from the constraints of certain normative understandings of privacy and visibility, he only finds 
himself captured and stuck within yet another (virtual) frame. 
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3.4: CONCLUSION 
 
In chapter two I discussed the film Four Eyed Monsters (2005) where I considered the nature of 
the subject-filmmaker binary. In this chapter I have also dissected the relationship between the 
two very present documentarians in We Live in Public (2009). Harris creates a platform for two 
social experiments in which he is both subject and documentarian and he documents 
independently using film equipment and surveillance webcams, but in turn Harris is the subject 
of filmmaker Timoner‟s documentary. Harris provides the viewer with an interesting look at the 
subject-filmmaker dilemma as he himself willingly steps in front of his own cameras, becoming 
both subject and observer in a real-time surveillance based documentation. Timoner on the other 
hand, portrays the role of unobtrusive yet subtly self-reflexive documentarian who bears the 
ultimate gaze: she is the authoring agent who definitively decides how to construe meaning from 
the recorded footage Josh took of himself. And by making use of self-reflexive methods she not 
only illuminates her role as authoring agent but she comments on Harris‟ own surveillance 
endeavours as self-reflexive. Harris‟ role as pseudo-documentarian of his own reflexive image is 
thought-provoking: as both observer and observed he is forced to oscillate constantly between 
various binaries, portraying the role of producer and (authentic) subject, revealing the private in 
public and demonstrating changing positions of control and subversion under the ever-present 
(imagined) gaze of the Big Other. Note that within this mediated platform the self often also acts 
as his own observing other, judging the self the way in which it is imagined the Big Other 
judges. 
With reference to Lacan‟s theories on the mirror gazing self and the visual metaphor of Cooley‟s 
“looking-glass-self”, I have demonstrated how the process of observing oneself as subject 
effectively turns the “I” into an “other”. In other words, the observer or “mirror-gazing self”, 
faced with her own reflection in the mirror of the screen is met with a gaze from herself as other 
(Cooley 1902:17; Robinson 2007:95; Žižek 2002:125-126).This dualistic relationship between 
subject and filmmaker-observer further sheds light on the difficulty with which the online self 
must often act as “prosumer” – modern SNSs dictate that an individual must construct and 
consume an identity of the self as captured by the mirror of the screen, both as the self and as 
other. On this mediated platform one observes one‟s own image as well as the images of other 
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selves who in turn consume their own online images of selves as other. The logic here is 
puzzling: the mirror of the machine provides the individual with the opportunity to gaze 
reflexively at the created image of the self while perceiving that image from the imagined 
position from which she is being seen: from the imagined gaze of the Big Other (Fink 2004:117). 
Harris willingly inhabits a territory stocked with electronic eyes that come to represent an 
observing Big Other. The awareness of viewers (even if imagined) not only places pressure on 
Harris by influencing his performance of the self in front of the cameras but provide him with 
“ontological” proof of his being, validating his existence (Žižek 2002:225). The focus here is that 
the “I” as subject of her own created and eventually monitored mediated self watches herself as 
she imagines an other might. Josh is both subject of surveillance documentation and the 
documentarian of his own mediated image. On the other hand the viewer of the documentary, We 
Live in Public (2010), observes Harris through filmmaker Ondi Timoner‟s eyes. She subtly 
utilizes formal techniques which allow the viewer to engage intellectually with the content seen. 
And her often self-reflexive representation asks us to consider Harris‟ own subject-
documentarian dilemma. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FANTASY NARRATIVES 
 
In this chapter I aim to inspect how filmmakers, Henry Joost and Ariel Schulman break down 
barriers between representational strategies and how that in turn affects the role of the filmed 
subject who himself becomes a filmmaker of sorts by the end of the documentary.  As with my 
discussions on Four Eyed Monsters (2005) and We Live in Public (2009) I am essentially 
investigating the documentary representation of documenting-selves online. First, I examine the 
representational strategies with which Schulman and Joost document their subject‟s tale and I 
explore how these modes relate to self-reflexive online documentation of the self. I then 
demonstrate how the self-reflexivity with which we are introduced to subject, Yaniv Schulman
17
, 
as narrator of his online self further sheds light on the very present role the Big Other plays in the 
documentation process of the self. Yaniv Schulman also makes use of self-reflexive methods 
when he himself is acting as documentarian. In that way I relate Yaniv Schulman‟s online 
construction of his identity to Lacanian theory on the mirror-gazing self. Angela Wesselman-
Pierce‟s role as mediator between Yaniv Schulman and his constructed onlinefantasies further 
contributes to the idea that the online self never manages her virtual impression in isolation but 
rather in collaboration with the imagined other. This self-reflexive documentary makes effective 
use of different elements from varied representational methods – ranging from observational to 
participatory - which provide the viewer with insight into the complex relationship between the 
subject and her filmmaker. 
As soon as the film, Catfish (2010) begins, credits are projected against a backdrop of what 
seems to be the silhouette of a torso, neck and head (a generic profile picture body)
18
 and then 
                                                          
17
 In order to avoid confusion I would like to remind the reader that the subject of this film will be referred to by 
his full name, Yaniv Schulman, while his brother, the filmmaker, will be referred to by his surname, Schulman. 
18
If a Facebook profile owner does not select a personalized photo as her profile picture, a generic body will 
automatically appear in the place reserved for the profile photo (Strano 2008: sp). 
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something which vaguely resembles a woman‟s face19. The image is projected in extreme close-
up, resembling a pointillist-like painting; only dots and pixels visible. These creative choices by 
filmmakers, Schulman and Joost, foreshadow two major themes of the film. Firstly, the generic 
profile picture body made popular by the SNS, Facebook, indicates that online media will sit at 
the centre of this film‟s content. Secondly, it presents the idea that up close things might not be 
what they seemed to be from afar. The latter view is a most prevalent theme in this self-reflexive 
documentary which explores the notion of constructed narratives and imagined illusions 
characteristic of online social networking practices. The creative choice to project credits against 
the backdrop of what seems to be a woman‟s face in extreme close-up reminds me of 
Michelangelo Antonioni‟s Blow-Up (1966). In this film the protagonist, who is also a 
photographer like Yaniv Schulman, blows up a picture in order to get closer to a truth: the 
character might have accidently witnessed a murder while innocently taking pictures in a park 
which in turn initiates a personal crime investigation. The protagonist cannot be certain though. 
Consequently, in an attempt to get behind the truth he blows up the picture more and more. In 
this provocative scene the viewer realizes that the more the photo is blown up, the less one is 
able to make out anything of the original picture – in other words, the closer the protagonist 
attempts to get to the truth, the farther away from it he actually is.  
In Catfish (2010), we find this same investigative process, in which the subject
20
 attempts to “get 
behind the truth”. In this documentary the subject engages in an interactive virtual relationship 
                                                          
19
Perhaps only upon viewing this sequence several times, will the viewer come to notice that it resembles what 
might be the profile picture of “Faccio” (Wesselman-Pierce), one of the subjects in the film. 
 
 
20
It is vital to note that referring to Yaniv Schulman as subject is somewhat complicated. Overtly, the filmmakers do 
tell him that he is the subject of the film but ultimately their documentary investigation leads to Angela 
Wesselman-Pierce. Yaniv Schulman’s role in the film might at times seem passive. Wesselman-Pierce initiates 
contact with him. Wesselman-Pierce (pretending to be “Megan Faccio”) ignites the virtual romance with him. 
Finally, even filmmakers, Schulman and Joost tell him what to do: something which he overtly addresses, stating 
that he doesn’t want to be the subject of the film.Yaniv Schulman then almost rebelliously performs the role of 
investigative filmmaker perhaps in an attempt to move away from the (pseudo) subject role which Schulman and 
Joost seem to force upon him. But even as filmmaker, Yaniv schulman is often told what to do by the filmmakers. 
In many ways Yaniv Schulman becomes a type of pawn: a means through which the filmmakers are able to reach 
actual subject, Wesselman-Pierce. Through Yaniv Schulman the viewer is able to witness the self-reflexive 
construction processes of the online mediated self. By the end of the film we learn that Wesselman-Pierce has 
faked her myriad online characters and we can surmise how she must have gone about it technically, only because 
we’ve been exposed to digital narrative practises via Yaniv Schulman. He therefore becomes an almost-subject: a 
vessel through which Schulman and Joost are able to access Wesselman-Pierce, the subject whose online 
escapades are being documented in relation to Yaniv Schulman. My focus in this chapter is however on Yaniv 
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with a woman (Wesselman-Pierce/ “Megan Faccio”) who, it turns out, seems to be the opposite 
of what she claimed to be online. Yaniv Schulman‟s investigative actions which aim at getting to 
the bottom of Wesselman-Pierces‟s virtual charade, brings an interesting element to the subject-
filmmaker dilemma I have been discussing throughout this thesis. Yaniv Schulman heroically 
performs the role of fellow filmmaker towards the end of the film, self-reflexively pointing the 
camera at his subjects, inspecting the situation as a journalist might. I will explore this 
occurrence throughout this chapter while maintaining the position that filmmakers, Schulman 
and Joost, construct a film that formally and thematically comments on their own subjectivity as 
filmmakers. 
 
4.1: THE FILMMAKERS 
 
The opening shot of Catfish (2010) positions Yaniv Schulman at the centre of the frame. The 
subject, obviously upset, is talking to the individual behind the camera, heatedly accusing him of 
awful filmmaking skills and subject handling. A bodiless voice is heard as the camera operator 
answers back (a convention throughout the film), willingly partaking in an argument on 
filmmaking ethics.The film thus foregrounds the relationship between subject and filmmaker and 
the question of filmmaking ethics from the outset. The mise-en-scéne underscores the concepts 
of double selves: on the wall behind the subject, a fragmented mirror distorts the image reflected 
in it. We shortly learn that the camera operator is the subject‟s brother, the filmmaker Ariel 
Schulman, engaging in a disagreement with his subject about what constitutes as good 
filmmaking principles. Due to the filmmaker‟s blatant presence in this scene, the onlooker is 
immediatelyfaced with a self-reflexive representation.The subject states in this first interview 
that the filmmaker, Schulman, is “doing a bad job” because he is catching his brother when he is 
not in the mood to “talk about it”. The viewer is not quite certain at this point what “it” is. Yaniv 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Schulman in order to maintain the interesting subject-filmmaker dilemma. And although he is an almost-subject, I 
will refer to him as “subject” for the sake of continuity. Arin Crumley and Susan Buice are auto-documentarians, 
involved completely as both subjects and filmmakers in Four Eyed Monsters (2005). Josh Harris is both producer 
and consumer of his own constructed virtual image of self inhis personal surveillance documentation in We Live in 
Public (2009). But Yaniv Schulman oscillates between (accidental) subject and aspiring investigative filmmaker.  
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Schulman‟s reaction would suggest that the filmmaker is intruding on a Goffmanian “backstage” 
area of sorts where the actor is preparing and has not quite yet put on his mask (desired social 
identity) for the cameras. He suggests “setting-up” an interview and “talking about it then”. The 
consequence is that as opposed to spontaneous fly-on-the-wall or observational filmmaking the 
subject would prefer a more rehearsed or controlled environment for the interview to take place. 
Ultimately, the filmmaker asks his brother whether he wants to be the subject to the documentary 
to which he replies; “no”. This is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it implies that the 
subject is caught off guard, setting up the filmmaker as spontaneous. During the conversation 
Yaniv Schulman evidently indicates that he would prefer the filmmaker to take on a traditional 
form of representation, with „set-up‟ interviews21.The subject‟s surprise and annoyance with his 
filmmaker who catches him off guard might suggest a tendency for the filmmaker to have been 
observational up until this point, gazing with his camera. But on the other hand the filmmaker‟s 
obvious engagement with his subject on matters of filmmaking, immediately introduces a strong 
self-reflexive element.It therefore becomes clear thatfilmmakers, Joost and Schulman continually 
shuttle betweendifferent representational methods. Secondly, Yaniv Schulman‟s negative 
response to whether he desires to be the subject of this documentary further sheds light on his 
own journey from subject to participatory documentarian
22
which in turn provides the viewer 
insight into the various subject-filmmakers dynamics present in documentary filmmaking. 
In chapters two and three I investigated how self-reflexive strategies can illuminate the role of 
the filmmaker as “authoring agent” who selectively and purposefully attempts to comment on the 
“means of representation”, utilizing techniques that persuade the audience to “question the very 
idea of documentary” (Maasdorp 2011:208; Nichols 1991:58). Inthe figures below (1, 2 and 3) 
the viewer observes the clear integration of such elements so as to trigger awareness of 
construction practises involved in the documentation process.  In one scene, we see Yaniv 
Schulman speaking on the telephone while being filmed by his brother, Ariel Schulman, with a 
handheld camera. We can therefore deduce that the second filmmaker, Joost, is filming them 
                                                          
21
The “set-up” interview typically refers to the documentary tradition of selecting a space with proper lighting in 
which individuals who are experts in their fields or have been the subject of the film partakes in a conversation 
with an interviewer. Such a situation has an organized quality to it rather than a spontaneity with which the 
observational filmmaker might impulsively present her subjects with questions she has not had time to prepare 
for. 
22
The participatory filmmaker will typically engage with her subjects, as opposed to capturing footage 
spontaneously as an observational or ‘fly-on-the-wall’ director might. 
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with a second camera. In the next shot, the filmmakers cut to a close-up of their subject on the 
telephone, from Schulman‟s point of view, obviously taken with the handheld camera seen in the 
previous shot.  
 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 
Joost is seen handling his film equipment. In figure two, Yaniv Schulman engages with one of the 
filmmakers behind the camera. He is listening to music that “Faccio” has sent him. She proclaims that her 
musician brother wrote and sings this song. Yaniv Schulman proposes, to the present filmmaker, that this 
band‟s music should be used as the soundtrack for the documentary. In the third figure, we see Ariel 
Schulman‟s camera equipment as Joost is filming him while a wire from Joost‟s camera obscures the 
frame. 
Besides explicitly exploiting self-reflexive strategies these filmmakers also teeter somewhere on 
the edge between the observational and the participatory. Contrary to observational modes of 
filmmaking, where the documentarian assumes the position of a “fly-on-the-wall”, participatory 
filmmaking necessitates “a sense of bodily presence”, rather than absence, which locates the 
filmmaker “on the scene” (Nichols 2001:116). While the blatant inclusion of the filmmakers in 
the film informs the viewer of their subjective directorial position, as Liani Maasdorp would put 
it, they also seem to be engaging with their subject on a participatory level while embracing a 
hand-held aesthetic style often reminiscent the observational mode of representation (2011:209). 
In certain instances the viewer specifically notices deliberate interaction from the filmmakers 
with their subject. In one scene Joost is capturing footage from within a car, trying to be 
unobserved. The result is a shot where subjects are out of sight, concealed by objects that block 
Joost‟s view. Similarly filmmaker, Schulman, captures footage of subjects Angela Wesselman-
Piersce and Yaniv Schulman‟s first encounter. This scene is captured from a low angle, implying 
that filmmaker, Schulman, attempts not to be blatant with his camera. 
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It is useful to take note of Jay Ruby‟s conviction that to be self-reflexive is to sufficiently 
demonstrate the filmmaker‟s presence as purposeful in commenting on the process of 
filmmaking: accidental visibility of a filmmaker is not always done with a sense of purposeful 
commentary (1988:35). Joost and Shulman‟s role as participating and self-reflexive filmmakers 
in this documentary is multifaceted. It becomes obvious early on in the film that they both have 
private relationships with their subject outside of the film, separately as brother and as friend. 
The knowledge of this makes the viewer understand why they engage so familiarly with their 
subject but it also causes the viewer to question authentic representations.In an interview with 
Ryan Gilbey, filmmaker, Schulman, reveals his concern about his brother during filming and his 
disgust with Wesselman-Pierce hoaxing him, stating that “He‟d been heartbroken” (2010:sp). If 
the filmmakers have their friend and brother‟s best interest at heart, would that not motivate them 
to represent his story compassionately? And would that not have an effect on objective 
documentation? One must consider the filmmakers are very well aware of the dilemma their 
familial relationship with their subject causes. Therefore, they rather resourcefully integrate 
deliberately self-reflexive methods in order for the viewer to engage critically with the obviously 
subjective material. 
In a scene halfway through the film, filmmaker, Schulman, performs the role of both unobtrusive 
observer and engaged participant. After discovering Wesselman-Pierce‟s virtual charade, the 
film crew arrives at her house in Ishpeming, Michigan, in order to get to the bottom of what is 
going on. Schulman accompanies his brother, the subject, Yaniv Schulman, onto the front porch 
and eventually into the Wesselman-Pierce home. Joost is waiting in the car, observing from afar 
with his camera. In the build up before this scene it is clear that all parties are rather nervous 
about what the possible outcome might be, making statements such as: “I‟m gonna keep the car 
running…and leave the doors open…and the windows…it might be that kind of an escape”. 
Armed with his camera, Schulman captures the footage of his brother and Wesselman-Pierce‟s 
first encounter in a purely observational form – resulting in shaky and obscure footage from a 
low angle, predominantly cutting subjects out of the frame. One gets the idea that the camera is 
supposed to be out of Wesselman-Pierce‟s sight and the viewer might deduce that he is 
attempting to not be too obvious about filming a potentially risky situation.  
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Initially filmmaker, Schulman, conducts himself as only an observer, allowing his brother to 
engage verbally.Gradually, the viewer becomes aware that he becomes more confident with his 
camera as he starts filming footage of subjects that are better framed; from angles which can only 
be pertained from a visible camera held at a certain visible height.  Eventually, Schulman is 
subtly directing Wesselman-Pierce, telling her to keep still as he is trying to capture the “wind in 
her hair” when she is standing on her porch. This foreshadows a scene at the end of the film in 
which Schulman is fully engaged in directing her, asking her to strike certain positions and talk 
to the filmmakers in the different voices of the characters she had performed over the eight 
month long virtual relationship with Yaniv Schulman.In this scenario the filmmaker 
conveniently oscillates between the roles of observational filmmaker to being completely 
engaged. This complex dynamic is mirrored by the filmmaker‟s self-reflexive methods that 
illuminate that as observer “in the field” his role is all but passive: his active presence is made 
known self-reflexively throughout the film and it is clear that he is not always purely observant 
as he clearly engages with the given scene from time to time. 
On a different occasion we witness similar complex representational methods. In a hotel room, 
Yaniv Schulman is corresponding with “Faccio” via Facebook in real-time. On occasion she has 
told him that she is a singer who writes and records original songs. At the request of Yaniv 
Schulman, “Faccio” now instantly mails him a cover song that she claims to have recorded on 
the spot. This ignites a revelation in Yaniv Schulman and his fellow filmmakers: they instantly 
recognize the song to be an original and in fact not a cover sung by “Faccio”. While this 
suspicious occurrence finally instigates an elaborate investigation to discover the truth, Yaniv 
Schulman initially desires to quit the entire documentation project. This leads to an argument 
between the two Schulman brothers, subject and filmmaker. During this argument 
representational strategies merge. Essentially, Schulman is verbally directing his brother, who 
inturn self-reflexively engages in an argument on filmmaking. The result is that self-reflexive 
methods become obvious to the viewer: Yaniv Schulman states that he does not “feel like being 
directed” by his brother, Ariel Schulman. This focuses the viewer‟s attention on Schulman as 
filmmaker and authoring agent of the documentary. Schulman equally confirms his position, 
stating that “making a movie” is “not easy” and “I‟m directing you in a film.” Filmmaker, Joost, 
is unobtrusively observing: while the brothers are engaging in a self-reflexive conversation, Joost 
captures often obscure and grainy footage as he observes the spontaneous interaction like a “fly-
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on-the-wall”.In the following subsections I explore Yaniv Schulman‟s role as self-reflexive 
narrator of his online self as well as eventual participatory filmmaker; all of which highlights the 
very present role the Big Other plays in the documentation process of the self. 
 
4.2: THE SUBJECT AS FILMMAKER 
 
In chapters two and three, I examined the intricate relationship between the subject and her 
filmmaker; observing that in some cases they can be one and the same. The shared role of subject 
and filmmaker makes for interesting narrative representations. In Four Eyed Monsters (2005) the 
viewer‟s awareness of the subjects‟ double roles encourages a critical engagement with the 
material and initiates questions about the authenticity of a re-staged history. We Live in Public 
(2009) further sheds light on how an individual can become an audience member of her own 
online performance of which she is both the producer and subject. Yaniv Schulman plays 
varying roles in Catfish (2010) which emphasise the rather complicated dynamics of producing 
content and being the content produced, looking while being looked at and filming while being 
filmed. As subject, Yaniv Schulman is portrayed by the filmmakers as a narrator of his own 
online self. He is often filmed while communicating with members of Wesselman-Pierce‟s 
virtual family via Facebookand  the viewer becomes privy to how he goes about in digitally 
manages his online impression of the self.Healso easily performs the role of fellow filmmaker 
and even implements investigative techniques in order to assist in the documentation process, all 
the while adhering to self-reflexive methods just as the filmmakers who filmed him weredoingup 
until this point.Additionally, these self-reflexive methods further the argument that the very 
present imaginary Big Other plays an influential role in the documentation process of the 
mediated self. During the self-reflexive moments the viewer notices in the subject‟s demeanour 
an acute awareness of a gazing entity; his actions sometimes blatantly directed towards the 
imagined Other. 
When Yaniv Schulman, who had been portrayed as subject up until that point, becomes a fellow 
filmmaker he performs the role of a participative documentarian, engaging with subjects and 
reflecting with his viewers (audience) on his experience. When he suspects “Faccio” to have lied 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 91 
about her identity, the film takes a turn and his role takes on a new element: he now seems to be 
on an investigative quest to “get to the bottom” of the lie. As he becomes involved in the 
production of the film he is suddenly seen working cameras, handling microphones and even 
wearing a hidden wire.The filmmakers meticulously go about in documenting the process in 
which he places a hidden microphone under his shirt: a kind of ritualistic process, filmed step by 
step, in order to indicate Yaniv Schulman‟s promotion from subject into fellow filmmaker. 
In a luring scene in which he interrogates “Faccio‟s” alleged younger sister and her friend he 
portrays something of an investigator. He asks them several questions about “Faccio” but they 
are not able to answer many of them. In fact, it becomes clear that the giggling sisterseems a 
little foggy about who Yaniv Schulman is. With this information the viewer assumes that 
Wesselman-Pierce must have also performed the role of “Faccio‟s” younger half-sister, Abby 
Wesselman-Pierce, in her and Yaniv Schulman‟s online communications. Finally, Yaniv 
Schulman walks away, turns the camera on himself and states: “Well, there‟s the confession. 
Pretty clearly… she [Abby Wesselman-Pierce] has never seen Megan [“Faccio”] before, doesn‟t 
know where she lives, doesn‟t get to talk to her…”23 An intertitle at the end of the film informs 
the viewer that the Megan Faccio we have come to know through Yaniv Schulman never existed. 
The visual images Wesselman-Pierce used to manifest “Faccio” were stolen from a complete 
stranger‟s Facebook profile page24. This scene is specifically poignant for me: not only does 
Yaniv Schulman get the information he is after, exposing Wesselman-Pierce as a liar, he also 
does not forget his (at that point imagined) future audience as he confirms the recently revealed 
information with his viewers. This reminds the viewer that amid the investigation, there still 
exists a performative element and the imagined presence of the Other plays a big part – after all, 
what would the purpose be of catching the truth on film if there is no witness to confirm it. 
 
                                                          
23
 At the very end of the film, Wesselman-Pierce confesses that although many of her virtual characters were 
completely false, she did indeed have an estranged daughter called Megan Faccio. It is then made clear that Yaniv 
Schulman never corresponded with the real Megan Faccio. He only ever communicated with Wesselman-Pierce 
who pretended to be her own daughter. 
24
In one instance Yaniv Schulman questions Wesselman-Pierce about the girl in the photos (who was used as a 
physical manifestation of Wesselman-Pierce’s imaginary “Faccio”). Wesselman-Pierce states that she is a family 
friend. The intertitles at the end of the film tell us that this is not true: the girl in the photos is not acquainted with 
Wesselman-Pierce in any way.  Wesselman-Pierce’s confession about who “Faccio” really is, is yet another lie. This 
scene supports the idea that, just like Yaniv Schulman, also Wesselman-Pierce’s inventions drive her farther and 
farther away from the truth. 
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4.3:NARRATOR OF THE ONLINE SELF 
 
The self-reflexive elements, characteristic of this documentary mode are mirrored in the online 
gazing processes documented. The omnipresent camera significant to the self-reflexive mode of 
documentation relates to omnioptic forms of gazing online which allow the individual a 
psychological position from which she feels watched. The ever present camera becomes an 
extension of the ever present other in omnioptic social environments. In the following section, I 
look at the narration process characteristic to the construction and subsequent gazing practice of 
the online visual self. This process can itself be rather self-reflexive as I will demonstrate. 
Yaniv Schulman‟s role as narrator in this documentary film is twofold: first he is the narrator of 
his own (desired) online image of the self; and second he journeys from protagonist to 
participative documentarian, no longer purely a subject, but an assistant filmmaker. In this 
section, I would like to discuss Yaniv Schulman‟s online impression management and the 
subsequent narration of his mediated self. I will do this by referring to a visual example as visual 
online communication – specifically in the form of the photograph – is a highly common practice 
on the SNS, Facebook. I argue that visual digitized narration in the form of the photo can serve 
as a tool for the online self to easily obtain her desired online identity.  
 
4.3.1: THE DIGITALLY ALTERED PHOTO 
 
The SNS, Facebook, as documented in Catfish (2010), encapsulates Nathan Jurgenson‟s theory 
on omnioptic environments (2010:377-278). The mutuality of gazing and the liberating act of 
being in control of one‟s own visibility present in this specific social online environment 
necessitates not only selective, but also collaborative narration and documentation of the self. I 
use the term “selective”, because in this environment the online individual is being watched by 
others and herself as other, resulting in an internalization of the gaze which causes the self to act 
according to imagined constraints (Dashtipour 2009: 323-324; Miller 1988:166-167). In addition, 
narratives of the self are developed collaboratively because the sociality of the site necessitates 
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interaction: every action online has the potential to be reacted to publicly, adding to or altering 
originally intended perceptions. This practise inspires collaborative narrative construction and 
subsequent documentation to exceed beyond the limits of Facebook to other online forums. I 
shift my focus now to the effect this can have on how the self constructs her desired visual online 
narrative in the form of the photographic image.  
Chalfen, suggests that there exists an assumption that the photograph represents a “real” moment 
captured (2002:141-149). In his opinion the onlooker of the photograph does not necessarily pay 
attention to the “shooting and editing practices” responsible for that preserved moment in the 
form of a photographic image (Chalfen 2002:141-142). The inception of digital photography has 
opened many avenues for the amateur photographer – virtually anyone with a digital camera has 
access to editing processes. This idea moves us away from the concept of “taking pictures” and 
brings us closer to the process of “making pictures” (Chalfen 2002:141). According to Brian 
Roberts digital photography provides its user with various possibilities for self-fashioning: 
technology enables us to “produce, store and retrieve” images effortlessly for “re-viewing” 
(2011:sp). As discussed in chapter two, re-viewing of the self as captured by the photographic 
image can become something of a ritual. Roberts insists that in such moments there is a process 
of “recognition” of the self in the photo as well as a moment of “re-cognition” (2011: sp). The 
latter refers to the narrative processes embedded in such a situation – reviewing the image of the 
self gives the individual the opportunity to “create continuity between past, present and imagined 
worlds” and to selectively initiate a process of narration which tells us “who we are” and to 
create, define and express our identities or “imagined ideal selves” (Ochs and Capps 
1996:19).Technical features inherent to modern SNSs and computer programs allow the 
individual to take it a step further and manipulate these images as desired in order to re-produce 
it (Roberts 2011: sp). 
Numerous theorists believe that we are constantly in the midst of narrating ourselves: we tell 
stories about ourselves, to ourselves and others in an attempt to situate ourselves within specific 
contexts and to make sense of ourselves situated in those contexts (boyd 2008 & 2010; Ochs & 
Capps 1996). According to Ochs and Capps narration becomes a means whereby to “apprehend 
experiences” and “navigate relationships with others” (1996:21). There is a sense that the process 
of narration is a necessary component that selves depend upon in order to produce not only 
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meaning and definition but also to essentially produce proof of the existence of that self – textual 
or visual narration in the form of photographs, home videos, diaries, letters, memoirs are all 
methods employed by the individual through which she can contextualize her experiences and 
gain perspective on how those experiences have shaped her specific identity (Ochs & Capps 
1996:21).  
We come here to another equally important aspect; if we are to believe that narration is firstly, a 
way for the self to shape and contextualize herself, and secondly, an utterly subjective account of 
a reality past, then surely it has the potential to also sometimes be a fictional invention of an 
imagined future. By looking at the following scenario, I dissect how certain imagined and 
eventually constructed illusions are virtually produced because of the technical features inherent 
to digitized cameras, computer programs and modern SNSs and how that can eventually 
contribute to the narration and subsequent documentation of the desired online self.  
In a photo that Yaniv Schulman drastically manipulates (or rather creates) the filmmakers 
illustrate the result of collaborative narration and subsequent documentation via imaginary 
processes. Throughout the film the viewer is privy to intimate correspondence between Yaniv 
Schulman and “Faccio”. A montage sequence is introduced in the beginning of the film in order 
to observe the escalation of their cyber courtship. The communication between Yaniv Schulman 
and “Faccio” gradually becomes more flirtatious and the content of their correspondence more 
sexual, culminating in the ultimate virtual, simulated fantasy: a digitally altered photo. I have 
established that the Lacanian perspective on the mirror-gazing self informs us that the ego (“ideal 
ego”) manifests itself within the imaginary of the self (Dashtipour 2009:323-324). It is crucial to 
comprehend that the self will never be able to “view herself fully”: the concept of self can only 
be made visible as constituted by the imagined gaze of the Other (Lacan 1986; Žižek 2002).As 
demonstrated throughout this thesis this dynamic implies the essential presence of an other. I 
have referred to Cooley‟s the “looking-glass-self” analogy that, similarly to Lacanian theory, 
functions on the basis that the “I” conceives of a concept of “self” by how she imagines an other 
to perceive her (Robinson 2007:95).Yaniv Schulman‟s visual documentation of the self online is 
created in order for the “I” to contextualize itself within the narrative of the “me”(Cooley 
1902:17; Ochs & Capps 1996:19-21). 
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In the previous section, I addressed the assumption that the photograph must be a “faithful 
record” of what the photographer sees through her lens; that the captured image “mirrors” reality 
(Roberts 2011: sp). Just as it is dangerous to assume authenticity when viewing the events 
unfolding in a documentary, neglecting to acknowledge the authoring agent of the film, just so it 
is vital to view the digitally altered photograph with critical assessment (Nichols 2011:100). In a 
virtual context where it is custom to take control of one‟s own visibility, Yaniv Schulman‟s 
creative actions are in accord with Chalfen‟s conviction that we have turned to “making” rather 
than “taking” photos (2002:142-144). Yaniv Schulman shows us how he goes about in this 
process. Throughout the documentary the filmmakers self-reflexively set Yaniv Schulman up as 
a creator: at the beginning of the film a chyron explains his professional position as photographer 
and the viewer often sees him with his camera equipment or in action, taking photos. Perhaps in 
this way the filmmakers are foreshadowing his journey towards self-reflexive filmmaker. 
In this scenario Yaniv Schulman attempts to create an image of him and “Faccio”. Naturally, 
geographical constraints prevent the couple from literally „being in the same room‟. But, that 
doesn‟t seem to stop him. The filmmakers show us how their subject goes about in creating a 
photo in which both he and “Faccio” are present. Subject, Yaniv Schulman, has access to 
“Faccio‟s” photos via Facebook25 and being a photographer the viewer can assume that he would 
have some sort of photo editing program on his computer. The filmmakers show us how he goes 
about in selecting a photo of “Faccio”. He then crops26, copies and pastes the photo onto an older 
photo of his. In this instance the filmmakers choose to focus the viewer‟s attention on the 
presence of the cursor with which he does his editing as it suggests a blatantly self-reflexive 
element. The result is seen in figure 6: Yaniv Schulman and “Faccio” in simulated reality. 
                                                          
25
This is important: a user has access to her fellow Facebook acquaintances’public photos. Not only might she view 
them, she is able to download them for her own personal usage. 
26
Regular photo editing programs provide the user with an option to “crop” a photo, meaning to trim the edges. I 
use the word here in order to indicate the cutting out of certain objects in a photo in order to be inserted in a 
different visual context. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 96 
G 
Figure 6 
The digitally altered photo of Yaniv Schulman and Megan Faccio. 
Revisiting Roberts‟ idea of the photograph as “mirror”, this cropped photo offers an interesting 
Lacanian occurrence (2011:sp). There are two semi-naked bodies next to each other in this 
photograph. Both subjects look at the camera lens. The amount of bare skin offers a suggestive 
touch to the image and while this visually created moment makes for what might have intended 
to be an intimate moment among the “couple”, a distance appears between the two mediated 
bodies forced, by technology, into the same space. The couple are essentially looking at “us”, 
their audience and not at each other. In this case, the audience initially consists of Yaniv 
Schulman and eventually “Faccio”, the other for whom he intends to exhibit this “artwork”. As 
the mediated couple stare out of the photo towards their maker, Yaniv Schulman, he is turned 
into other who looks back and must approve of his simulated creation. While the ideal intimacy 
the couple fantasize about is so far out of reach at that given moment, the mediated bodies 
become a perverted means whereby to access that fantasy, even if ironically virtual. Yaniv 
Schulman fittingly labels the email in which he sends “Faccio” the image, “Here‟s looking at 
you, kid”, referencing the 1942 film, Casablanca. The need to “look” becomes an important 
mechanism in this situation. Žižek‟s conviction is that “looking” verifies and proves existence 
(2002:225). He continues, stating that the appeal of the “fantasy” is not necessarily the fantasy 
itself but the presence of an observer to the fantasy (Žižek 2002:225-226). In other words, being 
the “object” of someone‟s fantasy is far more flattering than the actual fantasy. It is through the 
knowledge of someone watching that our existence is guaranteed; by gazing someone is 
“documenting” our existence. The logic is: “I exist insofar as I am looked at all the time” (Žižek 
2002:226).This digitally altered photo provides Yaniv Schulman with a “tangible” means 
whereby to realize an idealized fantasy-future where he is in a relationship with “Faccio”. This 
future event has been contextualised through previous virtual narration and in a desperate (or is it 
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narcissistic?) attempt to bring the idealized moment already written in the imaginary into being; 
a fake moment has to be created with the utilization of digital technology. Ironically, a moment 
captured in a photograph which has never existed and might never exist (as the viewer later finds 
out) is used as a mediator in order to get closer to a (imagined) reality. Here, the analogy with 
Antonioni‟s Blow-Up (1966) is powerfully illustrated: as the protagonist in this film attempts to 
get to the truth by blowing up his photograph, the farther away he actually is from it and the 
more fragmented and distorted his “reality” becomes. Similarly, Yaniv Sculman engineers an 
artificial moment which provides him with a readily accessible image that allows him to get 
closer to a fantasized truth. But the fantasy is in essence contrived and ultimately impossible. 
Therefore, the more Yaniv Schulman attempts to reach this imagined reality – which can only be 
reached by means of digital manipulation – the more he is perpetuating the virtual fantasy and 
the farther away he is from the truth.In this instance we are left with a moment hanging 
suspended in between the real and the virtual, mediated bodies sharing the same space, preserved 
by a photo that was never taken but created.  
Buying into the simulated illusion, Yaniv Schulman‟s imagined other, (“Faccio”), applauds his 
creation, stating; “Wow, we look good together”. This statement once again emphasizes the 
consequence of constructed visual narration and documentation. By stating that they “look” good 
together, “Faccio” inadvertently lays bare the methods behind creating desired visual 
impressions of the online fantasised self. The signs in this photo tell us that the couple are in an 
obviously intimate relationship, given the proximity of their bare bodies, and yet, the viewer of 
the film knows that they have never been in the same corporeal space. “Looking” good together 
seems to undermine whether they “are” good together in the sense of being a good couple. 
“Looking” good, informs the viewer of the fantasy, while being good together would refer to 
actual corporeal proximity. Her statement disregards whether they even “are” together, in the 
sense of ever having been in the same physical space. The visual, yet simulated, proof of Yaniv 
Schulman and “Faccio” making an ideal looking couple is far more significant as it feeds into the 
imagined fantasy which has been built on virtual intimacy up to this point. 
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4.4: CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I explored howfilmmakers, Ariel Schulman and Henry Joost, illustrate the result 
of collaborative documentation and narration via imaginary processes. They allow the viewer a 
glance into Yaniv Schulman‟simagination which he comes to realize within a simulated form. 
While documenting this, the filmmakers often engage self-reflexively with their subject: in turn 
laying bare the construction processes behind developing an identity for Yaniv Schulman as 
subject of the documentary as well as of his online self. The ubiquitous presence of observing 
others follows Yaniv Schulman‟s beyond the virtual environment (in which he selectively 
constructs an online self) and into the constraints of the mediated filmic self. Even as fellow 
documentarian he performs as he imagines he must according to the desire of the Big Other. 
Yaniv Schulmanmanipulates a photographic image of himself which receives complimentary 
reactions from his audience, “Faccio” (Wesselman-Pierce), which in turn feeds into his imagined 
concept of his desired self. But he also becomes an audience member of his own mediated 
performance and therefore critically engages with his own shared content. I have demonstrated 
how these images feed into what I believe these subjects imagine the Big Other desires.In this 
chapter I therefore specifically challenged the notion that the online photograph is a “real” 
representation and looked at how editing processes that are accessible to the masses with access 
to digital cameras and online editing programmes can construct virtual illusions and subsequent 
fantasized documentation of the desired online self.  
It is fitting that filmmakers, Schulman and Joost, should employ self-reflexive devices in a 
documentary that not only comments on film as construct but illuminates the self-reflexive 
construction processes of the mediated online self. The filmmakers additionally employ a 
mixture of representational strategies, from observational to participatory (while fundamentally 
adhering to self-reflexivity), that champion an often grainy, hand-held aesthetic quality. This 
merging of representational methods allows the filmmakers to comment on the notion of film as 
subjective construction which in turn thematically mirror Yaniv Schulman‟s own creative onlin 
endeavours. It also lays the foundation for the filmmakers‟ subject to engage, as a filmmaker 
might, with the construction processes involved in the representation of the film. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this thesis I have focused on the processes of self-documentation as represented in 
the documentary films, Four Eyed Monsters (2005), We Live in Public (2009) and Catfish 
(2005).In the three case studies I examined, subjects were projected against a backdrop of social 
and interactive, online environments, which encourage self-narration and subsequent auto-
documentation. The subjects‟ involvement in the filmmaking process provided the reader with a 
glance into the complex subject-filmmaker relationship. The dynamic of such a relationship, 
present in the construction process of a documentary film, raises questions about the authenticity 
of the representation. The filmmakers therefore utilize self-reflexive representational strategies in 
order to provide the viewer with a critical understanding of film as construct. These self-
reflexive signals shed light on the content documented in the films, and underscore the influence 
of subjectivity in the various mediated representations of the self. Drawing on theories of 
documentary form, I explored the idea that the subjects cannot be represented objectively, and 
can therefore not be viewed as separate from the filmmaking process, since they are so intimately 
engaged it. 
In addition I observed a preference for observational and participatory modes of representation 
and I argued that the presence of the filmmaker with her camera influences the authenticity of the 
filmed subject‟s behaviour. A clear correlation could be traced between the content documented 
in the various documentary films and the chosen forms of representation. The mainly self-
reflexive strategies not only draw the viewer‟s attention to filmic constructs, but also lay bare the 
contrived set-up of the mediated self within online environments. 
The documentary films are concerned with the interaction on SNSs between mediated bodies 
that produce content, but are also the content produced. The modern SNSs documented in the 
different films, such as Facebook, (fictional) online dating sites and personal surveillance 
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webcam sites, provide a milieu where democratic and mutual gazing and subsequent 
collaborative impression management is the convention. This kind of environment presupposes 
sociality and therefore the presence of virtual others is assumed. Awareness of this gazing, 
potentially interactive other, places great pressure on the self to construct and produce an online 
identity according to the Lacanian imagined desires of the Other. In the films, the viewer is able 
to witness the self-reflexive identity construction processes of the subjects, which assist them in 
producing and documenting a desired mediated self. By referring to Hille Koskela and Nathan 
Jurgenson I examined gazing hierarchies as framed by panoptic and omnioptic surveillance 
models. These surveillance theories allowed for a better understanding of the manner in which 
the visibility of the self functions in social online environments, where the omnipresent other is 
always lurking and gazing. I considered how hierarchical panoptic surveillance structures have 
developed into mutual surveillance structures online. Although the modern social surveillance 
model liberates the mediated self in that she is in control of her own visibility, in contrast to one-
sided hierarchical gazing, I argue that the self is forced to be very conscious of how she shares 
content about the self. This leads the mediated self to consciously manage an impression of her 
mediated self, aware always that there exists an other who observes. 
Elucidating the complicated dynamics of gazing-hierarchies, self-narration and subsequent self-
documentation via social mediation online (as documented by subject-filmmakers) I provided a 
theoretical framework that exposes the dual role of producer-consumer, or the “prosumer”. 
Online, the (desired mediated image of) the self can be both the content produced and consumed 
by others and the self as other. I evoked Jaques Lacan‟s concept of the mirror-gazing self and the 
Big Other, in order to explain this very dynamic. Participative gazing societies within social 
mediated platforms where selves are made visible to look at while looking (at the visible image 
of self and at images made visible of others by others) presents the self with a mirror-screen into 
which she can gaze. This gazing practise can initiate imaginary processes of self re-cognition and 
subsequent re-editing of the image of the self until it matches her ideal as she imagines her 
audience desires to perceives her.  
Socially mediated mutual gazing societies are at the centre of these self-reflexive documentaries, 
which again explicates the multifaceted role of the subject-filmmaker who does not merely 
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participate in complex gazing societies online, but is also challenged to portray the double role of 
both producer and consumer of her own constructed filmic image of self.  
Chapter two considered the hybrid representational methods the filmmakers use in Four Eyed 
Monsters (2005) permitting them to elucidate their roles as not only authoring agents but as self-
reflexive subjects, actively partaking in the construction of their mediated images. Arin Crumley 
and Susan Buice include re-enactments, as well as what appears to be “real” behind the scenes 
footage, in their filmic representation of a personal history. The filmmakers employ a mixture of 
representational methods that blend together autobiographical documentary, re-enactments, 
animation, montage sequences, re-staged drama with a self-reflexive undertone spliced together 
with what seems to be real „behind-the-scenes footage‟. The aesthetic style remains grainy and 
hand-held, reminiscent of the cinema vérité movements. Here the viewer becomes very critical, 
as she is made aware from the outset that the filmmakers are not only performing the roles of the 
subjects but are in fact re-telling a personal tale via filmic means. This knowledge serves in 
highlighting the dilemma of authenticity that the subject-filmmaker faces during auto-
documentation. This film attempts to document how individual users utilize online media in 
order to fashion desired virtual selves. Within the confines of the fictional online dating site, the 
filmmakers set themselves up as objects of the gaze of an other, and manage their online 
identities accordingly. Buice and Crumley are fundamentally turned into each others‟ Lacanian 
Big Other as they gaze at one another through various lenses, screens and mirrors. These subjects 
“look” at one another (and at the image of their mediated self) both as subjects and as 
filmmakers. In other words, the subject-filmmaker binary relationship permits the viewer to 
understand that in this specific case the subject of the film actually bears the ultimate gaze and 
constructs the way in which she (as subject) is represented. In order to emphasize their role as 
authoring agents, Buice and Crumley allow their camera to become an integral part of the 
reflexive production process, constantly signalling to the viewer that they, as subjects and as 
filmmakers, are essentially aware of what the camera represents, namely the Other. The presence 
of the camera also signifies their role as filmmakers. They use the camera provocatively, 
documenting their relationship and corresponding only through overtly mediated forms, which 
allow them to portray constructed versions of their imagined selves. In an exaggerated sense, 
these subjects are only ever seen the way they imagine the Other sees them, and we view them as 
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they are engaged in collaborative self-construction processes. Essentially this film draws the 
viewer‟s attention towards the subjective nature of narrative. 
In chapter three I explored the film We Live in Public (2009) and the advent of personal webcam 
surveillance, which can challenge traditional hierarchical gazing practises and allow the viewer 
to consider notions of omnioptic visibility. The subject of the film, Josh Harris, challenges 
traditional hierarchical gazing models in that he willingly makes his mediated self visible and 
viewable to the masses (others). But unfortunately gazing is not democratic in this environment, 
for although Harris liberates himself from the constraints of what is conventionally considered to 
be private, he is not able to gaze at his collective audience the way they gaze at him. On the 
contrary, he is rather only able to see himself the way online others looks at him, becoming an 
audience member of his own mediated performance of the self. Harris is severely influenced by 
the presence of his audience and although they are able to interact via online text with him it is 
important to note that they do not have to do this. In fact, they might merely silently observe as a 
voyeur does. In this instance, Harris is truly faced with himself as other in front of the mirror of 
the screen, isolated and in a Lacanian sense dependent on how he imagines the Other is seeing 
him. Filmmaker Ondi Timoner subtly makes use of self-reflexive techniques in order to 
emphasize Harris‟ own involvement with his personal documentation of the self, which turns 
him into a pseudo surveillance documentarian. While Four Eyed Monsters (2005) considers the 
relationship of subjects who are also filmmakers, in this film there exists a different connection 
between the subject and the filmmaker who observes him. Timoner predominantly remains an 
observer. The self-reflexive moments assist her in her portrayal of Harris as an observer of his 
own mediated image. While the documentation we see of Harris is produced by Timoner, who 
states her role as an authoring agent from the outset with the aid of expository representational 
modes, Harris himself presides in his own constructed world of cameras. Here he is both the 
content produced and the one producing the content (of himself). Timoner‟s presence as 
documentarian and her self-reflexive representational methods raise awareness of her 
representation as constructed, and provide commentary on Harris‟s own self-reflexive 
surveillance endeavours. Harris is both the observed and the observer of his own mediated 
image. He is faced with a challenge: he must oscillate between the roles of authoring producer, 
and subject (mediated image) produced. And while he seems to be in control of his own 
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visibility, he does not have control over the perception (even if imagined) of the ever-present 
gazing other. 
In chapter four, I examined the film, Catfish (2010), in which I demonstrated how the mediated 
self often engages in mutual visibility practises with others online. In online environments, the 
self is made visible to be looked at, while simultaneously looking back. Catfish (2005)documents 
the subject, Yaniv Schulman, who becomes romantically involved with an online other on the 
SNS, Facebook. This SNS provides its user with the opportunity to create an ever-evolving 
narrative, going back and forth, editing and re-editing information about the self. This process 
supports the theme of the film which attempts to highlight self-reflexive processes of self-
documentation. The online self is acutely aware of the very present other online, affecting the 
creation of that self according to imaginary constraints. In this film, Wesselman-Pierce pretends 
to be Megan Faccio, and thus becomes Yaniv Schulman‟s romantic (virtual) other. Wesselman-
Pierce shapes her online characters according to how she imagines Yaniv Schulman‟s desires. 
Similarly, I argued that Yaniv Schulman is also caught amid the virtual charade and follows suit 
in his own constructed way: at one point even manipulating a photograph to adhere to what he 
and “Faccio” have imagined their virtual courtship to be. By referring to the notion of visual 
identity construction I made the analogy that the screen becomes a mirror. The self faces her 
reflection in this mirror and observes both the self and herself as other. She is both “object” and 
“subject” (Roberts 2011). For me, the mediated (carefully selected) photographic online image 
“reflects” as a mirror might. But here, the individual is able to maintain a desired identity 
through accessible editing processes. While the self creates with the omnipresent Big Other in 
mind, it is vital to note that she also portrays the role of audience to her own performance.  
The presence of others follows Yaniv Schulman beyond the confines of the virtual and into the 
filmic realm, where he has progressed from subject to filmmaker. Here, too, he invites the 
imagined Other to partake in the documentation of his experience and witness his performed, 
mediated existence. As a self-reflexive filmmaker he documents Wesselman-Pierce‟s family, the 
same way Henry Joost and Ariel Schulman had been documenting him up until that point. Joost 
and Schulman tend to oscillate between methods reminiscent of the participative and 
observational modes – often disappearing from the action in front of the camera as a „fly-on-the-
wall‟ might. Indeed, the aesthetic quality of the film often reminds the viewer of the direct 
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cinema and cinema vérité – two different film movements that maintained similar stylistic 
choices with long takes and hand-held camera movements. But I would argue that the film is 
more participatory due to its strong self-reflexive tendencies. This in turn signals not only the 
filmmakers‟ roles as authoring documentarians but sheds light on Yaniv Schulman and 
“Faccio‟s” online expedition of self-construction. 
In the diverse online environments documented in the three films discussed, the subjects portray 
a variety of roles, ranging from mediated performer to auto-documentarian and online narrator. 
My discussion was concerned with two main focus points. First, I investigated the construction 
and subsequent documentation of the mediated online self. Second, I reminded the reader that 
ultimately I was faced with the filmic documentary representation of documented online selves. I 
believe that this notion is ultimately core to our understanding of these documentaries and makes 
me reconsider the audience contract once more. As I demonstrated in chapter one, viewers often 
assume that a given representation is authentic, neglecting to recognize that the filmmaker is an 
authoring agent who selectively interprets for her audience what is “real”. The viewer of these 
films is often blatantly exposed to self-reflexive methods, and compelled to recognize how 
technical features are utilized by subjects to achieve a certain ideal image of the self online. 
Thematically, this kind of self-reflexivity is mirrored in the filmic representation, making the 
viewer so much more aware of the constructed nature of the documentary form. I concluded that 
the documented individuals took on the (often complicated) role of subject-filmmaker, as their 
involvement in the filmmaking process grew to varying degrees. The dual role of subject-
filmmaker entailed that the filmic representations necessarily included self-reflexive indicators in 
order to demonstrate the position of an authoring agent who bears the ultimate gaze. 
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